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Michel Foucault is criticized for offering an account of power that leaves no room for the 
freedom of individuals.  This dissertation will provide an account of freedom that is 
compatible with Foucault’s descriptions of the operation of power and its role in the 
constitution of the subject.  First, I clarify Foucault’s own distinction between power and 
domination, the conflation of which has been the primary source of criticism of his social 
theory.  With this distinction in hand, I address the apparent break in Foucault’s middle 
and late periods, which, respectively, describe human beings as constituted by power on 
the one hand and as having the reflective critical capacities necessary for self-
transformation on the other.  I then explore Foucault’s criticism of the modern concept of 
autonomy, which he believes to be inherited from the Enlightenment and, more 
specifically, Kant.  Finally, I argue that Foucault does not dispense with the concept of 
freedom as autonomy altogether, but instead must embrace a concept of social freedom, 
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 The mainstream Anglo-American philosophical tradition has only recently begun 
to break away from an unfortunate caricature of Michel Foucault’s accounts of power and 
subject formation in which life in contemporary Western society is a state of perpetual 
domination from which individuals are helpless to escape.  But for many Foucault 
scholars, this caricature is startling and even bizarre.  In the first place, this pessimistic 
view is contradicted by Foucault’s own politically engaged life.  Furthermore, it seems 
unlikely that Foucault would dedicate such time and care to writing about domination and 
freedom only to declare that the former is inescapable and the latter an impossible ideal. 
 The problem, as I see it, stems from confusion regarding Foucault’s use of the 
terms ‘power’, ‘domination’, ‘resistance’, and ‘freedom’.  This confusion is no doubt 
fueled by Foucault’s own lack of clear, systematic definitions of these terms.  Moreover, 
Foucault devotes significantly more time to the discussion of domination than he does to 
the discussion of freedom in modern contexts.  His most notable analyses of freedom 
focus on the ancient Greek ethics of the care of the self, on the one hand, and a criticism 
of the Enlightenment concept of autonomy, on the other.  Readers are therefore left to 
speculate as to what freedom from modern forms of domination could be on Foucault’s 
account. 
 While the guiding question of this dissertation is “What is Foucauldian 
freedom?,” the related terms, ‘power’, ‘domination’, and ‘resistance’ must be defined and 
distinguished from their use in other well-known contexts.  This work is done not only 
for the sake of entering into contemporary debates in Foucault scholarship, or to put 
Foucault into conversation with other contemporary social philosophers, but because a 
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rehabilitation of Foucault’s works will provide useful conceptual tools for the real work 
of social criticism. 
 Chapter 1 begins by defining two senses of ‘Foucauldian power’.  On one level, 
power is an emergent property of interactions among individuals in which one action 
motivates another.  On the broader societal level, ‘power’ refers to the systematic self-
organization of behavior that arises from these interactions and, in turn, reinforces 
particular behaviors.  In other words, power helps to establish norms that serve to explain 
and justify the ways in which some actions motivate others.  Power, as the ways in which 
we influence each other by reference to a norm, is therefore a ubiquitous fact of social 
life. 
 All too often, ‘domination’ has been taken to be synonymous with ‘power’ on 
Foucault’s account.  No doubt the persistence of this conflation – which stems from 
works like Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 – has contributed to 
the longevity of the Foucault caricature that life in contemporary Western society is 
perpetual domination.  However, Foucault clarifies in later works that domination is a 
subset of power relations.  Domination is a state in which asymmetrical power relations 
have become fixed, whereas power relations generally considered are mobile, reversible, 
and fluid. 
 Thus far, this discussion of power and domination has been abstract and 
schematic.  While Chapter 1 helps to fill in some of the details by the use of concrete 
examples, Chapter 2 sheds further light on the concept of power by examining the 
relationship between power and the subject.  The relationship in question is that of 
constitution.   
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The subject is constituted by power in two senses.  In the first place, the subject is 
constituted by power insofar as a subject is the kind of being that can be responsive to 
normative frameworks and social strategies for organizing behavior.  This is a conceptual 
claim that a subject is only a subject when considered within relations of power, as a 
member of society (as opposed to, say, as a biological entity).  But the more interesting 
and more important sense in which the subject is constituted by power is captured in a set 
of interdependent ontological and psychological claims – that power categorizes 
individuals, makes their actions intelligible, and attaches them to their identities.  In other 
words, what subjects are, what they take themselves to be, and how they relate to 
themselves are largely the products of the power relations in which they have been 
socialized.  Naturally, the kind of subject produced by power will vary depending on the 
forms of power that operate in different historical contexts. 
With these basic definitions in hand, Chapter 2 begins to address two senses of 
‘freedom’ that Foucault has been accused of denying: agency and autonomy.  In the first 
place, it has been argued that Foucault’s middle period genealogies of the mid- to late-
1970s rule out the subject’s choice of action because actions are prescribed by power.  I 
argue instead that agency is in fact presupposed by Foucault’s accounts of power and the 
subject.  Conceptually, if subjects are the kinds of things that can be responsive to social 
norms, then there must be a set of available possibilities for their actions in order for the 
norm to play any meaningful role in shaping those actions.  Furthermore, Foucault’s 
works are rife with examples of agents interpreting norms and deliberating about how 
best to act in light of them. 
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 Although the concept of autonomy is introduced in Chapter 2, it is more fully 
explored in Chapter 3.  Here, I distinguish the Enlightenment concept of autonomy – of 
which Foucault is critical – from a broader sense of autonomy as self-direction.  Foucault 
demonstrates the ways in which an Enlightenment concept of autonomy has restricted our 
understanding of ourselves as subjects and even led to new forms of domination that 
often go unnoticed.  Perhaps the most important Foucauldian insight on this point is that 
the Enlightenment concept of the autonomous subject leaves no room for the thought that 
subjects are historically constituted and therefore may be constituted differently in 
different historical contexts.  More succinctly, the Enlightenment concept does not 
recognize itself as the product of a particular configuration of power and knowledge.  
Therefore, I argue that Foucault’s works are designed to detach us from this 
Enlightenment concept of ourselves, to prompt us to reconsider what we are as subjects, 
and to open a space for new possible relationships between the subject and power.  In this 
way, Foucault promotes a kind of freedom of imagination, a freedom to imagine “the 
possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.”1  
However, states of domination will not be dismantled through the freedom of 
imagination alone.  Freedom of imagination is not yet enough to fill the role of the kind 
of socially embedded autonomy that could serve as a more adaptable notion of freedom, 
applicable in and responsive to differing social contexts.  What we need is a concept of 
autonomy that also makes reference to the conditions of both its own formation and 
realization in the world.  With such a concept, we will have provided for Foucault a 
definition of freedom that refers not only to a capacity of the subject but to a state of the 
                                                
 1 Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment” in The Essential Foucault, ed. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas 
Rose (New York: The New Press, 2003), 54. 
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world.  Only such a concept could serve as the proper opposite of ‘domination’ as earlier 
defined.  It is at this point that Foucauldian insights direct us beyond Foucault to the 
Hegelian tradition that possesses just such a concept of autonomy. 
In particular, Axel Honneth has expanded Hegel’s concept of recognition as a 
way to fill the gap between the autonomous will and the world in which that will is to be 
realized.  I argue that the concept of recognition plays a crucial, though implicit, role in 
Foucault’s analyses of power and the subject.  Before we begin to see the ethical role that 
recognition could play for Foucault, it is important to draw out the role of the ontological 
concept of recognition, which I argue Foucault has unwittingly presupposed. 
The ontological concept of recognition states that it is recognition that constitutes 
the subject and distinguishes the human subject from animals in the natural environment.  
Here, recognition is the social feedback that forms the psychological makeup and the 
practical identity of individuals.  The idea that social recognition is constitutive of the 
formation of a practical identity is remarkably similar to the relationship that Foucault 
describes between power and the subject.  What’s more, the Hegelian idea that we have a 
need for recognition plays an explanatory role for Foucault.  It is this need that explains 
how power is able to get a hold on us and to attach us to the identities by which we are 
recognized.  It is the need for recognition that drives us to conform to the same norms as 
those to which our peers adhere and to value what they value.   
In addition to helping to explain some of the phenomena Foucault describes, the 
ontological concept of recognition can also help to temper some of Foucault’s more 
radical statements about resistance.  Foucault has been criticized, for example, for calling 
for a radical desubjectivation of the subject.  Such a desubjectivation would amount to a 
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rejection of any socially recognized identity on the grounds that such identities are 
inherently dominating.2  The need for recognition in order to achieve the status of full-
fledged personhood explains and justifies the intuition we may feel that this is too radical 
an ideal, perhaps even an impossible ideal.  Instead, such Foucauldian statements as, “we 
must refuse what we are”3 should be recast in light of the concept of recognition as a call 
to rid ourselves of these identities, to give ourselves license to experiment with others. 
With the ontological concept of recognition then already implied, it is not a far 
leap to imagine that Foucault’s works leave room for an ethical concept of recognition as 
well.  On an ethical concept of recognition, to recognize a subject with respect to a 
particular feature (e.g. as an autonomous subject) is not only to admit that s/he has this 
feature, but also to positively appraise h/er for having it.  Ethical recognition is linked to 
freedom on Honneth’s account in virtue of the fact that our autonomous wills are not 
realizable in the world without reference to the autonomous wills of other subjects.  Put 
simply, it is mutual recognition that ensures the cooperation necessary for the realization 
of social freedom.  Honneth therefore concludes that “freedom bears the institutional 
structure of an interaction, for it is only by recognizing their mutual dependency that 
individuals can achieve their respective aims.”4  Such a link between freedom and 
interaction is wholly appropriate to the Foucauldian framework that takes both power and 
domination to be emergent properties of interactions.  We can retain the spirit of 
                                                
 2 Judith Butler rightly notes that such a view is problematic on Hegelian grounds in Judith Butler, The 
Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 20. 
 
 3 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 216. 
 
 4 Axel Honneth, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundation of Democratic Life, trans. Joseph Ganahl 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 46. 
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Honneth’s observation while translating it into Foucauldian language by saying that 
freedom is the state that emerges from successful acts of resistance. 
Acts of resistance, then, are acts that aim to expand the borders of acceptable, 
socially recognized forms of subjecthood or ways of life.  The state of freedom that is 
brought about by acts of resistance is one in which individuals possess and exercise 
socially embedded autonomy insofar as they not only possess their freedom of 
imagination, but are also recognized and legitimated in translating their imaginings into 
conduct. 
That such definitions of ‘freedom’ and ‘resistance’ may appear anarchic or 
narcissistic is perhaps not unexpected, as these are criticisms often leveled against 
Foucault’s views.  However, we should not be put off by these ideas before we have 
discovered the role they are to play in an ethical and political theory.  Recall that 
domination, as a state in which asymmetrical power relations have become fixed, does 
not rely on any particular configuration of social institutions.  Instead, there is a danger, 
according to Foucault, that any set of institutions and social norms may promote states of 
domination.  He says that we must perform a constant checking of our present historical 
circumstance, to continually ask ourselves if we have failed to notice the development 
new forms of domination.5  Indeed, with this thought Foucault can also help to inform 
recognition theory by noting the potential dangers of too limiting a set of possible 
identities deemed worthy of recognition.  For this reason then, Foucault cannot himself 
prescribe new systems of institutions that would ensure our freedom, but must instead 
insist on a metaethico-political openness principle that allows for this constant checking 
                                                
 5 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 209 and Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics” in 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 231-2. 
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to be performed not only in the minds of philosophers and social critics but also at the 
real borders of our ways of life.  Hence we can make sense of Foucault’s enigmatic 
statement that “ethics,” as a way of life, “is a practice of freedom.”6  These concepts of 
resistance and freedom need not amount to an “anything goes” kind of ethics or politics, 
but instead serve to combat social stagnation and promote change in the direction of 

































                                                
 6 Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Foucault Live, 




Power and Domination 
 
The genealogical works of Michel Foucault’s “middle period,” roughly from 1970 
to the late 1970s, are primarily concerned with providing what he calls “an analytics of 
power.”1 Such a study rethinks traditional conceptions of power – as a commodity, as 
residing in the form of the law, as prohibition, etc.  Though Foucault is not concerned 
with providing a “theory of power,” that is, a metaphysical account of what power is, he 
is interested in examining the variety of technologies and points of application of power – 
how and where power functions.2  I take it that in denying that he provides a ‘theory’ of 
power, Foucault intends to reject two related ideas about what constitutes a theory.  In the 
first place, Foucault is clear that he does not provide a metaphysical concept of power in 
the sense of describing an ahistorical form of power that operates apart from its 
particular, historically variable instances.  Secondly, we must avoid the thought that what 
is at stake is a purely theoretical discussion of power, abstracted from the reality of 
political struggle and the practical motivation for said discussion.  To reject the label of 
‘theory’ is not to strip the concept of power of its critical force, but instead to focus on 
the analytic3 of power insofar as this involves inquiry into the everyday modes of power’s 
operation. 
Across his genealogical works, Foucault contributes to this analytics of power by 
way of concrete examples of power’s operation and negative descriptions that contrast his 
                                                
 1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 
1990), 82. 
 
 2 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978, 
trans. Graham Burchell, ed. Arnold Davidson (New York: Picador, 2007), 1. 
 
3 I take Foucault to be using this term in roughly the same sense that Heidegger writes of the existential 
analytic of Dasein, which takes as its starting point Dasein’s everyday modes of being. 
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model of power with traditional characterizations.  While, on almost any reading, the 
most significant impact of Foucault’s account of power is to change the conceptions we 
take for granted, his account is unfortunately easily misunderstood.  Foucault is criticized 
for giving an analysis of power that is too one-sided and pessimistic, as well as for 
discounting the role of individuals in creating and perpetuating dominating imbalances of 
power.  In what follows, I hope to provide an alternative interpretation of Foucault’s 
analytics of power that would make it maximally plausible while remaining faithful to 
Foucault’s own writings on the matter.  Such an endeavor will demonstrate that Foucault 
is only describing one sense of the term “power” – a largely new sense in that the form of 
power he describes has gone relatively unnoticed.  I will demonstrate that other kinds of 
power – e.g. judicial power, power to accomplish a task, the power one person has over 
another, etc. – are not ruled out by Foucault’s account.  Rather, he chooses to focus on 
the particular concept of power that he finds most dangerous precisely because it can 
operate surreptitiously.  Discovering what’s right in his account is of the utmost 
importance because this “Foucauldian power” shapes individuals and societies, often by 
means of an internally inconsistent logic of its operation as well as in ways that are 
inimical to common values, such as a right to privacy and control of our own minds and 
bodies. 
 Though most of Foucault’s writing about power takes the form of either negative 
description or examples of power’s operation, there are moments when a positive account 
is attempted.  A thorough treatment of Foucault’s analytics of power will coherently 
incorporate all three of these elements.  In reconstructing the account, we will find that 
what I am calling “Foucauldian power” is, at the most general level of description, the 
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self-organization of behavior.  I begin by looking at Foucault’s later works, particularly 
the essay “The Subject and Power,” which serves as the afterword to Dreyfus and 
Rabinow’s 1982 collection, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics.  
It is in this later work that Foucault gives positive descriptions in response to the 
question, “How is power exercised?”  First constructing an account of what power is will 
help to make sense of his remarks about what power isn’t.  In particular, this will clarify 
his most explicit early descriptions of power that are found in texts from 1975-6 at the 
heart of his genealogical period, most notably, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1.  
Throughout, care will be taken to ensure that this interpretive work at the abstract level 
does not conflict with Foucault’s analyses of concrete examples of the operation of 
power.  Taking these two works as starting points will reveal a coherent interpretation of 
power that spans the course of his genealogical and ethical writings. 
 Methodologically, looking across Foucault’s works to find a common concept of 
power may appear to be in tension with a fact that I have already acknowledged, namely, 
that Foucault avoided explicitly undertaking such an endeavor himself.  I have already 
claimed that each of Foucault’s works of the genealogical period explores the operation 
of power in a different context, and what’s more, the later works (of which “The Subject 
and Power” is a part) introduce new forms of power previously unmentioned in 
Foucault’s middle period.  However, the aim of my interpretive project is not to provide 
the theory of power that Foucault avoids for practical and political reasons.  Instead, my 
aim is to clear away the confusions that arise from interpretations that take any one of 
Foucault’s works to be providing just such a theory.  It is that sort of interpretive project 
that has led, for example, to the idea that we are all in an inescapable state of domination, 
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or to the idea that there is a radical break between Foucault’s middle and late periods that 
makes them incommensurable.  My own interpretive project relies on some of the few 
statements that Foucault makes about the general concept of power, especially the 
general claim that power is historically variable.  Rather than providing an ahistorical 
theory of power and its operation, I seek out the qualities of family resemblance that 
enable Foucault to continue speaking in terms of power while respecting differences 
across historical contexts.  In addition to the general claim that the operation of power 
takes a variety of forms, there are a number of features that appear across historical 
contexts, e.g. the self-organization of behavior, a relationship between power and the 
norm, and an element of strategy.  It is these common features that allow us to see the 
breadth of Foucault’s concept of power, to understand the relationship between the 
middle and late periods of his work, and to clarify the concept of domination for which 
we seek an opposing concept of freedom. 
 So, to begin with the general description of power found in “The Subject and 
Power,” we are told that power should be thought of in terms of government, in the 
broadest sense, designating “the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups 
might be directed.”  Foucault makes the further remark that we should note the dual 
meaning of “conduct” – as both a verb meaning “to lead others” and a noun meaning “a 
way of behaving.”4  Power leads the actions of individuals; it is not applied directly to 
individuals, but to their actions.  A relationship of power is defined as “an action upon 
                                                
 4 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 





action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or future.”5  As 
power only exists when one action shapes another, power is not a commodity; it is not 
something that people have, rather it is something that happens in interaction.  
Furthermore, the sense in which one action shapes another should not be thought of in 
terms of necessitation, but instead, in terms of motivation.  Power, then, is a way of 
directing the actions of individuals and groups through a field of possibilities, and it 
arises at the point at which one action motivates another.  
However, power is not present in every interaction among individuals; to say so 
would spread the notion of power too thinly.  For example, I might decide on a nice 
spring day to go read in Central Park.  After a while, I find my reading disturbed by 
children playing noisily nearby.  Wanting to continue my work in peace, I decide to 
leave.  The actions of the children have certainly influenced my action of leaving, but this 
is not an example of the operation of power.  What distinguishes this interaction from a 
relation of power is that it does not enter into an action-guiding system of regularities.  
On the one hand, when I sit down to read in Central Park, there is no expectation that my 
chosen location will remain quiet, nor any rule, either implicit or explicit, which says that 
it should.  On the other hand, there is likewise no such rule against my reading in Central 
Park.  In this case, neither the children playing nor my leaving enters into a system in 
which any of us are led to believe we should behave differently.  What is most important 
in distinguishing this example from cases in which power is operating is that power is 
normatively action guiding. 
 Foucault is careful, in this later work, to distinguish a variety of ways in which 
this guiding of actions can take place.  One way is certainly via verbal communication.  
                                                
 5 Ibid., 219. 
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We can be asked, commanded, persuaded, or verbally threatened into a way of behaving.  
Such communicative actions are part of discourse, which is, roughly, a system of 
relations between signs, objects, and subjects.  However, relations of power do not only 
emerge out of discourse.  In fact, it is arguable that in his genealogical period, Foucault is 
more interested in non-discursive relations of power.  This might include something like 
the arrangement of desks in a classroom, whether the teacher is standing or sitting, etc.  
Such non-discursive elements influence the perceptions and subsequently the behavior of 
both student and teacher, as for example the teacher standing may implicitly carry more 
authority and discourage misbehavior, as does the traditional arrangement of desks in 
rows so that each student can be monitored.  Such relations of power are sometimes quite 
subtle and may even go unnoticed.  On the other hand, coercion by physical force – 
where it enters into a system of regularities – is a relation of power that is both non-
discursive and obvious.  Such obvious cases of the emergence of power are not the focus 
for Foucault.  Instead, he chooses to describe relations of power that arise subtly and are 
reinforced socially, as in the case of following norms of behavior. 
 Foucault is particularly interested in putative norms that are not explicitly 
codified, but nonetheless widely accepted.  The earlier example of the arrangement of 
chairs in a classroom may be guided by one such norm.  Hubert Dreyfus discusses a 
similar kind of norm, that of “distance standing.”6  Consider the appropriate distance to 
maintain from your interlocutor when having a conversation.  There is no explicit rule 
about how close is too close, yet there is widespread agreement in the behavior of 
individuals within a culture regarding the appropriate distance.  As Dreyfus says, “the 
                                                




sense of appropriate distance was passed on to us by our parents and peers who didn’t 
know that they had the practice.  They just felt uneasy and backed away when we stood 
too close and moved closer when they felt we were too far away, and now we do the 
same.”7  There are strong social norms that govern distance standing practices; they are 
even quite fine-grained, as Dreyfus points out that the norm changes depending on with 
whom you are speaking (standing closer to loved ones, farther from someone with a 
cold), where you are speaking (standing closer when whispering in a library), etc.8  These 
cases demonstrate how detailed and refined the norms surrounding distance standing 
practices actually are.  And yet, Dreyfus is also quite right that these norms were 
reinforced by people who “didn’t know that they had the practice.”  These practices, for 
the most part, go completely unnoticed until someone violates the norm.  If speaking to a 
“close talker”, we may even back up throughout a conversation, only noticing that we’ve 
done so when we find ourselves in a different part of the room.  Foucault is most 
interested in the operation of power in cases such as these, when actions enter into a 
system of regularities that guides our actions through the use of an accepted, yet implicit, 
norm. 
We should take care for a moment to be precise about the role of norms.  
According to Foucault, the norm is defined by its role in legitimizing power.9  As a “rule 
of conduct,”10 the norm recalls Foucault’s emphasis on the double meaning of leading 
actors through a field of possible behaviors.  The norm is not itself an action, but a 
                                                
 7 Ibid. 
 
 8 Ibid., 108. 
 9 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975, trans. Graham Burchell, 
ed. Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni (New York: Picador, 2003), 50. 
 




principle that helps explain and justify the ways in which some actions shape others.  
Additionally, the norm serves to impose “functional regularity” within a population, as it 
categorizes actions as either “normal” or “abnormal”.11  The norm operates both on the 
level of “discipline” encouraging the “normal” behavior of individuals and on the level of 
“regulation” which pertains to the maintenance of a healthy population.12  Thus, though 
not an action itself, the norm prescribes both the ways in which actions “should” shape 
other actions and the categorization of these actions. 
 This brief sketch of the norm helps us to see that there is a logic to the operation 
of power; it can be rationalized, both in the sense of offering justification and in the sense 
of being understood.  In recognizing that there is a logic behind power, we stumble upon 
Foucault’s most persistently maintained characterization of power as always involving an 
element of strategy.  The concept of strategy is explicated in “The Subject and Power” as 
a response to the question raised above as to the means of power’s operation.  Here, 
Foucault considers “situations of confrontation – war or games” as a specific relation of 
power that brings to light three different understandings of “strategy”: 
1) a means to an end 
2) consideration of the thoughts of “the other” 
3) a procedure to deprive “the other” of his means of combat.13 
All three of these possible meanings of “strategy” require further explanation, and 
looking to Foucault’s early descriptions of power can help make sense of how they might 
                                                
 11 Ibid. 
 
 12 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, trans. 
David Macey, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, English Series ed. Arnold I. Davidson (New 
York: Picador, 1997), 253. 




pertain not only to explicit struggles, but to relations of power more generally.  In the first 
place, using the framework of strategy found in the later works helps to uncover 
particular features of the operation of disciplinary power found in the middle period.  At 
the same time, the examples found in the middle period provide more concrete content 
with which to understand better the description of power as strategy in the later works. 
 It is only the first sense of strategy that Foucault says is generally applicable to 
power relations.  Considering strategy as a means to an end reinforces the idea that power 
has an aim.  Foucault emphasizes this feature of power when he says that it is always 
“intentional,”14 that is, power always has an object, an action that it seeks to modify.  The 
idea that power has an aim should be understood on both the individual and societal 
levels.  On the level of interactions between individuals, it is easy enough to imagine that 
I have a goal in mind when I act in such a way as to produce a specific response from 
you.  However, Foucault’s main interest in power is at the broader social level, on which 
the actions of multiple subjects result in a systematic effect on the actions of others, or 
even their own actions.  Foucault describes the strategy of power on this level as “the 
totality of the means put into operation to implement power effectively or to maintain 
it.”15  Here, he echoes his earlier remarks in The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, in which he 
says that “power” “is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a 
particular society.”16  On this societal level, then, we can still speak of power having an 
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aim – the aim of preventing incest, or sex between minors, or sex outside of marriage, to 
take a few examples from The History of Sexuality Vol. 1.   
Although in such cases power may be said to be intentional, it is also, on this 
level, “non-subjective,” which is to say that although there may be a distinct aim, that aim 
does not necessarily belong to anyone in particular.17  The sum total of relations of power 
may add up to a clear, systematic effect on the societal level without any individual actors 
intending (in the colloquial sense) to produce such an effect, and often even without their 
considering the fact that such an effect is being produced.  “The logic is perfectly clear, 
the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented 
[tactics of power], and few who can be said to have formulated them…”18  Note, 
however, that it is only “often the case” that power is anonymous, and that this does not 
rule out that there are individual actors employing tactics for their individual aims; but 
even when such actors employ deliberate tactics, it is rarer still that any of them should 
know what the sum total of their effects of power will be on the broader societal level.19  
Foucault does not rule out instances of individuals deliberately acting in such a way as to 
exercise power over others; rather, he chooses to emphasize that on the societal, and 
indeed, even on the individual level, power may be non-subjective, for example, as can 
be seen in the case of following a norm by rote without attending to the effects it may 
have on the actions of others.  The systematic effects of power are rarely deliberate. 
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Understanding that the effects of power most often do not arise by design 
elucidates the definition of power with which we began: the self-organization of 
behavior.  The logic of power’s operation, the deciphering of clear aims when one action 
motivates another, is not given prior to the actions themselves.  Rather, relations of power 
can find support in one another “forming a chain or a system,” or they can contradict one 
another and become isolated.20  What we often think of as forms of “Power” with a 
capital P – “a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the 
citizens of a given state…a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the 
form of the rule…a general system of domination exerted by one group over another…” 
– are “only the terminal forms power takes.”21  And what’s more, Foucault reminds us to 
be nominalistic about power in this sense; “Power” is just the name we give to the 
patterns that emerge out of local power relations.22   
Because regularities emerge in the ways that actions motivate other actions, 
relations of power “constitute their own organization.”23  Norms or conventions, the 
power of the state, systematic domination, etc. emerge when there are discernible patterns 
in relations of power; “no strategy could achieve comprehensive effects if it did not gain 
support from precise and tenuous relations serving, not as its point of application or final 
outcome, but as its prop and anchor point.”24  Inversely, localized and isolated relations 
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of power cannot be generalized “without entering into an overall strategy.”25  Finally, 
once a stable pattern appears in relations of power, which crystallize in the terminal 
forms of “Power” such as those just mentioned, these patterns become “self-
reproducing.”26  There emerges a positive feedback loop between actions and the norm 
(or any of the forms of “Power”) in which the norm is strengthened by actions that 
conform to it, and these actions are thereby more easily encouraged by that strengthened 
norm.  In its terminal forms, “Power” is “the concatenation that rests on [the mobility of 
force relations] and seeks in turn to arrest their movement.”27  Power on the societal 
level, rather than the level of one action shaping another, is the overall, systematic result 
of those interactions.  These actions organize themselves by producing repetitions and 
patterns.  When Foucault says that power is non-subjective, then, it should be understood 
that the systematic effects of power are not the deliberate result of individuals, but the 
product of the self-organization of actions motivating actions. 
 The characterization of power as being non-subjective apparently creates 
problems for Foucault’s second meaning of ‘strategy’.  The idea that power always 
involves strategy as “the consideration of the thoughts of ‘the other’” suggests that actors 
always act to shape the actions of others in a deliberate manner, but this contradicts the 
above interpretation of power being non-subjective.  The contradiction disappears, 
however, when we recall the fact that Foucault does not mean for the second and third 
interpretations of strategy to be generally applicable to relations of power, merely to 
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those that have become relations of struggle.  These are those rare cases in which the 
effects of power are deliberate.  However, all relations of power involve strategies of 
struggle in potentia,28 and it seems that elements of these further notions of strategy can 
be found even when there is no deliberate struggle. 
 Though the use of the term ‘consideration’ suggests deliberation on the part of the 
actor – misleadingly in the most general discussion of relations of power – there is 
nonetheless a logic to power’s operation that requires adapting to the response of the 
other.  For example, Foucault’s genealogical works examine at length what he calls 
“technologies of power,” which are mechanisms or procedures that are set apart by their 
aim of encouraging certain ways of behaving and discouraging others.  For example, the 
giving of grades in school is a technology of power insofar as “rank in itself serves as a 
reward or punishment.”29  The examination not only describes the level of achievement 
of the student, but, more importantly, it serves to punish inadequate performance and 
reward diligence.  Without suggesting that they are the product of any particular designer, 
such technologies of power are well tailored to their goals.  Technologies of power recall 
the dual use of “conduct” insofar as the behavioral response of those who are to be led 
informs how they can be led.   
When Foucault describes the brilliant efficiency of disciplinary technologies of 
power, we can see that there is something calculated, or at least calculable, about the 
responses people have to such technologies.  Foucault describes the great increase in the 
efficiency of power as an increase in effects with diminishing costs, “not to punish less, 
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but to punish better...to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body.”30  
Disciplinary power focuses, at least in part, on the control of behavior via the control of 
ideas.31  In the 18th century, the use of physical force generally, and punishment via the 
spectacle of the scaffold in particular, gave way to an emphasis on training and 
correction.  Disciplinary power creates a catalogue of people according to their individual 
characteristics – in the direction and magnitude of their deviation from the norm – in an 
effort to reduce gaps between individuals and homogenize society.  Disciplinary power is 
“normalizing” insofar as its aim is not merely to stamp out but to correct deviant behavior 
in conformity with the norm.  Disciplinary power works in part because the responses of 
individuals are both trainable and predictable.  It is only because the grade produces a 
certain response in students, only because they have been convinced of its importance, 
that the procedure of examination is an effective technology of power.  There is this 
sense, then, in which the operation of power requires consideration of the thoughts of the 
other whose actions it seeks to modify. 
 This more abstract sense of “consideration” of the other can also lead us to a 
broader interpretation of the third type of strategy – depriving the other of the means of 
combat.  Again turning to disciplinary power, we can see that the increasing efficiency of 
its mechanisms implies that few relations of power actually turn into relations of struggle; 
there is less of an effort to resist these technologies of power because they are subtle and 
often masked.32  The examples of the operation of power from Discipline and Punish 
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regarding the soldier or the factory worker show us that disciplinary power breaks down 
the body into its constituent parts, considering every movement, creating docile bodies 
and pliable subjects who comply with the aims of power.  The pedagogical examples 
from this work show us that power invades the very thoughts of the other, creating 
thoroughly “normalized” subjects who do not even recognize the potential for resistance 
or consider that there may be danger in this normalization.  As briefly mentioned earlier, 
normalization is the process by which individuals are assessed and categorized in terms 
of their distance from the norm (imposing an order on multiplicity)33 to thereby bring 
them closer to that norm in the effort to create a society that, if not homogenous and free 
of ‘abnormals’, at least has procedures that would neutralize and hopefully correct them.  
Normalization, then, is a process that exploits the intersection of norms of disciplinary 
power that is applied to the individual and norms of regulatory power that is applied to a 
population.34  Normalized individuals habitually conform to ways of behaving that are 
condoned or encouraged socially.  This conformity by routine indicates a sense in which 
the other may be deprived of the means of combat insofar as normalization discourages 
h/er from even recognizing that a struggle exists in potentia.  This is perhaps one of the 
reasons Foucault finds danger in powers of normalization; individuals do not realize that 
they have any means of combat because they do not think they are at war. 
 Even though the three meanings of strategy that Foucault describes strictly apply 
only in cases of explicit struggle between two parties, we can see that elements of each of 
the senses of strategy are present in relations of power in general.  Though in “The 
Subject and Power,” Foucault is careful to say that not all relations of power have the 
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form of war or games, the description of power as involving war-like strategy had been a 
major theme of his earlier works.  Discipline and Punish describes power as the “overall 
effect” of the “strategic positions” of the parties in a relation of power.35  The History of 
Sexuality Vol. 1 emphasizes power’s relationship to conflict in describing power as a 
“multiplicity of force relations.”36  Though the emphasis on war, force, and conflict may 
be overstatement or rhetorical hyperbole on Foucault’s part, nonetheless Foucauldian 
power is appropriately analyzed in terms of strategy.  Foucault’s emphasis on the war-
like nature of power relations serves to dislodge the belief that strategy is not involved 
when relations are peaceful.  As power is a way of shaping behavior and emerges only 
when one action shapes another, it contains at least the strategic elements of intentionality 
and a decipherable procedure for achieving its aim. 
 Finally, we should be careful to distinguish what I have been calling ‘Foucauldian 
power’ from other senses of the term ‘power’.  Foucault himself distinguishes what he 
calls ‘power’ from the idea of a “capacity,” that is, “that which is exerted over things and 
gives the ability to modify, use, consume, or destroy them.”37  Power, in Foucault’s 
sense, emerges at the point of interaction between individuals, and is therefore distinct 
from the notion of a capacity or aptitude for the manipulation of things.  Although 
Foucault’s notion of power is broad in covering a wide range of social interactions that 
we don’t usually think of as instances of power, it is narrow insofar as Foucault does not 
limit himself to discussing the forms of “Power” that typically come to mind, e.g. state 
power, or the power of large corporations, nor is he concerned with notions of power as 
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capacity, or of power as a commodity that can be exchanged like (or with) money, or as a 
measure of energy, or even the exertion of brute physical force, though certainly any or 
all of these kinds of power may be appropriate topics of discussion within a given 
context.  Foucault is interested in how actions motivate actions within the social realm 
even when such motivation is not deliberate, and it will be important to bear in mind this 
specific sense of power as we move forward. 
 Now that we have some idea of what Foucauldian power is, we can examine some 
of the ways in which it has been criticized.  Particularly on the basis of his descriptions of 
power in his genealogical works, perhaps the most general line of criticism against 
Foucault’s account of power is that it is too pessimistic.  As Foucault notes that power is 
inherent in social groups, that it exists whenever actions shape actions related to a norm, 
one might come to believe that we are always at the mercy of this abstract, subjectless 
power.  Indeed, in a sense this must be true, for Foucault asserts that, “power is ‘always 
already there’, that one is never ‘outside’ it,” that there can be no escaping it.38  But what 
I hope to show is that this does not mean that we are always in a state of domination.  
Power, “which is not in itself a bad thing,” can be more or less dangerous depending on 
the degree to which it allows for a multiplicity of power relations.39 
 The criticism that Foucault’s account of power entails that we are always in an 
inescapable situation of domination rests on a conflation of the terms ‘power’ and 
‘domination’.  Foucault’s own works invite such a conflation, as he often describes 
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power in war-like terms, as we saw in his descriptions of the strategy involved in explicit 
struggles and his emphasis that some degree of war-like strategy is at work in every 
relation of power.  We’ve already touched on the hyperbole of Foucault’s early 
genealogical descriptions of power, as we saw that in The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, he 
calls power “the multiplicity of force relations.”40  Such a description may carry with it 
connotations linked to the use of physical force or coercion.  Although rhetorically 
effective in provoking worry about the effects of power, such descriptions may mislead 
his readers into drawing the conclusion that all power is insidious or dominating.  We 
should keep in mind that “force” can also denote an action that changes the direction of 
an object, which may serve as a metaphor for the direction of actions that takes place 
within relations of power. 
The conflation of the terms ‘power’ and ‘domination’ is even more 
understandable when we see that Foucault’s own genealogical works do at times present 
the terms as interchangeable, or at least fail to explain how they are being used.  For 
example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault shifts seamlessly from discussing “the 
power exercised on the body” to “its effects of domination”41 and asserts that the new 
disciplines of the 17th and 18th centuries “became general formulas of domination.”42  As 
Discipline and Punish contains no explicit distinction between power and domination, it 
is all too easy to come away with the impression that all relations of power have effects 
of domination or that disciplines are nothing more than formulae for domination.  Indeed, 
these are the interpretations put forth by many of Foucault’s detractors, but I will 
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demonstrate that such generalizations about the inherently dominating character of power 
are unwarranted, that instead, Foucault all along had in mind a distinction between power 
and domination that he only later makes explicit. 
 Criticisms of Foucault’s account of power that turn on the idea that power is 
domination seem to come in two forms – those that assert that such a claim is simply 
false, and those that worry about the consequences of such an account for critical social 
theory.  Responding to these criticisms will require the use of the distinction between 
power and domination found in Foucault’s later writings.  Since the concept of strategy 
establishes a continuity in Foucault’s earlier and later accounts of power, the distinction 
between power and domination should be accommodated by the earlier works as well, 
even if only implicitly.  This continuity will help to make sense of his early pessimistic 
descriptions of power with their conflation of terms and to counter the objections that rely 
on this conflation. 
Charles Taylor raises the objection that “Foucault’s analyses are terribly one-
sided,” which we will see amounts to a claim that Foucault’s “power” is just a marker for 
locating domination in all social practices.43  Taylor says that the weakness of Foucault’s 
account lies in failing to recognize the positive aspects of disciplinary power; “Foucault 
has missed the ambivalence of these new disciplines.  The point is that they have not 
served only to feed a system of control.  They have also taken the form of genuine self-
discipline that have made possible new kinds of collective action characterized by more 
egalitarian forms of participation.”44  It seems, then, that Taylor’s objection considers two 
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things lacking in Foucault’s account: genuine self-discipline and the egalitarian forms of 
participation it has made possible.  What Taylor has in mind when he says that the new 
disciplines have led to genuine self-discipline is complicated, and as it pertains to the way 
in which individuals are shaped by power, the discussion of this aspect of his objection 
will be reserved for Chapter 2.  That said, we are now in a position to see that Foucault 
does not rule out the more egalitarian forms of participation that Taylor finds lacking in 
his account.  But before arguing that Foucault does not deny the ambivalence of 
disciplinary power, I should like to examine a moment of tension in Taylor’s objection 
that can help us to better understand Foucault’s perceived one-sidedness. 
 When Taylor discusses the “one-sided” analysis of “these new disciplines,” he 
explicitly states that he is thinking of Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality 
Vol. 1 as the paradigm cases for his argument, for it is in these texts that Foucault most 
explicitly discusses the majority of disciplines listed by Taylor, “the barracks, the 
hospital, the school, the factory.”45  However, Taylor himself notes that, “by their very 
nature they lend themselves to the control of some by others.  In these contexts, the 
inculcation of habits of self-discipline is often the imposition of discipline by some on 
others.  These are the loci where forms of domination become entrenched through being 
interiorized.”46  In identifying these disciplines as a prime source for the internalization of 
potentially dominating norms, Taylor as much as concedes Foucault’s point; disciplinary 
power tends toward control of both the individual and the populace, and as discipline 
becomes the pervasive power arrangement, ever more areas of life become controlled. 
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 But even as Foucault’s chief concern is to bring to light modes of domination that 
often remain hidden, he by no means denies the ambivalence of power relations in 
general.  Even in Discipline and Punish, Foucault notes that as the bourgeoisie became 
the politically dominant class, there was at the same time, “the establishment of an 
explicit, coded, and formally egalitarian juridical framework, made possible by the 
organization of a parliamentary, representative regime.”47  Again in this same work, 
when Foucault describes the change in penal severity from torture to imprisonment, he 
does not deny that there is a quantitative change in the intensity of the punishment, which 
may indeed be more humane by some measure of humanity.  Given our liberal values of 
equality and dignity, these formal codes and changes in practices of punishment may 
signal genuine progress.48  However, Foucault’s aim is to show us that punishment did 
not merely undergo a change in the level of intensity, but that “these changes are 
accompanied by a displacement of the very object of the punitive operation.”49  The 
power to punish is no longer applied to the body, but instead to the “soul” – the character 
and habits – of those it now seeks to correct more than condemn.  Foucault’s concern is 
not with the quantitative change in the degree of cruelty in our practices of punishment; 
instead his focus is on the qualitative change toward new forms of cruelty brought about 
with a rise in disciplinary power.  Foucault’s project is to show us what we did not see 
before; it is not to say that there is no truth in the ways in which we typically characterize 
these phenomena.  We should not think that Foucault’s early occasional conflation of 
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“power” and “domination” amounts to the claim that all power is dominating, nor even to 
the more restricted claim that disciplinary power is inherently and irreparably 
dominating.  The claim, rather, is that even as these formally egalitarian codes of conduct 
were formed, even as punishment became more humane, “the development and 
generalization of disciplinary mechanisms constituted the other, dark side of these 
processes”50 precisely because of the efficiency with which they lend themselves to the 
control of some by others, as noted by Taylor.  
Thomas McCarthy, too, is concerned about the one-sidedness of Foucault’s 
account of power, as he asserts that it leaves us “no hope of arriving at an adequate 
account of social integration if the only model of social interaction is one of asymmetrical 
power relations.”51  Though McCarthy’s notion of “adequacy” here is ambiguous, I see 
no problem in granting him that a model of social interaction in which all relations are 
asymmetrical would exclude important arrangements of cooperation and mutual 
consideration.  But surely this cannot be the only type of social interaction available to 
us.  As we’ve already seen, not every social interaction will come under the heading of 
‘Foucauldian power’, only those that pertain to a system of regularities that itself has the 
aim of guiding behavior related to a norm.  Foucault is also emphatic in a late interview 
that there are relations of power that are not pernicious as he exclaims, “We all know that 
power is not evil!”52  Foucault proceeds from this statement to give examples of 
symmetrical relations of power.  Love and passion as well as pedagogy, if removed from 
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the pitfalls of “the pedagogical institution,” consist in “a sort of open-ended strategic 
game where the situation may be reversed.”53  Foucault’s description of power as 
involving an element of strategy does not rule out symmetrical relations such as those 
that occur in cooperative actions.  The first two types of strategy discussed above, a 
means to an end and considering the thoughts of the other, are still seen in relations of 
cooperation, while the third, depriving the other of the means of combat, if seen at all, 
must be in a much weaker form.  I emphasize that this should not worry us, as Foucault is 
clear that the three senses of strategy only come together in situations of explicit struggle.  
In a cooperative situation, there is no foe to explicitly combat.  Nevertheless, there may 
still be disagreement even within a cooperative relationship, in which case we would 
consider the most effective means for pulling the other party toward our way of thinking.  
Just as we reconsidered the notion of “depriving the other of the means of combat” in 
cases of normalization – in which there is no means of combat for one who does not see 
there is a fight – we can reconsider it here with respect to relations of cooperation in 
which we attempt to persuade the other party in accordance with our goals, in a sense 
urging them not to use their means of combat, rather than depriving them of it. 
These objections to Foucault’s account of power, that it is one-sidedly negative or 
that all power relations are problematically asymmetrical, cry out for a distinction to be 
made between a general notion of Foucauldian power and something more insidious.  We 
need a term that picks out just those power relations that are irreversibly asymmetrical 
and toward which we should feel no ambivalence.  Foucault calls this ‘domination’. 
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One sometimes encounters what may be called situations or 
states of domination in which the power relations, instead 
of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt 
strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen.  When 
an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of 
power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any 
reversibility of movement by economic, political, or 
military means, one is faced with what may be called a 
state of domination.54 
 
In general, then, power relations are “mobile, reversible, and unstable.”55  The 
level of domination at work in a society should be judged on a spectrum according to the 
degree of reversibility of power relations.  Foucault even uses McCarthy’s own language 
to distinguish between relations of power and states of domination when he describes the 
latter as cases in which, “power relations are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually 
asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom.”56  It should now at 
least be clear that Foucault is not claiming, as McCarthy asserts, that there can be no 
model of social interaction beyond asymmetrical relations of power.  At this point, we 
can say that it is only dominating power relations that are asymmetrical and fixed.  Power 
relations in general allow for high degrees of flexibility and reciprocity.57  Again, we 
should recall that not every social interaction will be an instance of Foucauldian power 
because many social interactions do not confront a normative system that guides 
behavior.   
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Here, the domain appropriate to power relations has been carved out and the 
subset of dominating power relations has been distinguished by their degree of stasis, but 
there is one further distinction that must be made with respect to the term ‘domination’.  
There are many ways in which this word can be understood, and it is important to see that 
Foucault has a specific sense of the term in mind.  Foucault’s genealogies are primarily 
concerned with states of domination as conceived of in terms of relations of power and 
both discursive and non-discursive structures that have become static; his concern is for 
social forms of power that limit the possible actions of individuals and operate at least in 
part through the actions of those individuals.  When Foucault writes about domination in 
this sense, he considers it distinct from forms of domination that use brute physical force 
to coerce the actions of individuals.  In particular, Discipline and Punish reveals the 
contrast between these two forms of domination as Foucault discusses the historical 
transition from forms of punishment (and power more generally) that operated on the 
body (e.g., public torture) to forms of punishment that operate via the correct training of 
“the soul,” (e.g. prisons viewed as correctional facilities).  Although this is not to say that 
there is nothing in common between these two forms of domination – after all, they both 
aim at controlling the behavior of individuals – they may require very different forms of 
resistance.  We have already noted the fact that Foucault’s works on power primarily 
analyze the social, circulatory forms that power takes and the ways in which these forms 
can become dominating, so it is this sense of domination that I will be considering in the 
search for a concept of freedom that opposes it.  Though Foucault is not ruling out other 
forms of domination, he finds the most cause for concern in these socially reinforced, and 
often unnoticed, forms of domination. 
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With the distinction between specifically Foucauldian power and domination in 
hand, it’s now possible to say more about the occasional conflation of these terms in 
Foucault’s genealogical works.  In these middle works, Foucault’s main interest is in 
specific relations of power – powers of normalization – that serve to homogenize 
individuals in conformity with a norm through the use of disciplinary and regulatory 
power.  Because they seek to create a stable, homogenized society, Foucault finds danger 
and philosophical interest in powers of normalization.  These power relations can be 
called “technologies of domination” for the simple reason that their aim is dominating.58  
If domination is a state in which power relations have become static and irreversible, then 
powers of normalization may be equated with technologies of domination insofar as this 
stasis is what they attempt to bring about.  Since powers of normalization aim to “fix” the 
behavior of individuals in conformity with the norm, in both senses of correcting and 
cementing behavior, they may be called technologies of domination.  It is my claim that 
if Foucault has conflated the notions of power and domination in his genealogical works, 
it is because the power relations he found to merit discussion have domination as their 
aim, not because all relations of power are inherently dominating. 
Having at least refuted the objection that Foucauldian power is nothing but 
domination, there are still problems left to face from those who claim that Foucault’s 
account of power hinders projects of social criticism.  Firstly, Nancy Fraser argues that, 
“Foucault writes as though oblivious to the existence of the whole body of Weberian 
social theory with its careful distinctions between such notions as authority, force, 
                                                




violence, domination and legitimation.”59  Fraser’s argument is that Foucault is, at the 
very least, bracketing the questions of whether and how the exercise of power, or even 
domination, may be legitimate, and she worries that he may be ruling out the possibility 
of asking such questions at all.  Fraser is at least partially correct.  Foucault does not 
provide us with a robust normative theory of his own – one that would serve as a nuanced 
guide for judging the legitimacy or illegitimacy of particular arrangements of power.60  
Instead, he has a rough guideline, that at some point along a spectrum of reversibility, 
power relations become so fixed as to be dominating.  In fact, because relations of 
domination are themselves power relations, there can be no systematic way of drawing an 
absolute line between power and domination.  Foucault does get slightly more specific in 
claiming that, “a system of constraint becomes truly intolerable when the individuals who 
are affected by it don’t have the means of modifying it.”61  From this statement, we can 
infer that it is at least worth trying to change a dominating system of power relations 
when it is so static that it requires change to come either from outside or from those 
within the system who are in the dominant position of strategic advantage.  However, 
such a system of domination is extreme, and surely it might be worth resisting before 
power relations have become so cemented, when those who are affected by it still have 
the means to resist.  Foucault does not pinpoint the degree or form of domination that 
                                                
 59 Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 32. 
 
60 Although Fraser suggests a number of normative frameworks that may potentially be implicit in 
Foucault’s criticisms, I demonstrate in Chapter 3 that Foucault criticizes particular arrangements of power 
by their own lights as well as by appeal to a common set of values (and by comparison to other potential 
values we might hold), albeit that such a set will be historically contingent.  Chapter 4 further argues that 
the idea of a need for recognition is implicit in Foucault’s account and can serve as an additional normative 
standard by which to judge relations of power. 
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justifies resistance.  Rather, as Foucault himself describes the project of his genealogical 
works, 
It is the reality of possible struggles that I wish to bring to 
light…It is absolutely true that when I write a book I refuse 
to take a prophetic stance, that is, the one of saying to 
people: here is what you must do – and also: this is good and 
this is not.  I say to them: roughly speaking, it seems to me 
that things have gone this way; but I describe those things in 
such a way that the possible paths of attack are delineated.62  
 
 Marking out the paths of possible resistance is a reasonable project, but we must 
still be careful to ensure that the possibility of this resistance itself has not been ruled out 
by Foucault’s account of power.  This is the final criticism to consider.  As stated by 
Charles Taylor,  
The Foucaultian thesis involves combining the fact that any 
set of institutions and practices form the background to our 
action within them, and are in that sense irremovable while 
we engage in that kind of action, with the point that 
different forms of power indeed are constituted by different 
complexes of practice, to form the illegitimate conclusion 
that there can be no question of liberation from the power 
implicit in a given set of practices.63 
 
In arguing that Foucault does not draw this “illegitimate conclusion,” it is important to 
delve deeper into what Taylor calls “the Foucaultian thesis.”  Foucault does assert that 
some arrangement of social institutions and practices will always “form the background 
to our action within them.”  Indeed, this assertion is made with dramatic flair in his 
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statement that there is no “outside” to power, a statement that, if taken out of context, 
may mislead us into accepting Taylor’s objection.64 
 When Foucault says that there is no outside to power, he is speaking of power 
most generally; as people living in a society, we are never uninfluenced by the accepted 
norms, institutions, and practices of that society.  However, societies may be widely 
variant with respect to these features, which Foucault calls the “complex strategical 
situation in a given society” – that is, the overall organization of power relations in a 
society.  Although Foucault would assert that we can never remove ourselves from every 
arrangement of power, this does not entail that we cannot remove ourselves from or alter 
particular arrangements of power as Taylor suggests.   
Foucault writes about sites of resistance precisely because “the power implicit in a 
given set of practices” is unstable, mobile, reversible.  We can see that one of the 
distinguishing features of domination is that, in it, power relations are frozen or 
immobile.  Power more generally then, is vulnerable to change.  Still one might wonder if 
Taylor's objection can't be narrowed.  We might think that despite the fact that power 
relations are generally flexible, situations of domination are inescapable.  This would be 
equally problematic for Foucault's account, as his goal is to point out the paths of attack 
for precisely those ways in which we are dominated by power without even noticing. 
However, we must go back to our description of domination and realize that there are still 
options for resistance even in such a state.  Although there are but a few drastic options 
available in the most extreme cases of domination, we should note that such domination 
is rarely pervasive, that is, it rarely pervades every sphere of life or set of power relations 
in which all individuals find themselves.  As far as Taylor’s objection goes, there can be 
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no doubt that Foucault would reject such a deterministic thesis as to rule out the 
possibility of our liberation from a given dominating set of social practices. 
I have, at this point, clarified Foucault’s account of power, as picking out the 
particular domain of social interactions that relate to the systematic guidance of behavior 
and identified domination as a description of power relations that have become static, 
allowing for reversal only by extreme measures.  Further exploration of the relationship 
between power and the subject is now needed in order to clarify the concept of freedom 
that is the appropriate contrast to domination in Foucault’s sense and to see what 
resources the subject has to be an agent of resistance and to undertake h/er own deliberate 



























The Constitution of the Subject 
 
When Foucault discusses means of resistance to domination, he rarely speaks of 
individual agents as the sources of this resistance.  For Foucault, it is the constitution of 
the subject that is in need of explanation, so he cannot take for granted capacities of the 
subject – e.g. the exercise of reason – that might be a constant well to draw from in 
resisting domination.   Instead, Foucault looks for unconventional sources of resistance, 
such as discursive structures1 and isolated communities that fall outside of the particular 
power/knowledge regime to be resisted.2  Because Foucault focuses more on sites of 
resistance than on capacities for resistance, there is a great deal of confusion about what 
the relevant notions of domination and resistance are supposed to be.  This confusion has 
led some to claim that individuals cannot be sources of resistance on Foucault’s account.  
For example, there are those who claim that the freedom implicated in talk of resistance 
is either the agency or autonomy of the subject and that Foucault denies that the subject 
has any such capacities.3  In order to understand the sense of freedom Foucault has in 
mind when he speaks of resistance, we must move beyond the abstract idea of 
domination found in Chapter 1 to examine the effects of domination on the subject.  This 
chapter will argue against the idea that domination and resistance refer exclusively to the 
status of an individual, e.g. as having agency or autonomy.  Although agency and 
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autonomy may be important for the possibility of resistance, Foucault’s claims that we 
are dominated do not amount to claims that either a) we have no agency or b) our 
autonomy has become nothing more than a tool to be used against us by power.  I intend 
to dispel such criticisms by taking a closer look at the relationship between power and the 
individual qua subject in Foucault’s works.   
 The first step toward this goal should then be to define the relevant notion of the 
individual.  The individual who stands in relations of power to other individuals, 
institutions, etc. is what Foucault calls ‘the subject’.  The subject is constituted by 
relations of power in two senses.  Firstly, to constitute can mean to characterize or define.  
A pawn is constituted by the game of chess insofar as a pawn is only a pawn within the 
context of the game of chess.  This amounts to a conceptual claim in the case of the 
subject: a subject is only a subject when considered within relations of power.  More 
loosely, a subject is an individual qua member of society (as opposed to a biological 
entity, for example).  A subject is the kind of thing that can be responsive to normative 
frameworks and social strategies for organizing behavior.  This sense of the word 
‘constitute’ provides a stipulative definition that picks out the subject relevant to 
Foucault’s analyses.  The second sense in which subjects are constituted by power is 
more complicated and more interesting.  ‘To constitute’ can also refer to giving organized 
existence to a thing, to build or establish.  In this sense, we arrive at a set of 
interdependent psychological claims about the subject: power constitutes subjects by 
categorizing individuals, making their actions intelligible, and attaching them to their 
identities.  In other words, the ways in which individuals understand and relate to 
themselves are largely products of the specific power structures in which they are 
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socialized.  These two senses of the word ‘constitute’ are related insofar as the former 
conceptual definition spells out the conditions necessary for the latter psychological 
claims. 
 Before saying anything more specific about the mechanisms by which subjects 
are constituted, it will be helpful to consider some of the difficulties facing such a task.  
Recall that Foucault emphasizes in a number of works that he never intended to provide a 
general theory of what power is.4  Instead, each of his works examines only a specific 
type of power and the mechanisms of its operation.  Since mechanisms of power 
constitute subjects, we should expect that different forms of power constitute subjects 
differently.  It is this key point that I believe has been overlooked in the secondary 
literature on Foucault’s account of the subject, resulting in a widespread belief that 
Foucault’s different accounts of the relationship between power and the subject are 
incompatible with each other.  While Foucault’s genealogical period focuses on powers 
of normalization that produce the subject, his later ethical period focuses on possibilities 
and procedures of self-transformation by which the subject constitutes itself.  Indeed 
neither picture is wholly plausible on its own, but reading the two periods together 
provides a richer, more nuanced account of subject formation that is also much less 
radical than either provides on its own.  So, the next steps will be to examine the most 
seemingly contradictory of these accounts and to look for the methodological principles 
and theoretical claims that can unify them. 
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The Normalized Subject 
 The most extreme account of power’s hold on the subject comes from Discipline 
and Punish, a first reading of which leaves the impression of a whole society of 
individuals who are nothing more than cogs in a machine.  In this work, Foucault 
emphasizes the roles of training, surveillance, and correction in order to point out the 
similarities between pedagogical institutions, factories, and prisons.  Each of these 
institutions steps in at a different point in the constitution of subjects to ensure that 
society extracts from them the maximum of their capacities.  The very same mechanisms 
of power are used in each of these institutions to create and maintain docile, productive, 
orderly, disciplined individuals. 
 Surveillance and judgment are the tools of disciplinary power.  Surveillance 
allows individuals to be categorized.  Consider, for example, the school.  What does each 
student do?  Which students are sitting quietly?  Who hasn’t done their homework?  Lists 
are made; students are individuated by their conduct.  But surveillance isn’t enough for 
training or correction. What Foucault calls a ‘normalizing judgment’ must be made.5  In 
disciplinary power, a norm is established prior to the evaluation of existing individuals.6  
The norm sets the standard for the optimum behavior of individuals.  All of this 
surveillance and cataloguing is then compared to the optimum so that the normalizing 
judgment measures an individual’s deviation from the norm. Steps are then taken to 
reward those who have met the standard and to punish those who have not.   
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With the need for reward and punishment we encounter the examination, which is 
implemented in a variety of contexts: pedagogy, psychology, factory work, prisons, etc.  
The examination is “at the centre of the procedures that constitute the individual as effect 
and object of power.”7  It combines the arts of surveillance and normalizing judgment.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the examination is brilliantly efficient because it measures the 
aptitude of the subject and this measurement immediately serves as either reward or 
punishment.  The examination tells you at once both what kind of person you are – a lazy 
worker, a criminal, a “C” student – and how far you are from being the person you ought 
to be – productive, obedient, an “A” student.  Thus, disciplinary power is both 
individualizing and totalizing.  It creates individual identities by categorizing behaviors 
and attempts to homogenize these individuals by reducing the gaps between them.  
 With disciplinary power, we go beyond the mere behaviors of individuals to make 
judgments about their nature or their character.  This fact is brought to light by Foucault’s 
genealogy of the techniques of punishment.  With the shift from public torture to 
imprisonment, “one no longer touched the body, or at least as little as possible, and then 
only to reach something other than the body itself.”8  Increasingly, the character and 
habits of individuals, more than actions alone, became the concern of penal practices.  
Psychiatric expertise, criminal anthropology, and the discourse of criminology “provide 
                                                
 7 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 192. 
 
 8 Ibid., 11, 16.   
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the mechanisms of legal punishment with a justifiable hold not only on offences, but on 
individuals; not only on what they do, but also on what they are, will be, may be.”9   
The rise of disciplinary power brings an immense shift in the nature of 
individualization, which is also traced genealogically in Discipline and Punish in parallel 
with practices of punishment.  Whereas the feudal regime catalogued individuals by 
reference to kinship relations and performance of deeds (noble or ignoble), discipline 
individualizes by surveillance, examination, and comparison to the norm.10  Disciplinary 
power individualizes by what Foucault calls  ‘subjection’, or the production of truths 
regarding the internal nature or character of the individual.11  Subjection exploits a belief 
that there are deep and hidden truths to discover about an individual’s character; with 
sufficient insistence that such deep secrets are the keys to our identities, one can actually 
produce the secrets one seeks.  As evidenced by the changes in the penal system, it is no 
longer the deeds that are at the heart of investigation, but the doer behind them.  
Subjection does not only take place in the realm of punishment, but in other domains as 
well.  We have already seen this subjection in the example of pedagogy above, as 
students’ characters are thought to be revealed by their performance.  Subjection also 
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occurs in the domain of sexuality.  Especially illustrative is the shift from ancient codes 
of conduct, in which sodomy was merely a category of actions, to 19th-century 
homosexuality, which characterized a mode of being for individuals.12  What’s more, the 
shift to conceiving of homosexuality as a way of being brought with it the belief that 
sexuality was the deep secret of our identities, as though knowing that the individual is a 
homosexual provides thorough knowledge of the individual h/erself.  So in sexuality as 
well as pedagogy and criminality, we find “a new specification of individuals” involving 
the simultaneous discovery and production of their inner natures.13 
It is the increasing tendency to view human beings as a potential object of 
scientific knowledge, not only biologically but psychologically, that has enabled an 
increase in subjection.  In the process of subjection, perhaps even more than in other 
processes of subject formation, knowledge and power are mutually reinforcing.  Power 
encourages the collection of information regarding individuals on which the knowledge 
of the human sciences is built.  But at the same time, the knowledge of the human 
sciences provides power with its justification and specifies the nature of the information 
to be collected.14  Foucault emphasizes this mutually dependent relationship between 
power and knowledge when he describes the disciplinary power that blossomed in the 
18th century as “a type of power…that can only function thanks to the formation of a 
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knowledge that is both its effect and also a condition of its exercise.”15  The individual, 
then, fits into this complex web of power/knowledge as both its “effect and object.”16  
The individual is produced by this power/knowledge regime at the very moment it is 
studied as its object.  It is with the emergence of the human sciences that “various 
concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, 
personality, consciousness, etc.”17  This construction of identities by the production of 
truths internal to the individual is the mode of individualization specific to disciplinary 
power. 
 So we see that the examination – as the paradigmatic mechanism of disciplinary 
power – constructs individuals and makes their actions intelligible by describing 
deviations from the norm in terms of, at least quasi-scientific, classifications and 
explanations.  But there are other mechanisms by which individuals become attached to 
these identities and come to recognize them as their own.  It is not enough merely to 
produce third personal identifications of individuals.  The subject must be tied to an 
identity in order for identification to have any bearing on h/er behavior.  Foucault even 
goes so far as to say that the subject simply is a relationship one has to oneself.18  It is the 
nature of this relationship that is constituted by relations of power. 
 The relationship of self to self established by disciplinary power is one of self-
surveillance.  By Foucault’s description, schools, hospitals, factories, and prisons are all 
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modeled on Bentham’s infamous Panopticon, in which prisoners are compelled to 
monitor their own behavior even in the absence of a prison guard.19  Foucault describes 
the Panopticon as the reverse of the dungeon.20  Whereas the dungeon held prisoners 
hidden away in darkness, the Panopticon is organized so that prisoners may be constantly 
visible.  The cells that contain individual prisoners, so as to isolate them from each other, 
are arranged in a circle around a central guard tower.  The cells are backlit so that each 
prisoner is fully visible at all times from the position of the tower.  The guard within the 
tower, however, is hidden from the view of the inmates.  This creates a situation in which 
it actually becomes unnecessary for any guard to be present in the tower.  The threat of 
surveillance becomes enough to motivate prisoners to surveille themselves.   
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the 
inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that 
assures the automatic functioning of power.  So to arrange 
things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even 
if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of 
power should tend to render its actual exercise 
unnecessary.21 
 
In these panoptic institutions, the relationship of power is internalized by the subject.  
The student, patient, worker, or inmate who is caught in this panoptic configuration 
“inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he 
becomes the principle of his own subjection.”22  In a society modeled on the Panopticon, 
individuals are taught to be vigilant with regard to their own inner natures and the 
potentially deviant behavior motivated by them.  In reading these descriptions by 
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Foucault and recognizing them as being at least partial descriptions of the society in 
which we do find ourselves, we are presented with an image that is even more 
frightening, even more insidious than the fictional Big Brother.  It seems that Foucault 
would have us believe that our own situation is worse than a totalitarian regime governed 
by an all-seeing dictator.  In a regime of disciplinary power, no such authority is 
necessary.  We surveille ourselves. 
 In the Panopticon, the relationship of self-surveillance is especially vigilant with 
respect to criminal impulses.  But in other contexts, it is not always such impulses that we 
look for in self-examination.  In addition to establishing the relationship one has to 
oneself, power delimits the aspects of the individual that are relevant to subject 
formation.  Power/knowledge regimes, such as that of the human sciences, determine 
what we ought to look for when we introspect (which can itself take a variety of forms, 
one of which is self-surveillance).  Whether criminal impulses, deviant sexual desires, or 
temptation toward sin, to take a few examples, power/knowledge regimes tell us what 
kinds of truths about the subject will be produced by subjection.   
 Foucault provides several concrete examples of practices that give the individual 
a particular relationship with h/erself.  Both the religious act of confession and 
psychiatric evaluation have in common this search for inner truths with which the 
individual identifies.  But because they have different goals in mind, these practices 
identify different aspects of the individual as the material of subject formation.  
Foucault’s 1974-75 lectures in Abnormal provide the clearest illustration of the 
transformations in the focus of subjection.   
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Early in its development in the 19th century, modern psychology was concerned 
with childhood sexuality.  If an adult was delinquent, the delinquency could likely be 
traced to early masturbation.  There was a tendency to explain nearly every deviation 
from the norm in adulthood by reference to childhood masturbation, which was 
eventually expanded in the second half of the 19th century into the notion of perversity 
more generally.23  Over time, with the rise of psychoanalysis, childhood sexuality was 
replaced by the instincts as the focus of inquiry.24 
Even prior to the development of psychiatry and its search for the hidden truths of 
childhood sexuality, there was the practice of Christian confession with its own concerns 
about sex.  In confession, too, we see changes with respect to the aspects of the subject 
that merit investigation.  In the 12th and 13th centuries, confession as the “examination of 
conscience” became more or less codified.25  From this point on, the examination 
proceeded via reference to “the Ten Commandments, the seven deadly sins…the 
commandments of the Church, the list of virtues, and so forth.”26  Nevertheless, the 
features of the subject that were deemed relevant to this examination changed over time.  
For example, in the 17th century there was a shift in the information to be gathered around 
the sin of lust.27  Prior to the 17th century, the questions in confession were aimed at 
discovering the nature of the relationships involved in the lustful act.  The new system of 
questioning concerns, not relationships, but the sensation and desires of the body of the 
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penitent.  “The old examination was essentially the inventory of permitted and forbidden 
relationships.  The new examination is a meticulous passage through the body, a sort of 
anatomy of the pleasures of the flesh.”28   
In these examples alone we find at least four aspects of the individual that have 
been used for subjection: childhood sexuality, instinct, relations to others, and bodily 
pleasure.  We can see, then, that there are various ways to construct a subject, that 
different power/knowledge regimes construct subjects differently, and that the very same 
practices (of confession and psychiatric examination) can be used to produce different 
relationships of self to self depending on the relevant material of subjection. 
Practices of subjection, like confession and psychiatric evaluation, are insidious 
because they have a tendency to make the subject feel liberated by the very processes that 
tie h/er to an identity constructed by relations of power.  Both of these practices rely on 
what Foucault calls “the speaker’s benefit.”29  The beliefs that, for example, sex is taboo 
and that power is generally repressive create a delight in speaking about the inner sexual 
desires that appear subversive to the repressive regime.30  The speaker’s benefit even 
contributes to our continued desire to characterize power as repressive.31  But Foucault 
would show us that it is actually an artifice of power to make people believe that 
speaking the truth about themselves is liberating, and that ‘truth’ is opposed to ‘power’.32  
Disclosing the deep hidden truths of our identity doesn’t liberate us from repressive 
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power; it is rather to buy into the very assumptions on which disciplinary subjection 
relies.  In fact, “it is an immense labor to which the West has submitted generations in 
order to produce men’s subjection: their constitution as subjects in both sense of the 
word.”33  These senses of ‘subject’ are, in Foucault’s words, “subject to someone else by 
control or dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self knowledge.”34  
Though these definitions of ‘subject’ do not appear until the late essay “The Subject and 
Power,” it is significant that Foucault still uses the notion of conscience that was so 
important to the practice of confession discussed in his earlier genealogical works.  In 
this conscience we can see reinforced once again the idea that the subject is a relation one 
bears to oneself – a relation of self-surveillance with respect to hidden truths in the case 
of disciplinary forms of power. 
What these works provide, then, is a bleak picture of subjects who monitor their 
own activities based on an understanding of themselves that is wholly fabricated by 
forces external to them.  The subject participates and even encourages h/er own 
subjection because it is experienced as pleasurable due to a naïve belief in the power of 
the truth to set us free.  But in painting this bleak picture, Foucault hopes to bring us to 
the recognition that the disciplinary model of the subject is not the only possible 
configuration of subjectivity.   He further urges us to dislodge from our minds the 
mistaken opposition between power and truth that sustains our desire to participate in our 
own subjection.  The following passage is indicative of both of these motivations in 
Foucault: 
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The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an 
‘ideological’ representation of society; but he is also a 
reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I 
have called ‘discipline’. We must cease once and for all to 
describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 
‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it 
‘masks’, it ‘conceals’.  In fact, power produces; it produces 
reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.  
The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of 
him belong to this production.35 
 
The individual is fictitious insofar as both the very concept of the subject and the 
individual subjects created are products of a particular historical context.  According to 
Foucault, there is nothing universal about our constitution as subjects.36  But the 
individuals produced by configurations of power are real, they really exist within their 
historical context, and they do have a relationship to themselves that makes them the kind 
of subjects that they are.  The statement that “the individual and the knowledge that may 
be gained of him belong to this production” by power helps cement in us, Foucault’s 
readers, the realizations that our current concept of the subject is only one of many 
possibilities and that our power/knowledge regime encourages us to constitute ourselves 
as disciplinary subjects.  Coming to these realizations may be the first step necessary for 
resistance to such power structures. 
 But one thing I wish to emphasize in this chapter is that the constitution of 
disciplinary subjects is particular to disciplinary power structures.  These apparently dark 
descriptions of subject formation only apply to a relatively short period of human history 
in the West.  Foucault’s later works on the ancient Greek notion of “care of the self” 
focus instead on practices of self-mastery and self-transformation.  Such practices appear 
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entirely contrary to his accounts of disciplinary subjection in the genealogical period.  
However, this contradiction is immediately erased when we simply keep in mind the fact 
that different power/knowledge regimes constitute subjects differently. 
The Subject of Self-Transformation 
 Turning to the works of Foucault’s ethical period will draw out the tension 
between subjects constituted by power and subjects capable of self-transformation.  
Foucault’s interest in Greek and Greco-Roman culture focuses on “arts of existence” as 
linked to the care of the self.  The phrase “arts of existence” refers to “those intentional 
and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also 
seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make 
their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic 
criteria.”37  We should note the drastic differences between this description of subject 
formation and those descriptions found in the genealogical period.   
 In the ancient Greek care of the self, subject formation is both intentional and 
voluntary.  In discipline, by contrast, subject formation seems to go on behind the backs 
of subjects. Disciplinary power forges a relation between the subject and itself whether or 
not the subject is aware that the process is taking place; the question of whether the 
process is voluntary doesn’t even arise.  Furthermore, in the ancient Greek arts of 
existence, subjects give themselves rules of conduct; the rules or norms are not prescribed 
in a code of conduct external to the subject, as in disciplinary power.  Finally, the very 
goal of subject formation is different in the arts of existence and discipline.  Rather than 
seeking to create docile, productive, obedient subjects, the arts of existence have an 
                                                




aesthetic criterion for successful constitution of the subject.  The goal was to give a style 
to one’s life in which “one could recognize oneself, be recognized by others, and in 
which even posterity could find an example.”38 
 By way of highlighting the element of individual choice in the arts of existence, 
the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality stress a difference between 
these practices and code-based moralities.  In volume two, we are told that in classical 
thought, as opposed to the Christian pastoral, “the demands of austerity were not 
organized into a unified, coherent, authoritarian moral system that was imposed on 
everyone in the same manner.”39  Rather, “with the exception of a few precepts that 
applied to everyone,” moral standards “were always tailored to one’s way of life, which 
was itself determined by the status one had inherited and the purposes one had chosen.”40  
So although there were still certainly limitations on one’s constitution as a subject – the 
few universal precepts and the duties corresponding to status – there was a high degree of 
flexibility with regard to the form one gave to one’s life.   
Ancient Greek ethics, according to Foucault, revolved around finding a style of 
life that was best suited to one’s own aims.  So ancient ethics “takes the form, not of a 
tightening of the code that defined prohibited acts, but of an intensification of the relation 
to oneself by which one constituted oneself as the subject of one’s acts.”41  In fact, rather 
than focusing on prohibitions, moral reflection concerned itself precisely with those areas 
                                                
 38 Foucault, Aesthetics of Existence, 451. 
 
 39 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 21. 
 
 40 Ibid., 60. 
 
 41 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 3: The Care of the Self, trans. Robert Hurley (New 




of life in which one had the most liberty.42  Subject formation became a tekhnē, a work 
that one performed on oneself to achieve perfection in relation to one’s goals.  If it is the 
aim of such a tekhnē to give style to one’s life in such a way as to mark it as truly one’s 
own, then, “if there were not precisely this freedom of the subject making use of his 
tekhnē according to his objective, desire, and will to make a beautiful work, then there 
would be no perfection of life.”43 
Unification 
These references to freedom, liberty, style, and choice should be striking after the account 
of disciplinary subjection, which contained no mention of such features or capacities of 
the subject.  But what is even more striking is that Foucault’s later works argue that 
freedom is present wherever there is power, which of course means discovering a kind of 
freedom even in disciplinary power.  However, reading freedom back into the works of 
Foucault’s genealogical period is not as difficult as it may first appear.  Since both the 
genealogical and ethical periods describe power in terms of strategy, both periods must 
accommodate the distinction between power and domination that comes out of this 
characterization of power.  What is crucial for unifying Foucault’s seemingly 
contradictory accounts of subject formation is that this description of power in terms of 
strategy relies upon the freedom of the subject as agent. 
“When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the actions of 
others” – just as I did in Chapter 1 to bring out the role of strategy – “one includes an 
important element: freedom.  Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar 
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as they are free.”44  It becomes clear that the sense of freedom that power presupposes 
must be agency when we recall that subjects are constituted by power insofar as subjects 
just are the kinds of things that can be responsive to norms.  Being responsive to norms 
means that subjects must be faced with a field of possible actions.  The norm can only 
guide subjects to one action over another if there is a choice in action.  Put another way, it 
is the subject’s agency that enables the effects of power.  What we must therefore 
understand is that the subject is free in its choice of action even in disciplinary regimes of 
power.  More will have to be said about how this agency relates to the kind of freedom 
that will serve as the opposing concept of domination, but for now, it’s already becoming 
clear that the middle and late periods are connected by shared concepts.  Both periods 
accommodate the distinction between power and domination by characterizing power in 
terms of strategy and presupposing the agency of the subject. 
 In addition to these consistent concepts of power, domination, and agency, there 
are further methodological and theoretical considerations that help to create a general 
schematic account of the subject that underpins both the middle and late periods of 
Foucault’s writing.  First let’s look at some methodological clarifications made by the 
later Foucault.  As his work matured, it became clear to him that the subject, in one form 
or another, had been his focus all along.45  Foucault eventually came to catalogue his 
works in terms of three axes of experience: truth/knowledge, power, and the subject.46  
His earliest works from the archaeological period tend to focus on the formation of 
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knowledges and the discursive formations that specify the historically contextualized 
conditions for making truth claims.  The middle-period genealogies that we have 
examined then identify power as central to the development of both knowledge and the 
subject.  Finally, the late ethical works look at the relationship one has to oneself as the 
basis for constitution and recognition of oneself as a subject.  Though each of these 
periods explores a different axis, Foucault acknowledges their interdependence.47  He 
further clarifies that all three axes have in common the analysis of a different mode of 
subject formation: 
I would like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of 
my work during the last twenty years.  It has not been to 
analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the 
foundations of such an analysis.  My objective, instead, has 
been to create a history of the different modes by which, in 
our culture, human beings are made subjects.  My work has 
dealt with three modes of objectification which transform 
human beings into subjects.48 
 
These “modes of objectification” are ways in which one can think of oneself as a subject.  
The three modes to which Foucault here refers are:  
1. the subject as the object of the human sciences  
2. normalized subjects (mad/sane, sick/healthy, criminal/ “good boys”) 
3. the product of self-constitution49  
Each of these modes of objectification corresponds to one of the three axes of Foucault’s 
works.  The truth/knowledge axis examines the subject qua object of the human sciences; 
the power axis examines the subject constituted by powers of normalization; and the 
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subject axis examines technologies of the self by which subjects can effect their own self-
transformation.50  These axes of experience should not be viewed as independent of one 
another.  The three periods of Foucault’s works corresponding to these axes appear 
contradictory if each is intended to be a general theory of subject formation.  Yet the late 
Foucault is clear that there are always overlaps in the influence of these axes and that no 
process of subject formation is ever as one-sided as his analyses.51  Even to label a 
particular power/knowledge regime as disciplinary or regulatory is potentially 
misleading.  It’s not as though there were never disciplinary practices prior to the 18th 
century; it’s just that disciplinary power reached a new height and prominence at this 
time.52  So too with the axes along which Foucault studies the subject; though they are 
almost always all present in some degree, we may characterize some periods as relying 
more heavily on powers of normalization and others on practices of the self.  These 
methodological clarifications lead to two important theoretical claims. 
First, we can make more precise the idea that different periods constitute subjects 
differently.  The mode of subjection will depend largely on both the primary 
power/knowledge regime in place and the relevant notion of the subject to be produced 
(an ethical subject, a subject of true discourse, etc.).  The second theoretical point to be 
drawn out of Foucault’s methodological considerations is this: not only are subjects 
constituted differently in different historical contexts, but it is also the case that each 
individual subject is constituted differently by reference to a different axis of experience.  
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My relationship to myself as an object of the human sciences need not be the same as my 
relationship to myself qua ethical subject.  Foucault makes explicit this internal 
differentiation of subjects within a single individual when he says that the subject  
is not a substance.  It is a form, and this form is not 
primarily or always identical to itself.  You do not have the 
same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute 
yourself as a political subject who goes to vote or speaks at 
a meeting and when you are seeking to fulfill your desires 
in a sexual relationship.53 
 
 So all three axes of experience will be relevant to subject formation in any given 
power/knowledge regime.  Depending on the historical context, these axes may create 
domains of subjectivity within the individual that reinforce or contradict each other.  
There is not just one way to constitute subjects in general, and each individual subject 
may even be constituted as a multiplicity of subjects.  We may finally conclude from this 
that all three periods of Foucault’s work can be brought together under the heading of “a 
history of thought,” which he describes as, “an analysis of what could be called focal 
points of existence in which forms of a possible knowledge, normative frameworks of 
behavior for individuals, and potential modes of existence for possible subjects are linked 
together.”54 
Individuals, Agents, and Autonomous Subjects 
 With this general discussion of Foucault’s account of the subject behind us, we 
can begin to address the objections briefly mentioned earlier.  As was the case with 
criticisms of Foucault’s account of power, these objections to his account of subject 
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formation come in two broad types: those that take issue directly with what Foucault has 
said about the subject (e.g., that it is false), and those that worry about what this account 
means for our ability, as individuals, to resist dominating forms of power. 
 In the first category of objections, there are those who claim that Foucault has 
eliminated the very concept of subjectivity.  Jürgen Habermas, for one, argues that what 
Foucault calls “individualizing power” is misleading.  Though we know that there are 
different ways to individualize subjects, we should still take care to acknowledge 
Habermas’s point that, at least in disciplinary modes of individualization, the techniques 
are merely numerically individualizing.  Habermas’ criticism is that disciplinary 
individualization does not allow for individualism conceived of as a subjective space of 
interiority in which individuals may differ from each other.  Instead, individuals are 
“mechanically punched out” by powers of normalization, and therefore, despite being 
numerically distinct, individuals are identical in their relationship to themselves.55   
 Such an account of individualizing power would certainly seem contrary to our 
own experience of the ways in which we differ from other individuals.  It would also 
have worrying implications for our ability to resist dissatisfying power structures if 
indeed power thoroughly forms even our feelings of repression and oppression according 
to its own aims.  But I take it that Habermas is greatly oversimplifying Foucault’s 
account of disciplinary subjection.  Even if every individual stood in the same position 
with respect to relations of power, this claim about the internal contents of the minds of 
individuals would not necessarily follow.  Moreover, we should recall that Foucault does 
not say we are all in the same relations of power, which are complex, varied, and 
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perpetually in flux.  There are at least three reasons to believe that Habermas is mistaken 
about the disciplinary process of individualization. 
 First, we have already seen that each historical context individualizes some 
subjects more than others.  Recall the change we saw in the ways subjects were 
individualized from feudal regimes to the disciplinary regimes of the 18th century.  These 
modes of subject formation tie some individuals more strongly to their identities than 
others.  In a feudal society, the more powerful and privileged are more individualized, 
more distinguished from the group as a whole.  In a disciplinary society, by contrast, it is 
the child more than the adult, the mad more than the sane, the delinquent more than the 
well-behaved, who is most individualized.56  So disciplinary power individualizes the 
abnormal more than the normal.  Individuals who deviate from the prescribed norms of 
disciplinary power must be thoroughly specified in their individual modes of deviation in 
order to be targets of the most effective means of correction.  Certainly the internal 
character of those who deviate will not only differ from those of the docile and obedient, 
but from each other as well.  The disciplinary mode of normalization strives for 
homogeneity precisely by making these differences useful.57 
 Second, we should recall the ways in which even a single individual is constituted 
as a multiplicity of subjects corresponding to different contexts, to different axes of 
experience.  Given that each individual is not one but many subjects, there is all the more 
opportunity to take up a variety of relations to self.  Some of these relations may fall 
closer to the norm than others.  In a disciplinary regime, one may be more individualized 
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as a political subject, less as a sexual subject, according to one’s degrees of conformity to 
the norms of these different contexts. 
 Finally, Foucault often emphasizes power’s reliance on the existence of a variety 
of social roles.  Such roles correspond to the self-conceptions of those who hold them, 
and they play a part in the effective functioning of power.  Take for example the priests 
of Abnormal and their role in the early formation of powers of normalization.  The priest 
must have very particular internal qualities if he is to be effective.  These qualities 
include “zeal” – love or desire for the role he plays in the salvation of others; “holiness” – 
a constant vigilance with respect to his own acts and desires; and he must be trained with 
particular knowledge – he must know how to interpret the desires and actions of his 
parishioners as well as what penance is appropriate to their circumstances.58  Contrast 
these internal qualities of the priest with those of the penitent.  The penitent has no 
relation to the salvation of others; s/he is not vigilant with respect to h/er actions and 
desires (as one becomes a penitent after one has sinned); and s/he does not have the 
requisite expertise and interpretive abilities to prescribe h/er own penance.  Similar 
contrasts can be seen in other examples as well, as with the teacher and student, the 
psychiatrist and patient, and the guard and prisoner.  Indeed there is even a greater variety 
of social roles than this, as we see other roles within the family, for example, that fall 
outside of this schema of authority.  Each of these social roles requires a different relation 
to oneself.  In particular they require recognition that the duties proper to such a role are 
one’s own.  Although Habermas is right that powers of normalization encourage 
conformity to a norm of behavior, they do so largely by exploiting a variety of relations 
to self and others. 
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 Though we may not all be cast from the same mould, one could still be deeply 
concerned by the level of conformity in behavior that is achieved by powers of 
normalization.  Thomas McCarthy has just such concerns.  His objections still fall under 
the first category directed against the account of the subject, but rather than claiming 
Foucault has eliminated subjectivity itself, McCarthy argues that he has eliminated the 
subject’s agency.  We will have to examine McCarthy’s argument carefully to see what is 
entailed by his notion of agency and whether or not Foucault has eliminated it from the 
subject. 
 McCarthy appears to be most troubled by the claim that the individual is “merely 
‘one of the prime effects of power’,” a quotation he emphasizes more than once.59  But to 
say that the individual is one of the prime effects of power is not yet a clear statement 
against agency.  It’s possible to read this claim as being akin to Habermas’s criticism that 
our individual subjective experiences are made the same by relations of power, or it may 
be to claim that Foucault denies our responsibility for our thoughts and actions.   
But it’s not a claim Foucault made.  It is true, as we have seen, that Foucault 
asserts that power shapes individuals.  However, Foucault never said that we are merely 
effects of power; this is McCarthy’s addition.  Indeed, Foucault is often explicit that 
individuals are more than the mere effects of power, “they are never the inert or 
consenting targets of power; they are its relays.  In other words, power passes through 
individuals.  It is not applied to them.”60   
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So what does McCarthy have in mind here that could be a reasonable criticism of 
Foucault?  He makes two further remarks that suggest that his real concern is with the 
ability of subjects to consider and choose their own actions.  McCarthy’s first remark 
emphasizes the apparent contradiction between Foucault’s genealogies and his later 
works featuring “active agents,” so we should begin by examining more closely the role 
given to agency in these two periods.61  
Let’s consider again the potentially contradictory images we get of the subject in 
Foucault’s genealogical and ethical periods.  On the one hand, I could reassert that there 
is a common account of the relationship between power and subject formation to be 
found if only we abstract from the particulars of any given power/knowledge regime.  On 
the other hand, I must grant McCarthy that different power/knowledge regimes can form 
very different kinds of subjects.  However, part of the project of unifying the two later 
periods of Foucault’s works involved demonstrating that freedom, conceived of as choice 
in action, was an integral part of the genealogical period (and disciplinary power) all 
along.  And, as a matter of fact, one of McCarthy’s criticisms of Foucault in his middle 
period is that he unwittingly presupposes agency at the same time that he denies it.  
McCarthy’s own examples serve as a good starting point for making the case that 
power/knowledge regimes do not dictate the particular actions we take.  He even argues 
that we must exercise our own judgment in complying with the norm.  McCarthy notes 
the role of the prisoners of the Panopticon, who must be “competent” and “active” in 
order to follow the rules laid out for them.62  Further, it occasionally happens that, in 
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cases where conformity is not unconscious or habitual, following a rule or conforming to 
a norm requires an agent to judge when and how to apply the rule or norm and to choose 
whether to act in accordance with or defiance of that rule or norm.   
Indeed, examples of interpretation and choice on the part of individuals are 
abundant in Foucault’s middle works.  Discipline and Punish describes the roles of a 
variety of experts – the judge, inspector, doctor – who examine subjects, assess their 
specific circumstances, and decide what is to be done with them.  Ian Hacking further 
notes that as far back as the archaeological period, Foucault leaves room for the decisions 
of individual agents.  Although Foucault says that power is anonymous, this does not 
mean that individuals have nothing whatever to do with the functioning of power.63  As 
Hacking clarifies, it is often individuals who set up directives according to their own 
aims.  It’s just that none of them knows what kind of power all of these directives will 
add up to.64  The overall power structure unfolds without the planning of any individual 
and takes on a life of its own.  This self-organization of power is, as we have seen, the 
basis for Foucault’s focus on the analysis of power relations absent the reference to the 
actions of particular agents. 
McCarthy’s criticism of the account of the subject in the genealogical period 
relies on there being a contradiction between the subject constituted by power and the 
subject capable of self-transformation found in the ethical period.  But in fact, the project 
of unifying the two periods is only strengthened by McCarthy’s claim that there is agency 
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implicit in the genealogies.  His claim is only an objection if we assume that Foucault had 
intended to eliminate agency and inadvertently failed to do so.  
This assumption is at the heart of McCarthy’s further criticism that Foucault does 
not wish to supplement an account of agency with an account of anonymous power, that 
instead his project is one of replacement.65  McCarthy, I believe rightly, notes that a 
“commonsense view requires agency and structure to be equally basic,” but goes on to 
say that Foucault has rejected such a balance.66  But this can’t be Foucault’s aim.  Even 
as early as the forward to The Order of Things (1970), Foucault states that he does not 
think it is wrong to give a history – in this case the history of science – in terms of the 
actions of individuals – scientists.67  Rather, it is simply that the perspective of particular 
agents is the standpoint most typically adopted, and Foucault believes there to be much 
more going on in the cultural background to shape the course of science than even the 
scientist is aware of.  This suggests to me that Hacking is right about the implicit 
inclusion of the acts of individuals in Foucault’s account of power.  The switch to talking 
about anonymous power is a methodological change of focus, not a denial of the agency 
of individuals.  We must recall at this point that to say that power produces subjects is to 
say, on my reading of Foucault, that it shapes the ways in which individuals understand 
and relate to themselves.  Such a claim says nothing about which agentive capacities 
subjects have or how they came to have them.  In short, I think it’s clear that Foucault’s 
concern about domination is not about whether individuals can be agents.  But if it’s not 
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agency that is at stake in Foucault’s discussions of domination, then the question is what 
kind of freedom is present for subjects of the ethics of the care of the self that is lacking 
in disciplinary power/knowledge regimes. 
McCarthy may be asking a similar kind of question when, in addition to his 
concern about “active agents,” he raises the objection that Foucault leaves no room for 
autonomy in his pronouncement of the death of Man.  McCarthy suggests that Foucault 
rules out the very thing he needs, that is, a notion of autonomy that is “consistent with 
both the social dimensions of individual identity and the situated character of social 
action.”68  So McCarthy’s concern goes beyond worries about agency; if agency is not 
the relevant notion of freedom for resistance, then perhaps it is autonomy, a concept with 
obviously Kantian connotations. 
In responding to McCarthy’s objection, we should be clear about what the death 
of Man entails.  It is the concept of “Man” utilized and propagated by the human sciences 
that Foucault finds troubling.  This concept involves a dual conception of the subject as 
both the transcendental ground for all knowledge and the empirical object of knowledge.  
Quite apart from his perhaps contentious arguments that man as the object of knowledge 
is in perpetual tension with man as the foundation of knowledge, one reason for 
Foucault’s skepticism concerning the concept of Man is its inclusion of a transcendental 
component.  Foucault is outspoken about his rejection of such transcendental notions of 
reason and autonomy untouched by socialization.69  Talk of “the death of Man” itself 
serves as a reminder that the concept of “Man” is a construct of a particular historical 
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context.  As Ian Hacking puts it, “Foucault said the concept of man is a fraud, not that 
you and I are nothing.”70 
Now this description of the death of man involving Foucault’s rejection of the 
transcendental may already appear to grant McCarthy’s point that autonomy is missing in 
Foucault’s account.  But we should notice that even McCarthy’s description of autonomy 
is not the transcendental Kantian concept.  By taking seriously the need for a concept of 
autonomy that is consistent with the “social dimensions of individual identity,” McCarthy 
moves toward a concept of socially embedded autonomy that Foucault may very well 
endorse.  
Amy Allen argues for such a concept of autonomy in Foucault’s works by 
reminding us that the configurations of power in which we are constituted as subjects are 
our “historical a priori,” and as such, delimit the conditions of possibility for being a 
thinking subject.71  These conditions are binding whether we like it or not because we 
can’t reject them without surrendering our ability to perform intelligible actions (much in 
the same way that we would fail to make intelligible utterances if we did not conform to 
at least some linguistic conventions).  However, this is only to say that discursive 
structures set limits on thought and action, not that they prescribe a particular content for 
our thoughts and actions.72  This distinction is crucial insofar as it entails that we can 
choose our actions, but that their meaning is dependent on the discursive structure in 
which they are performed.  Again by comparison to linguistic meaning, one can choose to 
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utter any words, but if one wishes to be understood, one must be mindful of the meanings 
that the linguistic community will attach to those words.  Yet, an adequate notion of 
socially embedded autonomy will have to include not merely the ability to deliberate and 
choose among possible options, but also to reflect upon the limitations of these 
possibilities themselves.   
The notion of socially embedded autonomy will be further explored in Chapter 4.  
But for now, it’s worth saying that not everyone would grant that Foucault has even such 
a socially embedded autonomy in mind.  Linda Alcoff, for one, argues that Foucault’s 
account of our formation as subjects renders our subjectivity the primary source of our 
domination, which would then make autonomy the unattainable opposite of that 
domination.73  Indeed, on Alcoff’s reading, it may seem that our subjectivity is so 
thoroughly formed in the service of a particular power/knowledge regime that nothing we 
do can be considered genuinely our own.  Such a line of thought appears to be the basis 
of the objection to Foucault’s work by Charles Taylor that we briefly encountered in 
Chapter 1.  Taylor’s concern is that Foucault has ruled out any form of “genuine self-
discipline” by emphasizing the ways in which our work on ourselves serves systems of 
power.74  It is not hard to see why Taylor and Alcoff share this concern about the 
surreptitious use of our subjectivity to dominate us.  We have only to look to Foucault’s 
own words to show us that self-constitution never occurs outside of relations of power.  
Even if we say that “the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of 
the self, these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the individual 
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himself.  They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, 
imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group.”75  The individual 
does not work on h/erself in isolation from all cultural influence.  Recall that one of the 
things power picks out is the feature or features of the subject that are relevant to 
introspection and subject formation.   
But to take this to mean that our self-constitution is necessarily dominating is 
surely too extreme.  These worries belonging to Alcoff and Taylor rely on the assumption 
that any self-relation formed within relations of power cannot be in the interest of the 
subject itself.  To say that the features deemed relevant to subject formation are 
constructed within a historical context is to say that they are not universal or fundamental 
features of some transcendental subject.  It is not to say that any way of understanding 
what a subject is involves domination, coercion, or lies.  Insofar as we constitute 
ourselves as subjects at all, this must take place within a social system, for the subject just 
is an individual qua member of society.  We saw in Chapter 1 that the inability to escape 
all relations of power does not amount to the inability to escape domination.  There is no 
reason to assume that being constituted as a subject in relations of power automatically 
entails a system of domination.   
 So there are two reasons to believe that subjectivity is not inherently dominating.  
First, this distinction between power and domination is crucial to avoiding the claim that 
any social undertaking is a form of domination.  And secondly, we have Foucault’s 
examples of self-constitution from the ancient Greek ethics of the care of the self in 
which he goes as far as to “strongly emphasize” that forms of introspection do “not lead 
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to the constitution of oneself as an object of analysis, decipherment, and reflection,” but 
instead, “involves the subject looking closely at his own aim.”76   
There is at least the potential for non-dominating structures of subjectivity.  But 
this potential does not mean that we, here, now are not in fact dominated by the structure 
of our subjectivity.  It strikes me that this could be Alcoff’s only real concern with 
Foucault’s account of the subject.  But if this is the claim that she, and perhaps Charles 
Taylor, wishes to make, then it is not an objection.  I take it that the genealogical works 
are intended for the very purpose of showing us ways in which we were previously 
unaware of our own domination.  If our subjectivity can be a source of domination 
because autonomy itself is shaped by power, then autonomy per se cannot be the concept 
of freedom that opposes domination.   
Indeed, Foucault would have us rethink the very concept of the subject and its 
autonomy that have enabled the domination perpetrated by disciplinary power. If the 
problem is that we are, as a matter of historical fact, too attached to a concept of the 
subject that dominates us, then the question should be what we can do to detach ourselves 
from this concept in order to use our subjectivity in ways that are inimical to dominating 
power structures.77  To this end, Foucault says that the intention behind his writing is to 
describe the histories of our conceptions of ourselves in such a way as to reveal the points 
at which resistance is possible;78 he wants “to learn to what extent the effort to think 
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one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think 
differently.”79  This quotation establishes a complex relationship between history, 
thought, and freedom that will be explored in Chapter 3. 
 
 
                                                
 
 79 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 9. 
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Chapter 3: 
The Critical Project 
 
This chapter is primarily concerned with establishing the connection between 
thinking one’s own history and the ability to think differently.  Since Foucault explicitly 
links the ability to think differently to a genealogical investigation of our historical 
situation, a study of the genealogical project itself is in order.  This study will proceed by 
addressing three common positions taken with respect to the question of whether and 
how there can be a normative aspect to the genealogical project.   
Foucault is often charged with having done away with the normative resources 
with which we could offer a criticism of power/knowledge regimes.1  This assumption 
seems to be shared by proponents of Foucault and his detractors alike.  Roughly, it seems 
that there are three positions commonly occupied in the Foucault literature on this point.  
On the one hand, it is argued that Foucault’s genealogies are purely descriptive, that he is 
not engaged in offering evaluations of power or distinguishing legitimate from 
illegitimate forms of power.  On the other hand, Foucault is accused of 
“cryptonormativism,” that is, of tacitly making normative claims that he then either fails 
to acknowledge, or perhaps worse, explicitly disavows.2  Those who believe there is a 
normative component to Foucault’s genealogies then fall into two categories.  There are 
those who assert that he is employing the principles of what Nancy Fraser calls the 
“standard modern liberal normative framework” (and that he is not entitled to do so).3  
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And there are those who argue that he is employing a new or different set of principles 
(which are insufficiently elaborated for the purpose of social criticism).4   
None of these positions does justice to the Foucauldian project.  I will argue that 
the genealogical works contain both descriptive and normative threads that, respectively, 
demonstrate the historical contingency of our current model of the relationship between 
the subject and power and undertake an internal criticism of that model.  Foucault’s 
ethical period, then, describes a different model of power and a different concept of the 
autonomous subject.  While Foucault does not offer this model as an alternative for 
which we should strive, it is crucial – if we discover something distasteful about our 
current model – that we should at least in principle be able to think differently.  In short, 
the genealogical project of “thinking one’s own history” should create the detachment 
necessary in order to “think differently.” 
Genealogy as Critique 
 In his late works, Foucault describes the common project of his oeuvre as that of 
constructing “a historical ontology of ourselves.”5  Such a project aims to discover and 
describe how we came to be what we are as subjects and the limits and constraints of 
what we are as a result of these processes.  Further light can be shed on the notion of a 
historical ontology of ourselves by examining Foucault’s relationship to Kantian critique 
and the project of Enlightenment. 
 Foucault most explicitly links himself to a kind of Kantian project in his essay, 
“What Is Enlightenment?” According to Foucault, the question “Was Ist Aufklärung?” is 
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still relevant today, firstly because philosophers have failed to dispense with it since Kant 
wrote his essay of the same name; “from Hegel through Nietzsche or Max Weber to 
Horkheimer or Habermas, hardly any philosophy has failed to confront this same 
question, directly or indirectly.”6  Elsewhere, Foucault identifies himself with this same 
philosophical lineage for whom the question of Enlightenment is central.  Foucault 
identifies with Kant’s “Was Ist Aufklärung?” because it connects “a reflection on 
history” with the present moment in which the author is writing and does so for the sake 
of examining what we call knowledge.7  The thread that connects Foucault to his self-
identified philosophical lineage is precisely this emphasis on the significance of historical 
context to present philosophical inquiry. 
 Indeed, Foucault asserts that the central question of Kant’s conception of 
Enlightenment is “what difference does today make with respect to yesterday?”  In this 
question there is an attitude toward the present that strongly links Foucault’s project to 
that of Kant. This attitude involves the idea that today must be understood in relation to 
the history that led to it, as well as the idea that reflection on today can motivate a 
particular philosophical task – whether that task is Kant’s dare to us to use our reason or 
Foucault’s historical ontology of ourselves.8  This attitude, which Foucault calls “the 
attitude of modernity” is “a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent 
critique of our historical era.”9 As a “permanent critique,” the philosophical ethos that 
connects Foucault to Kant, Nietzsche, the Frankfurt School, etc. is that of continually 
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asking what is different about today.  This permanent critique involves, on the one hand, 
the ever-renewed project of taking stock of the present; for Kant this took the form of 
recognizing our immaturity with respect to the use of reason.  On the other hand, it 
involves a “limit attitude”; for Kant this took the form of recognizing the limits of our 
knowledge and the limits that our use of reason cannot go beyond.  Foucault’s historical 
ontology of ourselves is similarly concerned with a diagnosis of the present on the one 
hand and an assessment of limitations on the other.  
 Foucault’s limit-attitude, however, is directed toward uncovering the limits that we 
may transgress.  We must try to discover, in what is presented as rational and necessary, 
that which is arbitrary and contingent.  It is this project that has led scholars like Amy 
Allen to claim that Foucault’s critique of Kant is “immanent rather than total…a critique 
of critique itself, a continuation-through-transformation of that project.”10  Foucault 
suggests such a reading when he says that, “the point, in brief, is to transform the critique 
conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form 
of a possible crossing-over.”11  Foucault identifies this new limit-attitude of modernity as 
particularly well-articulated by Baudelaire, for whom, “the high value of the present is 
indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is, 
and to transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is.”12  The historical 
ontology of ourselves allows us, not to uncover the truth of who we are, but to discover 
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ourselves as constantly in-production; the task of “modern man” is to invent himself.13  
Historical Contingency 
 Because Foucault’s project is a historical ontology of ourselves, his inquiries will 
attempt to reveal “what is not or is no longer indispensible for the constitution of 
ourselves as autonomous subjects.”14  The descriptive component of Foucault’s work is 
the construction of this historical ontology of ourselves.  As an ontology, it seeks to 
describe the subject.  Yet, despite the perhaps misleading use of the term ‘ontology’, this 
description is not of a metaphysical, ahistorical subject.  Rather, the emphasis on 
historical ontology tells us that the present concept of the subject and modern forms of 
subjectivation are historically contingent.  Revealing the historical contingency of the 
concept of the subject is the first step necessary in detaching ourselves from this concept 
and discovering what is no longer indispensible for our constitution as subjects. 
The historical ontology of ourselves is therefore a kind of Kantian critical project, 
akin not to the Critique of Pure Reason, but to “Was Ist Aufklärung?” in which critique 
involves taking stock of the present and uncovering limits.  Foucault’s descriptive project 
is critical in both of these senses as it exposes the historical conditions of possibility for 
subject formation.  This project should be understood as transcendental in a very limited 
sense, which is better understood by entering into a well-known debate between Béatrice 
Han and Gary Gutting. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Foucault claims that subjects are always constituted 
within a power/knowledge regime.  Han takes this to be a metaphysical claim and offers a 
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criticism of Foucault by his own lights in asserting that “the existence of a coextensive 
relationship between knowledge and power is not simply a historical given, but a 
structural invariant,” that power-knowledge “appears here as a metaphysical entity” of 
the kind genealogy “sought to combat,” and that it “reintroduc[es] the same essentialist 
perspective that [genealogy] had attempted to render untenable.”15  Such a reading of the 
concept of the power/knowledge regime is, as Han argues, in conflict with the stated aims 
of the genealogy and undermines the idea that Foucault is searching for historical 
conditions of subject formation.  However, a careful examination of the concept of 
power/knowledge will demonstrate that Han’s understanding of it is far more robust than 
what Foucault had in mind.  
Looking at Foucault’s descriptions, of disciplinary power for example, we can see 
that he makes three kinds of claims about power.  There are empirical causal claims about 
how disciplinary power arose, e.g. that the formation of the Prussian army and the 
invention of the rifle enabled a particular kind of training of the body.  There are 
empirical generalizations about the way power works, e.g. that it tends to conceal itself.16  
And then there are conceptual claims, e.g. that some power/knowledge regime is 
necessary for the formation of the subject.  If any of these sets of claims could be seen as 
problematically transcendental, it is the last of the three. However, there are several 
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reasons to believe that Han’s characterization of power/knowledge involves too strong a 
notion of the transcendental. 
There are many different senses in which a claim can be transcendental.  But 
Foucault’s statements about power are not transcendental in any sense that is stronger 
than that of uncovering historical conditions of possibility.  First of all, the claims 
Foucault makes about power/knowledge regimes are not transcendental in the sense of 
being a priori claims; they are based on his own rigorous historical studies.  The 
generality of the claim that subjects are formed in power/knowledge regimes comes out 
of the historical studies themselves; the generality stems from an examination of the 
particulars.  Secondly, power/knowledge regimes are not ahistorical; the 
power/knowledge regime is not a structural invariant as Han claims.  There is no free-
floating metaphysical entity “the power/knowledge regime” above and beyond any of its 
historical manifestations.  Foucault emphasizes that ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ must be 
given very specific historical content and warns us that, “no one should ever think that 
there exists one knowledge or one power, or worse, knowledge or power which would 
operate in and of themselves.”17  Han acknowledges as much when she says – in her 
reply to Gutting’s review of Foucault’s Critical Project – that the conditions of 
possibility for subject formation identified by Foucault are “limited in their extension, 
historically relative and thus variable.”18  Interestingly, in her book itself, Han states that 
the concept of the power/knowledge regime found in the genealogical period plays the 
same role that the concept of the historical a priori did in the archaeological period.  And 
                                                
 17 Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?” in The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2007), 60. 
 
 18 Béatrice Han, Reply to Review of Foucault’s Critical Project by Gary Gutting, 4. 
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~beatrice/Gutting%20_answer_%202003-05.pdf 
80 
this historical a priori is distinct from a structuralist notion precisely because it is neither 
“universal” nor “invariant.”19   
Finally, Foucault instructs us to understand power/knowledge not as a 
metaphysical entity, but as “an analytical grid.”20  As a methodological tool, 
power/knowledge picks out the elements that are pertinent to Foucault’s analyses.  It has 
the strategic benefit of “preventing the perspective of legitimation from coming into play 
as it does when the terms knowledge (connaissance) and domination are used.”21  
Foucault’s claims about power/knowledge regimes are therefore transcendental only in 
the sense of spelling out the historical conditions of possibility for subject formation.  
Though they are not at the same level of description as the empirical claims for which 
there are counterexamples, his use of the term ‘power/knowledge regime’ is best 
understood as a lens that allows us to see features of our social world that had hitherto 
gone unnoticed. 
Since the methodological concept of the power/knowledge regime serves as a grid 
of analysis for any given set of historical conditions for subject formation, it is a formal 
element of that analysis.  The general notion of the power/knowledge regime does not 
provide the substantive content for any of the historically particular forms that 
power/knowledge takes.  Instead, the schematic use of power/knowledge brings to light 
the historically specific conditions of subject formation in particular historical contexts, 
including what Foucault calls “problematizations.”   
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Foucault uses this term to describe the process by which concepts became 
problems, or central questions for us.  The most concrete descriptions of 
problematizations and their relationship to Foucault’s own work occur in The History of 
Sexuality Vol. 2 and Fearless Speech.  In the latter, he describes “the process of 
‘problematization’—which means: how and why certain things (behavior, phenomena, 
processes) became a problem.”22  He goes on to say that a problematization is “an 
answer” that “appears as a reply to some concrete and specific aspect of the world.”23  
His own works identify and analyze this process of problematization.24 As early as The 
Order of Things, Foucault describes his work as uncovering the “conditions that make a 
controversy or problem possible.”25   
The problematization then, is already a product of the past.  This is perhaps even 
more clear from statements we find in Discipline and Punish and Abnormal, in which 
Foucault discusses respectively “the problematization of the criminal behind his crime” 
and “the problem of the instincts” as the condition that enabled the general application of 
psychiatric power both inside and outside of the asylum.26  In these cases we can see that 
the problematization is the object that is believed to hold the answers to a question.  In 
asking what explains the crime, the 18th century created the problematization of the 
character or nature of the criminal.  In probing the psychological motivation for an 
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agent’s actions, the instincts were problematized.  In searching for the key that unlocks 
the secret of our sexual identities, the 19th century produced the problematization of 
desire.  Problematizations, in short, are sites of inquiry into the subject that promise to 
deliver answers about the nature of the subject’s identity.  The historical ontology of 
ourselves, then, is generated by examining the problematizations that make up the 
relevant material for subject formation so that we may then ask whether any of these 
problematizations are indispensible for our constitution as subjects. 
It is sometimes supposed that Foucault’s own method of inquiry is a form of 
problematization.  It may even be tempting to say that Foucault problematizes the 
concept of the power/knowledge regime.27  However, I wish to argue against the 
ascription of the term ‘problematization’ to Foucault’s methodology in order to keep 
distinct two very different sets of aims.  Both Foucault’s descriptive project and his 
understanding of the term ‘problematization’ can be further clarified by an examination 
of their differences. 
We should emphasize, first of all, the strategic function of the genealogies.  
Historical problematizations are sites of inquiry that underpin particular 
power/knowledge regimes, such as disciplinary power, biopower, or an ethics of the care 
of the self.  These problematizations do not arise from the work of a single individual, but 
rather, like the operation of power discussed in Chapter 1, are the culmination and 
coadunation of various, often disparate, practices.  To classify Foucault’s own method as 
problematization overlooks the fact that the genealogies are a single agent’s act of 
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resistance.   They are not an attempt to make power/knowledge the new key to our secret 
identities; rather, the genealogies aim to release us from the hold that our own 
power/knowledge regime has on our conceptions of ourselves as subjects.   
But perhaps the more crucial difference is that these historical problematizations 
already presupposed particular aspects of the subject as the relevant material for the 
constitution of their identities.  Foucault’s investigations, by contrast, undermine the idea 
that any of these conceptions of the subject are natural, necessary, or self-evident.  While 
a problematization identifies a specific source of a subject’s identity, the analytical grid 
of power/knowledge does not pick out an aspect of the subject as the relevant material for 
subject formation.  Instead, it allows problematizations to show up as objects of analysis.  
Nevertheless, there is a clear connection between historically particular 
power/knowledge regimes and our formation as subjects. Foucault urges us to look at 
these power/knowledge regimes, with their own problematizations, in order to reveal the 
contingency of such regimes and such ways of conceptualizing our own subjectivity.  The 
project of exposing the contingency of our ways of thinking is an element in Foucault’s 
transformed Kantian project of determining limits that we may transgress.   
 By shifting the focus to power/knowledge, Foucault reveals that the contingency 
of past problematizations rests on their status as discourses.  To problematize desire is at 
the same time to produce the discourse of sexuality as a way of making sense of desires 
and the behaviors they inspire.  One might argue that desire is nothing new; but to say 
that desire was problematized in the 19th century is not to claim that desires didn’t exist 
until that time.  It’s to say that desire as the key to our sexual identities was an idea that 
emerged in a particular configuration of power/knowledge in the 19th century, replacing 
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the medieval Christian problematization of the flesh.  But then it may be tempting to say 
that the discourse of sexuality tracks ‘the truth’ in some way, that Freud ‘discovered’ 
sexuality in the same way that Newton discovered gravity; and the fact that gravity was 
discovered at a particular historical moment does not make the truth of gravity 
historically contingent.  It’s not something we can do away with.  So what is different in 
the case of sexuality?  Or the instincts or a criminal nature for that matter?   
These problematizations are contingent precisely because they exist at the level of 
discourse.  Insofar as sexuality is a discourse, it is a way of speaking and behaving; it 
doesn’t exist in the absence of this speech and behavior in the sense that gravity exists 
whether or not we have discovered it.  The mere fact that desires exist is not enough to 
make them the key to our sexual identities any more than did the existence of the flesh or 
pleasures during the eras of their problematization before the problematization of desire.  
Although Foucault has very little to say about the metaphysics of the subject, it would be 
easy enough for him to allow that there are determinate features of human beings – that 
we have desires may be among them – but that these features radically underdetermine 
the cultural concepts that we take to define our identities.  Foucault’s project of 
describing problematizations and identifying them as particular discourses then allows 
him to expose their contingency.   
Genealogy’s ability to reveal historical contingency is one important focus of the 
essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.”  It is here that Foucault introduces the idea that 
genealogy “opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’,” where the idea of the ‘origin’ 
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indicates an essential nature or a unified foundation.28  Where Foucault clearly identifies 
a deep connection with Nietzsche’s work is in the idea that “genealogy does not resemble 
the evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people.”29  It does not map a 
destiny because there is a clear rejection of the idea of a telos to history.30  But even 
without the idea of a telos, genealogy is not in the business of tracings evolutions, as is 
most evident in the structure of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals.  The three 
essays contained in this work focus on different factors that all come together in the 
formation and reinforcement of modern ‘slave’ morality: the rise of Christian culture, the 
pre-historical use of punishment as repayment of debt, and an asceticism that is not 
linked to any particular time.   
Though none of Foucault’s works is so ambitious as to give a general genealogy 
of morals, the same weaving together of disparate threads can be seen in his specific 
genealogies, e.g., of punishment, abnormality, and sexuality.  Taking Abnormal as an 
example, we can see that Foucault exposes the ways in which practices of confession 
have been co-opted by the field of psychoanalysis, but for very different purposes.  
Rather than seeking forgiveness for sin, the psychoanalytic patient seeks her 
identification as ‘normal’ and means to correct what is ‘abnormal’.  It is by revealing the 
similarity of these practices that Foucault highlights the differences in their 
interpretations.  Though Foucault identifies psychoanalysis as the heir to confession 
because both take sexuality as a central focus, it is not because psychoanalysis evolved 
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from confession.31  Rather, a set of once-unrelated knowledges (medical, legal, familial) 
– no doubt driven by a general increase in the validity assumed of scientific knowledge – 
merged over a relatively short period of time resulting in the medicalization of 
abnormality.32  Rather than tracing evolutions from a singular point, as genealogists, both 
Nietzsche and Foucault embark on a search for descent that “disturbs what was 
previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the 
heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself;” it disrupts unifying 
interpretations by showing the disunity of the elements that make up our modern 
practices.33  
One of the ways in which genealogy accomplishes this disruption is by creating 
what Foucault calls a “counter-memory.”34  A counter-memory is opposed to what 
Foucault calls “traditional history,” that is, the kind of history that weaves a coherent 
narrative, recognizes elements of the past in the present, and creates a unified foundation 
for our values and practices.  A counter-memory unearths the overlooked elements of 
history that cannot be integrated into such projects.  Whereas Nietzsche attempted to 
construct a counter-memory on a grand scale and toward an ambitious goal by reviving 
the values of the classical empire against the weight of 1800 years of Christian morality, 
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Foucault’s genealogies provide a more modest counter-memory in the form of fine-
grained histories of modern practices. 
Though it is only in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” – written just before he 
made the switch from archaeology to genealogy – that Foucault discusses the idea of a 
counter-memory, echoes of this idea can be found at the midpoint of his genealogical 
period in the 1975-6 lecture course, Society Must be Defended.  It is in this work that 
Foucault describes the critical force of what he calls the “insurrection of subjugated 
knowledges.”35  He goes on to explain that by “subjugated knowledges,” he has two 
things in mind.  The first is very much like what he had earlier described in the idea of a 
counter-memory.  Subjugated knowledges are, on the one hand, “the historical contents 
that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematizations” and 
which “allow us to see the dividing lines in the confrontations and struggles that 
functional arrangements or systematic organizations are designed to mask.”36  On the 
other hand, there is a second sense in which Foucault would have us understand 
subjugated knowledges.  They are local knowledges, “disqualified as nonconceptual 
knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically 
inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or 
scientificity.”37  These subjugated knowledges in the second sense are identified as the 
knowledge possessed by the psychiatric patient, the ill person, the nurse, or the doctor.38  
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It may not strike us as at all strange that Foucault should be interested in what is known 
by the psychiatric patient or the ill person, or generally by those who are most obviously 
the subjects of potentially dominating relations of power.  Their position may indeed 
allow them to understand the operation of power and its mechanisms and techniques 
better than those who approach “the disciplines” from the perspective of their scientific 
validity.  What is perhaps most interesting, though, is that subjugated knowledges also 
include those of the nurse and the doctor.  Here we should understand Foucault not as 
referring to medical knowledge, but to everyday practical knowledge, the nuanced 
proficiency with which these experts are able to navigate in their roles.  Such practical 
knowledge may well be below the level of articulation on the part of the expert and be as 
revealing of the real mechanisms of power as the knowledge possessed by their patients.   
All of these local forms of knowledge serve to dispel the idea that the concepts 
and practices we take for granted form a non-contradictory, unified system that rests on a 
foundation that is firmer than the historically contingent merging of once-distinct 
elements.  Casting doubt on the existence of a legitimate foundation for our concepts and 
practices at the same time that they are exposed as historically contingent provides the 
conceptual release necessary for us to be able to call these concepts and practices into 
question.   
But then we are left with a further question.  What is the status of these 
subjugated knowledges or Foucault’s own counter-discourse that invites us to focus on 
power/knowledge as a new axis of inquiry?  Do they merely produce more historically 
contingent discourses?  Yes.  But why are we inclined to say that Foucault’s genealogies 
“merely” produce another discourse?   
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We must make allowance for the complex and unstable 
process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and 
an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, 
a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
strategy.  Discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it 
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.39 
 
Foucault suggests here that we should assess the value of his contribution in terms of its 
success as a strategy of resistance.  On this point, Foucault makes the provocative 
suggestion that “truth is in the future.”40  While of course his genealogies must be 
evaluated in terms of the truth of the empirical claims they make, their real significance 
as a contribution to discourse will lie in what we make of them, in the paths of resistance 
that they open up for us.   
In this suggestion that genealogy, insofar as it produces a new discourse, may be 
able to change relations of power, we already implicitly run into a project that is more 
than merely descriptive. To be sure, there is an important descriptive element to 
Foucault’s works in the exposure of the historical contingency of any particular 
power/knowledge regime.  Characterizing Foucault’s genealogies as purely descriptive 
would even have the benefit of avoiding several problems, e.g. that Foucault commits the 
genetic fallacy or that he undermines his own normative claims (since he wouldn’t be 
making any).  But a purely descriptive reading of the genealogies creates problems that 
are even more serious than those it seeks to avoid. 
Taking Foucault’s project to be one of pure description once again ignores the 
strategic element of his work.  The critical project is already set up as at least the 
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preliminary undertaking necessary for a project that is political in nature.  Foucault wants 
to find “the connections that can be identified between mechanisms of coercion and 
elements of knowledge” in order to delegitimize the practices by which we constitute 
ourselves as subjects.41  He wants to show us that these power/knowledge ensembles “are 
not at all obvious in the sense that whatever habits or routines may have made them 
familiar to us, whatever the blinding force of the power mechanisms they call into play or 
whatever justifications they may have developed, they were not made acceptable by any 
originally existing right.”42  The point of the kind of critique that exposes contingency is 
to make us skeptical of the assumptions on which our accepted practices rest in order to 
break the force of habit that binds us to them. 
This questioning of assumptions is yet another form of critique that Foucault 
identifies in Kant’s “Was Ist Aufklärung?”  As Foucault interprets Kant’s call to cast off 
our immaturity, Kant is invoking a notion of critique as “the movement by which the 
subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question 
power on its discourses of truth.”43  But going well beyond Kant, Foucault will invert the 
further link between the critique of reason and the legitimacy of power.  As Foucault 
reads Kant, it is “once one has gotten an adequate idea of one’s own knowledge and its 
limits, that the principle of autonomy can be discovered.  One will then no longer have to 
hear the obey; or rather, the obey will be founded on autonomy itself.”44  Putting these 
two Kantian ideas together, we see that Kant had the optimistic idea that reason and 
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autonomy can help combat illegitimate uses of power.  However, for Foucault, the 
investigation into the conditions and the limits of our constitution as subjects yields the 
striking revelation that reason and autonomy themselves are not divorced from their 
historical contexts.  Foucault thereby performs an immanent critique of critique itself, 
undermining our recourse to autonomy as a stable foundation from which to question 
effects of power. Indeed, Foucault turns the relationship between obedience and 
autonomy on its head, as his middle period genealogies show us the ways in which our 
modern autonomy is formed out of our obedience, rather than discovering that the ‘obey’ 
is founded on autonomy. 
The Internal Criticism of Modern Autonomy 
 
 The autonomous subject founded on the principle of obedience is linked, for 
Foucault, to the Enlightenment, humanism, and the human sciences.  The subject as 
understood in these traditions is at once transcendental – the condition of possibility for 
knowledge and meaning – and empirical – the object of a body of knowledge.  Foucault 
intends to demonstrate that such a concept of the subject has led to new forms of 
domination, even as the humanist project sought liberation through the invocation of 
human rights.  At first blush, it might seem that such a demonstration requires adopting a 
standpoint other than that presupposed by these traditions.  And to be sure, one of the 
most important methodological maneuvers of both Foucault’s descriptive and normative 
projects is to detranscendentalize the subject.  In another Kantian reversal, rather than 
taking the subject to be the condition of possibility for knowledge, we must explore the 
historically variable conditions of possibility for being a subject.  This is Foucault’s aim 
in taking power/knowledge as his analytical grid. 
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 A successful application of this methodological tool would enable us to see that 
the transcendental subject itself, instead of serving as a philosophically robust foundation, 
turns out to be another symptom of a particular power/knowledge regime.  Yet, Béatrice 
Han argues that Foucault himself cannot escape the standpoint of the transcendental 
subject.  Han’s argument on this point is structurally identical to her argument, earlier 
examined, regarding the transcendental nature of power/knowledge.  Subjectivation, she 
claims, always necessarily has the same form, even if its historical contents vary 
dramatically.45 
 As we saw in Chapter 2, Han is quite right that Foucault describes common 
schematic elements that highlight particular features of historical forms of subject 
formation.  ‘Subjectivation’ refers to the general procedures involved in subject 
formation.  These procedures involve picking out some aspect of the subject as the 
relevant “ethical substance” – that is, some part of the subject must be the focus of 
subject formation.  One may focus on acts, desires, the movements of the soul, the 
intensity of feeling experienced, or any number of alternatives involved in the process of 
determining ethical conduct.  There must also be a way in which the individual 
recognizes her obligation to behave in accordance with a broad ethical system (or narrow 
moral code).  This may also take a variety of forms, from recognizing oneself to be part 
of an ethical community that adheres to certain standards to seeking to provide an 
example of a beautiful life for posterity.  There is an “elaboration of ethical work” – that 
is, what one must do in order to be a subject of a particular ethical system.  And finally, 
there is a “telos of the ethical subject” – that is, the reason for engaging in ethical 
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conduct, whether that’s in order to become master of oneself, in order to achieve 
tranquility of the soul, or in order to achieve salvation in an afterlife.46  
But just as Han overstated the case for a metaphysical transcendental reading of 
the power/knowledge regime, so too does she overstate the case with respect to 
subjectivation.  In spite of the specificity with which Foucault describes the formal 
elements of subject formation, they nevertheless maintain the status of abstractions from 
historically manifest particular cases.  To say that subjectivation requires a relationship 
between the subject and truth or a process of recognition may appear more contentful 
than the description of an abstract power/knowledge that we encountered in Han’s earlier 
argument.  But we must not forget that just as there is not one power or one knowledge, 
there is not one truth or one recognition.  In his later works describing the transformations 
involved in the relationship between the subject and truth, Foucault is explicit about the 
fact that they were accompanied by “the transformation of the notion of truth itself.”47  
The concept and process of recognition is less explicitly discussed by Foucault, but it is 
similarly clear that the relevant notion changes from one power/knowledge regime to 
another, not only with respect to who is being recognized (a moral subject, a subject of 
true discourse, a subject of knowledge) but also in terms of whose recognition matters 
(that of the subject h/erself, h/er friends, h/er community at large).  We should therefore 
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treat this abstract process of subjectivation in the same way we treated power/knowledge: 
as a methodological lens rather than a substantive metaphysical entity.48 
 Han, however, has another significant worry.  Foucault often employs language 
that we associate with the standpoint of a transcendental subject.  Especially when 
discussing subject formation in an ethics of the care of the self, Foucault acknowledges 
the important roles of freedom and reflection.  Nancy Fraser, too, worries that Foucault is 
tacitly employing such concepts in his normative evaluation of modernity even as he 
attempts to reject them.49  Fraser worries that Foucault implicitly appeals to the values of 
what she has called “the standard modern liberal normative framework.”50  This 
framework conceives of power as operating top-down, emanating from a sovereign and 
being imposed on individuals.  It respects the rights and dignity of the individual 
sovereignty of subjects, and it adopts definitions of ‘freedom’ and ‘liberation’ as the 
opposite of the terms ‘domination’ and ‘repression’.  The idea that domination and 
repression are abuses of power also indicates that this framework contains a distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power.51 
 Foucault, of course, must reject some of what goes into the standard modern 
liberal normative framework as spelled out by Fraser, if only because he does not believe 
that power in late modernity operates in a top-down fashion.  But of course, Han and 
Fraser are both correct that Foucault often sounds like he’s invoking the values of this 
modern liberal framework.  It is at this point that we must distinguish between two 
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different modes of criticism offered by Foucault.  Although he does not subscribe to the 
“standard modern liberal normative framework” as the normative framework of social 
criticism, this does not preclude the possibility of an internal critique of modern values.  
At least one of the projects of the genealogies is to convince us, we modern Western 
readers, that by our own lights there is something troubling about the ways in which we 
relate to ourselves as subjects.  While Foucault’s descriptive project releases us from the 
feeling that our concept of the subject is natural or necessary, that is not enough to 
suggest that we ought to change it.  We need a further normative evaluation that leaves us 
dissatisfied with the ways in which we relate to ourselves as subjects.  Internal criticism 
creates just this sense of dissatisfaction and further motivates us to adopt new modes of 
subject formation. 
 The work of internal criticism proceeds by revealing that we are not achieving our 
own aims.  For example, Foucault shows us that the language of “liberation from 
repression” has led to unnoticed forms of domination.  Foucault believes that we still 
view ourselves as the products of repressive Victorian ideals, especially around the 
subject of sexuality.  Furthermore, we are tantalized in modern society by promises of 
liberation from this repression.  Foucault would have us see that the problem of 
repression as silence is not really present in modern Western society.  Rather, there is 
abundant discourse on sexuality and on this idea of repression itself.  Indeed, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, it is gratifying for us to define the relationship between sex and power in 
terms of repression.  Again, “the speaker’s benefit” relies on the idea that as long as 
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sexuality is taboo, speaking about it gives one a taste of liberation; it provides a sense of 
freedom that is just enough to quench one’s thirst for freedom.52   
 But what this abundance of speech encourages is a proliferation of knowledge 
about deviant sexualities.  It allows people to be categorized by their sexual pleasures in a 
way that calls for a normalizing judgment.  This is taken to an extreme in a discipline like 
psychoanalysis in which one’s speech about one’s own sexuality serves as a site for the 
hold of an authority figure who can judge one to be normal or abnormal.  Though the 
uncovering of the truth of one’s sexuality was intended to liberate the subject, what it 
succeeded in doing was creating an ordered society of individuals capable of being 
categorized and normalized.   
This internal criticism demonstrates that our invocation of an opposition between 
repression and liberation has failed to produce our liberation.  But Foucault’s problem 
with modern Western society is not exactly that we aren’t really liberated.  The problem 
is that when we use binary oppositions such as that of repression vs. liberation, we mask 
the way in which power really operates, and thereby perpetuate the ways in which we are 
actually dominated under disciplinary power/knowledge regimes. 
Some of the work of internal criticism, then, will proceed by describing the ways 
in which the operation of disciplinary power is at odds with modern liberal values.  For 
example, the description of a panoptic disciplinary society offered in Discipline and 
Punish should already make us uncomfortable with the idea that, through self-
surveillance, we have become our own prison guards.  But perhaps more needs to be said 
about the sources of this discomfort.  If we adopt something like the standard modern 
liberal normative framework, one might suppose that illegitimate uses of power are those 
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that impinge upon the individual sovereignty of human subjects.  Lives that are subject to 
strict scrutiny and an extreme degree of control by an other are deemed oppressive.  Only 
in the prison, when one has broken the social contract and is in need of rehabilitation, do 
we accept a seizure of liberty. 
 But the prison looks like the factory and the schoolhouse.  Inmates of all of these 
institutions are monitored and subjected to strict schedules that limit unstructured time.  
They are designed in such a way as to limit opportunities for delinquent behavior.  Any 
other goals are at best secondary to this one.  In the factory, the goal of productivity is 
ensured by strict surveillance.  But worse than this is what becomes of the liberal ideal of 
education.  If the liberal ideal is to promote the use of reason, individual sovereignty, the 
ability to be a good citizen who serves as a check on government power, then these goals 
are wholly in conflict with the actual surveillance and control imposed on students.   
 This elaboration of the sources of our discomfort in reading Discipline and Punish 
may be helpful insofar as it demonstrates Foucault’s use of internal critique; he shows us 
that we are failing to meet our own liberal goals.  But at the same time, this elaboration 
already overanalyzes and intellectualizes the reaction Foucault is trying to provoke from 
his readers.  Even if you don’t have a robust philosophical account of liberal values at the 
forefront of your mind, it’s enough for you to think, “Surely our schools ought not look 
like prisons.”  
But in fact, it seems that at least one philosophically robust notion of autonomy 
leads to the opposite conclusion, that there is nothing wrong in a disciplinary society.  
Nancy Fraser takes up and extends the Habermasian idea that the internalization of an 
authority figure is necessary for the development of autonomy.  The image is that of the 
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child who internalizes h/er parents’ rules and norms and then grows up to have the 
critical capacities to reflect upon and assess their validity.53  In an extension of this view, 
Fraser argues that in a perfectly disciplined society, the internalized norms “would not be 
experienced as coming from without.  The members of this society would, therefore, be 
autonomous.”54  In the discussion of schools that look like prisons, I already conceded 
that we think power is used illegitimately when we are controlled by an other.  But on 
Fraser’s description of a perfectly disciplined society, we are controlled only by 
ourselves, and, she thinks, there can be no problem with that.  Fraser claims that we are 
only uncomfortable with Foucault’s description of such a society because it is written in 
such a way as to invite the genetic fallacy.55  So Fraser says, “if that’s discipline, I’m for 
it.”56 
 Several questions arise from Fraser’s criticism of Foucault.  Do his works commit 
the genetic fallacy?  Are the specific norms internalized during the formation of 
autonomous subjects really irrelevant for our evaluation of autonomy?  Why should we 
accept that with the internalization of any set of norms there comes a point at which the 
subject inevitably becomes critically reflective?  Amy Allen addresses these questions in 
response to Fraser and Habermas. 
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 Allen first points out, and we should keep in mind, that Foucault is not merely 
critical of the concept of autonomy.57  Indeed, at times there is implicit praise for the 
Enlightenment even with its concept of autonomy because, as we saw at the beginning of 
this chapter, it has promoted the project of “a permanent critique of our historical era” – 
Foucault’s very own project.  What concerns Foucault is the way in which he views 
Enlightenment autonomy (which is more or less the model Habermas has in mind) as 
inextricably linked to disciplinary power.  Foucault’s criticism does not cut across all 
concepts of autonomy, and even relies upon the idea that “autonomy is made up of 
contingent practices with a specific history.”58 
 Nevertheless, Foucault is obviously critical of certain aspects of disciplinary 
power, and we must therefore question the historically specific form of autonomy that has 
enabled that kind of power.  And in performing this inquiry, he is accused of committing 
the genetic fallacy.  The idea behind the genetic fallacy is that features relevant to the 
origin of a belief, practice, theory, etc. are wholly irrelevant to the evaluation of the truth, 
legitimacy, or value of that belief, practice, theory, etc.  Allen, in refuting this criticism, 
draws upon oft-neglected literature that demonstrates that not all genetic arguments are 
fallacious.  She makes an important distinction between structural and historical accounts 
of autonomy; “structural accounts focus solely on an individual’s current 
capacities…historical accounts, by contrast, focus not only on an individual’s capacities 
for critical reflection, but also on the process by which the individual came to have the 
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desires (motives, values, beliefs) that she has.”59  For example, on a historical account of 
autonomy, it would be a violation of autonomy to brainwash a person into holding a 
particular set of beliefs.60  Where Foucault extends the historical account is in examining 
not only how we come to have the beliefs and desires that we do, but also how we come 
to have our very capacity for critical reflection.61 
 Here Allen spells out two perspectives by which one might come to question the 
process of acquiring the capacity for critical reflection as well as potential problems with 
each perspective.  On the “internalist” approach, one “asks what the agent would think 
were she to reflect on that causal history” by which she came to acquire the capacity for 
autonomy.62  If Foucault adopts this approach, then he merely reveals the connections 
between power and autonomy and leaves it up to his readers what to make of this.  
Without being prescriptive, the internalist approach would seek to show individuals by 
their own lights that there is something worth criticizing in the process by which they 
came to have their capacities for critical reflection.  The concern regarding this approach 
is that autonomy could be so malformed as to lead us to endorse the historical conditions 
in which we are formed only because we “have been so thoroughly disciplined by 
them.”63  Allen ultimately rejects this perspective, though I think she is too hasty in doing 
so.  We have already seen that there is an element of internal criticism in Foucault’s 
works, and indeed, he must be seen as adopting the internalist perspective when he states, 
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“It is important to say how a certain regime functions, what it consists in, and to prevent a 
whole series of manipulations and mystifications.  But the choice has to be made by 
people themselves.”64 
 Allen argues instead for an externalist reading of Foucault in which he would seek 
to demonstrate that, “when measured by standards that are external to the perspective of 
individual agents, the crucial role that disciplinary power plays in the formation of 
subjects renders their putative autonomy suspect.”65  In the externalist approach, a third-
person perspective is taken in asking whether the process by which the agent acquired 
h/er autonomy is legitimate.66  The problem with such an approach is that, external to the 
perspective of the agent, it is difficult to specify “the conditions that constrain autonomy 
without arbitrarily labeling as non-autonomous those whose beliefs, values, and forms of 
life with which we happen to disagree.”67  Although Allen endorses the externalist 
reading of Foucault, she stops short of discussing what alternative standards Foucault 
might be employing.  Nancy Fraser would argue that this is because no such alternatives 
can be found in Foucault.  As she says, “I find no clues in Foucault’s writings as to what 
his alternative norms might be.”   
Gary Gutting is at least more charitable to Foucault in acknowledging that the 
rejection of the “technical terms of idealist philosophy” need not mean that Foucault 
cannot employ terms like ‘freedom’ and ‘reflection’ as “everyday features of human 
                                                
 64 Michel Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault” in Power: The Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault 1954-1984 Vol. 3, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: The New Press, 2000), 294. 
 
 65 Allen, “The Entanglement of Power and Validity,” 91. 
 
 66 Ibid., 90. 
 
 67 Ibid., 90-91. 
102 
life.”68  So we need not choose between Han, who thinks Foucault does employ the 
technical terms of idealist philosophy, and Fraser, who cannot find an alternative use for 
these terms.  Foucault is keenly sensitive to the changing senses of the concepts of ‘self’, 
‘freedom’, ‘reflection’, ‘truth’, etc.  His works are devoted to tracing the histories of these 
very concepts and their transformations.  It would be most uncharitable indeed to 
presume that he imports modern Enlightenment concepts back into the ancient Greek care 
of the self rather than acknowledging the fact that terms like ‘freedom’ have different 
meanings in these different contexts.  This is why Gutting reminds us that, “in their 
everyday sense, freedom and reflection do not imply Kantian (or Sartrean) autonomy” 
and thereby leaves us with the apt and clever “metaphysical equivalent to Freud’s famous 
reminder that sometimes a cigar is just a cigar.”69 
 Although it may appear that Foucault leaves no room for autonomy at all, in fact 
his works show us only that autonomy as conceived in the Enlightenment is a sham.  This 
form of autonomy is understood as the freedom of the subject who is bound only by 
principles derived from the use of h/er own reason.  The humanist tradition that has 
adopted it has, contrary to its aims, led to an increase of domination.  What is needed, 
therefore, is a reconception of autonomy and the Enlightenment framework that supports 
it.  We can precisify the terms of Foucault’s criticism of modern autonomy by returning 
to the comparison we made in Chapter 2 between subjects of disciplinary power and 
subjects of an ethics of the care of the self.  As Béatrice Han suggests, “the Greek 
                                                
 68 Gary Gutting, “Foucault’s Critical Project,” review of Foucault’s Critical Project, by Béatrice Han, 
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, May 1, 2003, http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23402-foucault-s-critical-
project/. 
 
 69 Gary Gutting, “Foucault, Hegel, and Philosophy” in Foucault and Philosophy, ed. Timothy O’Leary 
and Christopher Falzon (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 33. 
103 
model… plays the role of a simpler first matrix from which to evaluate a contrario 
modernity.”70 
Thinking Differently 
 It is sometimes supposed that Foucault is most interested in preserving freedom in 
the sense of negative liberty.  And indeed, he has even had occasion to characterize 
critique itself as “the art of not being governed quite so much.”71  However, I believe that 
when we identify the kind of freedom at stake in the criticism of disciplinary power, we 
ought to focus instead on Foucault’s question of “how not to be governed like that.”72  
The problem with disciplinary power regimes is not, or not only, that they govern too 
much.  They also govern in such a way as to limit a positive conception of freedom that 
we have all but forgotten in favor of theories of human rights.73  In his works on the 
ancient Greek care of the self, Foucault emphasizes that this ethics was geared toward 
self-mastery or skillful self-management.  Highlighting the ways in which the care of the 
self enabled the skillful management of one’s own life renders visible, by contrast, the 
degree to which this self-mastery is lacking in a disciplinary power/knowledge regime.  
Here we have something like a combination of what Allen calls the internalist and 
externalist readings of Foucault’s criticism of our autonomy.  On the externalist reading, 
Foucault offers up a concept of freedom that we don’t often employ for the purpose of 
social criticism, so it is an alternative standard of evaluation.  On the other hand, Foucault 
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does not exactly argue in favor of this alternative understanding of freedom.  Instead, he 
shows us what it would look like, and takes the internalist approach of allowing his 
readers to judge whether or not it is an attractive alternative.   In the move from detaching 
us from our concept of the autonomous subject toward enabling us to think differently, 
Foucault shows us that disciplinary power/knowledge regimes preclude this type of 
freedom as self-management, but leaves it to us to decide if that lack is problematic.   
 Recalling the discussion of ancient Greek ethics from Chapter 2, we have already 
seen that this ethics did not take the form of a codified, universal set of principles by 
which everyone was expected to live.  And what’s more, it did not take the form of a set 
of prohibitions, but instead called for sincere contemplation in the areas of life in which 
one enjoyed the most liberty.  For example, we might compare the moralization of 
sexuality in Christianity as a contrary model.  Traditional Christian morality, we know, 
prescribes and prohibits specific sexual acts.  Sex takes place within a heterosexual, 
monogamous marriage, and for the purpose of procreation.  All else is sinful.  In the 
ethics of the care of the self, the regulation of sexual activity was based on one’s 
particular circumstances.  There was no prohibition against sex between men, for 
example, but one had to consider carefully one’s role in this arrangement in order to 
ensure that one was not being overly submissive and thereby sacrificing the self-mastery 
that was the ethical goal of one’s life.74  The virtue of abstention, too, depended on one’s 
personal goals.  The athlete might renounce sexual pleasure in order to divert his energies 
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into his athletic pursuits, but abstention was not a virtue per se.75  With respect to the 
ethics of sexuality, the Greeks employed the term “chrēsis aphrodisiōn,” which “referred 
to the manner in which an individual managed his sexual activity, his way of conducting 
himself in such matters, the regimen he allowed himself or imposed on himself…”76  
Recalling from Chapter 1 Foucault’s definition of government as involving the dual 
meaning of ‘conduct’, the significance of chrēsis aphrodisiōn becomes clear.  Its crucial 
elements are self-government and self-direction – not the self-government that comes 
from internalizing the gaze of an authority figure or a set of precepts, but the self-
government that comes from an examination of one’s aims and consideration of the best 
means of achieving them. 77 
 Because the care of the self required that individuals make a careful study of their 
own specific aims and direct their actions in accordance with these aims, it was necessary 
that one be prepared to face any number of situations.  Especially trying were those 
situations that might drum up temptation or in which one might be most liable to act 
immoderately or in a way that was contrary to one’s own goals.78  The sense of freedom 
involved in this self-government, then, is contrasted not with heteronomy but with 
                                                
 75 Ibid., 20.  Nietzsche makes a similar point in On the Genealogy of Morals 3.8.  Even as the third 
essay of this work denounces asceticism as an unhealthy turning inward of the instinct to cruelty, he praises 
the “chastity” of philosophers and athletes: 
“There is nothing in this of chastity from any kind of ascetic scruple or hatred of the senses…it is rather the 
will of their dominating instinct, at least during their periods of great pregnancy.  Every artist knows what a 
harmful effect intercourse has in states of great spiritual tension and preparation; those with the greatest 
power and the surest instincts do not need to learn this by experience, by unfortunate experience – their 
“maternal” instinct ruthlessly disposes of all other stores and accumulations of energy, of animal vigor, for 
the benefit of the evolving work: the greater energy then uses up the lesser.”  Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the 
Genealogy of Morals” in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern 
Library, 2000), 3.8. 
 
 76 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 53. My emphasis.  
 
 77 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 222. 
 
 78 Ibid., 184. 
106 
enslavement, being a slave to oneself.79  One had to be master of oneself to such a degree 
as to face a variety of circumstances with unwavering commitment to one’s goals.  Here 
we arrive at the important notion of “paraskeuē”: 
the equipping, the preparation of the subject and the soul so 
that they will be properly, necessarily, and sufficiently 
armed for whatever circumstance of life may arise. 
Paraskeuē is precisely what will make possible resistance 
to every impulse and temptation that may come from the 
external world. Paraskeuē is what will enable one both to 
achieve one’s aim and to remain stable, settled on this aim, 
not letting oneself be swayed by anything.80 
 
The most important notion of freedom, then, in an ethics of the care of the self was to 
build a kind of savoir-faire, the ability to manage oneself skillfully in practical matters 
and to tailor one’s approach to the varying conditions of need, status, time, and any other 
mélange of circumstances.81  It is for this reason that the ancient Greeks problematized 
food, drink, sexual activities, etc.82  The concept of regimen was vital for the production 
of this positive notion of freedom as self-mastery and preparedness.  Again, regimen is 
not a set “of universal and uniform rules,” but “a treatise for adjusting one’s behavior to 
fit the circumstances.”83 
 This notion of autonomy as self-direction in accordance with one’s aims can be 
better understood by examining Nietzsche’s “sovereign individual.”  This “emancipated 
individual” is contrasted with those who have been made uniform, regular, and calculable 
by “the morality of mores,” that is, through the laws and customs of society. The 
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sovereign individual is emancipated precisely in the same sense that Foucault’s self-
governing individual is free from being a slave to himself or to circumstance.  Nietzsche 
goes as far as to say that the sovereign individual’s “mastery over himself also 
necessarily gives him mastery over circumstances.”84  But the most striking claim made 
by Nietzsche on this point is that the sovereign individual is “autonomous and supramoral 
(for ‘autonomous’ and ‘moral’ are mutually exclusive).”85  In an obvious jab at Kant, 
Nietzsche notes the paradox of a position that touts the self-directedness of individuals in 
accordance with a universal moral law.  For one thing, the law one gives unto oneself one 
could just as easily revoke.  But more to the point, in Kant’s moral philosophy, the will 
that provides the moral law is a universal will.  It is a wholly impersonal will, and for that 
reason, it cannot properly be called self-government. The “self” that is the individual is 
not represented in the willing. 
 For Foucault, a socially imposed, universal moral code cannot be derived from 
universal reason, and that is because reason itself is not universal.  This claim is not the 
obvious quibble that there may be deviant cases of reason – for example, in mentally ill 
individuals or in children who have not yet developed fully rational capacities.  It is a 
stronger claim that reason itself is not impervious to the effects of historical 
circumstance.  Foucault speaks of wanting to know how it is that certain historical forms 
of reason came to present themselves as reason itself.86  The thought behind statements 
                                                
 84 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 2.2. 
 
 85 Ibid. 
 
 86 Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” 286. 
108 
like this one must be that there can be no rational set of principles that does not reflect a 
historical set of values.87   
 This thought is in part why Foucault cannot simply accept a structural account of 
autonomy, as Habermas does.  It matters how we come by our capacity for critical 
reflection.  And this further rules out an avenue of resistance that is proposed in Kant’s 
“Was Ist Aufklärung?”  In this essay, Kant urges us to cast off the immaturity of 
obedience to an authority figure and instead to use our reason to decide what we will and 
will not do.  Because Kant’s subject is both transcendental and empirical, the 
transcendental use of reason is free of influence from social conditions and can provide 
its own criticism of these conditions.  However, Foucault rejects this conception of the 
subject as yet another symptom of a particular, contingent power-knowledge regime.  He 
therefore has no recourse to invoke an unblemished reason against that regime.  Instead, 
Foucault will focus on the ways in which being an empirical subject has led to new forms 
of domination, and he will not accept the Kantian way out by the use of reason. 
 We have already seen, in Chapter 2, that disciplinary power thrives on the 
knowledge gained in the human sciences.  Its most important mechanism is the 
examination, applied in a variety of contexts in order to gain detailed knowledge of 
individuals and their degree of deviation from what is considered the optimum.  With 
ever-increasing refinement, disciplinary power intervenes in the everyday conduct of 
individuals and tells them how they ought to be and how they ought to behave.  Even the 
institutions of the modern liberal democratic state have taken on a more calculated and 
reflective sense of government, in which there is a conscious and deliberate calculation of 
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the most efficient means of conducting, directing, and monitoring the individuals of its 
population.88  Disciplinary power, therefore, deprives us of the control of our own lives 
that was encouraged in the ethics of the care of the self.  To be sure, there is self-
government in disciplinary societies, but it is not the self-government that comes from a 
careful examination of one’s aims and consideration of the best means of achieving them.  
Self-government in disciplinary societies is perhaps more properly characterized as self-
surveillance.  It comes from internalizing the normalizing judgment of an authority 
figure.  The lack of freedom as skillful self-management should be seen not only as a 
criticism of our institutions but of our very way of conceiving of ourselves as subjects.  It 
is viewing the subject as an object of knowledge for the human sciences that allows 
disciplinary power to get a hold on us and take over the control of our every day lives. 
 It is important to realize that it is not only the lack of skillful self-management 
that makes disciplinary power potentially unappealing.  For the ancient Greeks, there was 
a purpose to this skillful self-management.  It was intended to give a particular style to 
your life.  Individuals who are maximally free in the sense of skillful self-management 
will have what Foucault calls a “special brilliance,” and this in virtue of the fact that there 
is a deliberate structure manifest in their actions.89  It is the style of one’s life that will 
allow others to recognize you as the particular individual that you are. 
Foucault says nothing by way of argument that we need or even desire this kind 
of recognition our particularity.  However, when we consider the ways in which we are 
recognized as individuals in disciplinary power, there does seem to be something 
importantly missing.  Disciplinary power is depersonalizing.  It substitutes individuation 
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for individuality, “as the measurement of the individual that it presupposes is effected to 
the detriment of the respect of the individuals themselves.”90  Rather than encouraging 
the particularity of individual styles of living, disciplinary power individuates precisely in 
order to homogenize.  It homogenizes by turning each individual into a “case” that is an 
object of knowledge and an object of power.91 The individual is both recognized and lost 
because all of this measuring of aptitudes and capacities is intended to encourage people 
to reduce the gaps between themselves and the optimum.  Giving the student a D is both a 
measure of their performance and a punishment for having not performed better. 
Individuals are made regular, calculable, and ideally, uniform.  Here, we can return again 
to Nietzsche’s sovereign individual who is distinguished from his society of calculable, 
regular, uniform individuals who are “like among like” – the sovereign individual is “like 
only to himself.”92  In a society in which everyone is encouraged to behave in more or 
less the same way, individuality actually becomes a bad thing; it means you’re not like 
everyone else, you’re not normal.  
What is missing then, is recognition of the value of one’s particularity.  As 
subjects of the human sciences, individuals are recognized as particulars by a specific set 
of properties.  These properties depend on context, but all share the feature of being some 
form of measurement of the degree of deviation from a norm.  We can look again at the 
helpful examples of the school and the factory.  In the school, you are the person who got 
the 64% or the 98% on the exam.  In the factory, you are the person who exceeded or 
failed to meet the quota, and by such an amount.  In disciplinary power, we are points on 
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a graph and are recognized as the sum of our properties.  But there is an important 
property for which we are not recognized in disciplinary power, a recognition of a 
property that comes close to the kind of idiosyncratic recognition that was valued in the 
ethics of the care of the self and possessed by Nietzsche’s sovereign individual.  What 
disciplinary power/knowledge regimes fail to recognize is precisely the property of 
being-more-than-the-sum-of-one’s-properties. 
Though Foucault does not advocate returning to anything like an ancient Greek 
way of life, it is important that his modern Western readers feel the attractive force of a 
redefined positive sense of freedom and the value of recognition.  If Foucault’s goal is to 
make us rethink our concept of autonomy, then we must also rethink the conceptual 
structures that support it.  Since it is the human sciences that have bolstered the modern 
concept of autonomy, we would need to see that there is another way of conceiving of 
human existence.  I submit that Foucault chose the ancient Greek ethics of the care of the 
self as his focus because, rather than relying on a science of the human being, it centered 
on an “aesthetics of existence.” 
 As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, Foucault uses the phrases “arts of existence” 
and “aesthetics of existence” to describe these “intentional and voluntary actions by 
which men not only set themselves rules of conduct but also seek to transform 
themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make life into an oeuvre 
that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.”93  In a well-
known interview with Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault asks rather cryptically, “But 
couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art?  Why should the lamp or the house be an 
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art object but not our life?”94  These puzzling statements have led to the wealth of 
speculation and criticism that surround Foucault’s interest in an aesthetics of existence.  
Foucault does not specify what these “important stylistic criteria” are that we should set 
for ourselves, and one may get the sense that an aesthetics of existence is a narcissistic 
enterprise or a superficial self-styling.  In order to discover what is valuable in the idea of 
an aesthetics of existence, we should inquire as to why we might want to look to 
aesthetics as a way of life at all. 
 Johanna Oksala, in her own work Foucault on Freedom, provides a survey of the 
literature on the aesthetics of existence.  She concludes that  
Foucault’s ethics-as-aesthetics...represents an attempt to 
seek ways of living and thinking that are transgressive in 
the extent to which, like a work of art, they are not simply 
the products of normalizing power.  The target of these 
practices is not primarily the aesthetically impoverished 
forms of experience, but rather modes of normalization.95   
 
While I agree with Oksala that Foucault uses the idea of an ethics of aesthetics as a foil to  
a normalizing ethics – such as that found in disciplinary power – I think we must be more 
careful in understanding how that is accomplished.  It’s not at all clear that works of art 
are inherently transgressive or even that they are not the products of normalizing power, 
as Oksala states.  When one considers the extent to which the artworld is governed by 
experts, the artist’s need to procure funding for h/er projects, etc., it seems that works of 
art may be just as subject to normalizing tendencies as is our own subjectivity.  Oksala is 
right about the usefulness of an aesthetics of existence not because works of art are by 
nature transgressive, but because conceiving of our lives in artistic terms provides an 
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alternative to the perspective of the human sciences. As Foucault tells us in his own 
words: 
My idea is that it’s not at all necessary to relate ethical 
problems to scientific knowledge.  Among the cultural 
inventions of mankind there is a treasury of devices, 
techniques, ideas, procedures, and so on, that cannot 
exactly be reactivated but at least constitute, or help to 
constitute, a certain point of view which can be useful as a 
tool for analyzing what is going on now – and to change 
it.96 
 
In this attempt to divorce ethical problems from scientific knowledge, Foucault’s middle 
period genealogies already make the first step of provoking our dissatisfaction with the 
concept of the autonomous subject founded on the human sciences.  The later works, with 
their focus on aesthetics of existence, then help us to think outside of that framework with 
which we have become disillusioned.  An aesthetics of existence is not an inherently 
transgressive idea; rather, it is, as a matter of historical contingency, the perfect foil for 
the scientism we’ve inherited from the Enlightenment.  Foucault describes his own 
motivation in these terms when he notes that, “recent liberation movements … need an 
ethics, but they cannot find any other ethics than an ethics founded on so-called scientific 
knowledge of what the self is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on.”97  
To the extent that the aesthetics of existence provides a non-scientific way of 
conceptualizing the subject, it continues the work begun by the exposure of historical 
contingency – to divorce us from the concepts we take for granted and expand our 
freedom of imagination.  But if the recognition enjoyed by individuals in an aesthetics of 
                                                
 96 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 236. 
 
 97 Ibid.,  231. 
114 
existence is attractive, then there is a transgressive quality to conceiving of one’s life as a 
work of art that extends beyond mere imagination and enters the realm of conduct.   
To be sure, Foucault himself may be guilty of having an overly romantic view of 
the transgressive power of art and the artist.  But we need not accept a general assertion 
that art and artists are by nature transgressive in order to glean the more plausible 
message that the freedom of imagination, alone, is not enough to combat states of 
domination.  Considering what Foucault has to say not only about the ancient Greek 
aesthetics of existence but also about the role of art and the artist in modernity,98 we can 
see that adopting a style by which one can be recognized is an important part of the effort 
to expand the borders of our concepts of the subject and power.  The following chapter 
will further explore this need for recognition in order to arrive at the conclusion that 
Foucauldian freedom combines elements of a social concept of freedom with what I will 
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 Combining Foucault’s criticism of Enlightenment autonomy with his concepts of 
power and domination reveals a desideratum for the concept of Foucauldian freedom.  
That is, a Foucauldian concept of freedom must not confine itself to freedom of 
imagination or any other capacity of the individual subject.  This is because the term 
‘domination’ that ‘freedom’ would oppose already refers to the concrete interactions of 
subjects.  Foucault goes so far as to link freedom with ways of life in two of his, perhaps 
most cryptic, statements on the topic.  Foucault describes a two-way relationship between 
ethics and freedom in which ethics is “a practice of freedom” and “freedom is the 
ontological condition of ethics.”1  In the essay in which these statements appear, Foucault 
is clear that he means ‘ethics’ in the sense of ethos – “a mode of being for the subject, 
along with a certain way of acting, a way visible to others.”2  This chapter should be 
understood as an attempt to answer the question, On what concept of freedom could a 
way of life be a practice of the freedom that is its very condition of possibility?   
Any notion of freedom that is limited to a capacity of the subject – such as 
imagination or self-legislation – cannot serve as the condition of possibility for ethics as a 
way of life without reference to the ways in which those capacities are both formed and 
exercised.  Instead, a Foucauldian concept of freedom must take into account the social 
and material conditions of its own realization.  Although it may strike us as initially 
                                                
 1 Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Foucault Live, 
trans. Phillis Aranov and Dan McGrawth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), 434 and 
435. 
 
 2 Ibid, 436. 
116 
obvious that domination must refer to such a state of affairs and not merely to subjective 
capacities, a similar opposing concept of freedom has not typically been the focus of, for 
example, the liberal philosophical tradition.  From Locke, Hobbes, Kant, etc. we receive 
concepts of freedom that focus on subjective capacities while bracketing consideration of 
the conditions necessary for the exercise of these capacities.3  To see both that this is the 
case and that it is problematic, we can turn for a moment to Axel Honneth who 
distinguishes among three kinds of freedom, which he labels ‘negative’, ‘reflexive’, and 
‘social’.4   
Negative freedom is roughly characterized as a lack of external impediment to the 
realization of one’s aims.5  In such a concept of freedom, the subject is free as long as its 
actions can be regarded as a matter of individual choice.6  The problem with such a 
concept of freedom is that it does not include any reference to the manner in which the 
individual comes to make h/er choice; “instead, the causality of an inner nature…guides 
the subject’s actions and choices ‘behind its back’.”7  Not only is it the case that any aim 
the subject chooses to pursue is a valid choice deserving of pursuit unhindered by 
external impediment, it is also the case that internal impediments (e.g. fear or a lack of 
clarity about one’s own intentions) cannot count as restrictions on freedom.8  Although it 
may sound at times as if Foucault endorses such a concept of negative freedom – as 
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addressed in the previous chapter – such a concept must be insufficient for his purposes 
given his insights regarding the social formation of our aims and desires.   
The concept of reflexive freedom attempts to solve one of the problems of 
negative freedom, namely, the lack of reference to the manner in which the subject comes 
to have the aims it does.  Reflexive freedom focuses on “the subject’s relationship-to-self; 
according to this notion, individuals are free if their actions are solely guided by their 
own intentions.”9  A reflexively free individual is able to distance h/erself from h/er own 
whims and impulses in order to pursue aims that are the deliberate choice of h/er will.  
One of the most influential versions of reflexive freedom is, of course, Kantian autonomy 
in which subjects are self-governing according to self-imposed laws.  But reflexive 
freedom can also take a form more similar to what we saw of the ethics of the care of the 
self.  That is to say, reflexive freedom can consist in self-realization through a careful 
process of deliberation regarding one’s own aims.10   
Although the last chapter spent much time on the freedom of the ethics of the care 
of the self, it was not to say that this is the kind of freedom that can oppose the concept of 
Foucauldian domination.  Rather, Foucault’s discussions of the care of the self provoke 
us to reconsider our relationship to self and the very meaning of autonomy, which 
Foucault believes to have been overwhelmingly received in a narrowly Kantian sense.  
Neither concept of reflexive freedom – as autonomy or self-realization – is robust enough 
to elude the insidious forms of domination that Foucault thinks still pervade the otherwise 
seemingly liberal character of modern social life.  To understand the failures of reflexive 
freedom, we have only to inquire into the means of realizing it.  Honneth reminds us that 
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subjects “can only achieve self-determination once institutional relations within social 
reality offer opportunities to achieve [their] aims.”11  Whichever notion of reflexive 
freedom is at stake, it will “stop short of the conditions that enable the exercise of 
freedom in the first place; they artificially bracket out the institutional circumstances and 
forms that are crucial for the successful completion of the process of reflection.”12  
Contrary to a Kantian or Enlightenment concept of autonomy, ‘freedom’ as the term 
opposing ‘domination’ cannot remain isolated in the realm of reason or even the realm of 
imagination that we found to be a crucial element of freedom in the previous chapter.  
Concepts of freedom that focus solely on capacities of individual subjects ignore both the 
social conditions for realizing freedom in the world and the historically contextual and 
social formation of autonomy itself.  An appropriate concept of freedom must take into 
account both of these social dimensions of the realization of freedom. 
 The idea that the autonomy of individual subjects must be understood as a 
capacity that is socially and historically formed has been taken up by a number of 
philosophers writing on Foucault.  In particular, Amy Allen argues persuasively that 
Foucault takes issue only with the Enlightenment concept of autonomy but leaves room 
in his own thought for a revised version, which assumes instead “the impurity of practical 
reason, its embeddedness in contingent, historically specific practices, and its rootedness 
in relations of power.”13  Allen also helpfully reminds us that Foucault himself claims 
autonomy as a goal when he sets out to discover, “what is not or is no longer 
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indispensible for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects.”14  For all the 
criticism of Kantian autonomy discussed in the previous chapter, Foucault still seems to 
take some concept of autonomy to be the kind of freedom at stake when he uncovers 
hitherto unnoticed forms of domination. 
 Allen’s description of what I previously called ‘socially embedded autonomy’ 
strips Kantianism of its subject-centered transcendentalism and acknowledges that 
subjects’ capacities are culturally constituted.  This socially embedded autonomy that is 
presupposed by Foucault, on Allen’s account, amounts to a more modest statement that 
the subject has the capacities for critical reflection and deliberate self-transformation.  
The problem, though, is that this version of socially embedded autonomy cannot serve as 
the concept of freedom that would properly oppose the Foucauldian concept of 
domination.  If socially embedded autonomy of this kind is presupposed, then it cannot 
be what’s missing in states of domination unless states of domination strip us of this 
capacity or render it ineffective.  But we can clearly see that this is not the case.  In 
Foucault’s descriptions of the operation of disciplinary power, critical reflection and self-
transformation become the very tools of domination as subjects monitor and correct their 
own behavior.  Since the capacities of critical reflection and self-transformation can be 
utilized differently in different social contexts (as we saw in the previous chapter), the 
freedom we are searching for cannot merely refer to these capacities of the subject and, 
instead, must include reference to the social conditions in which these capacities are 
formed and in which they are to be realized. 
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 Allen herself takes issue with the concept of socially embedded autonomy that she 
discovers in Foucault’s works, but for reasons other than those just stated.  For Allen, the 
problem lies not in the concept of freedom itself; rather, she makes note of a problem she 
finds in Foucault’s overall characterization of socialization that has important 
ramifications for the concept of socially embedded autonomy.  Allen’s criticism, put 
simply, is that Foucault has an underdeveloped account of non-strategic interpersonal 
relationships and intersubjectivity (though, crucially, she acknowledges that Foucault 
does not deny the very possibility of such relationships).15  With her criticism, Allen 
reinforces the idea that subjects are dependent upon each other for the realization of their 
freedom and calls for a supplement to Foucault’s analyses of power that would more 
explicitly address reciprocal, cooperative relations of power.  Where Allen looks to 
Habermas and an account of communicative action to supplement Foucault’s analyses of 
power, I suggest that we turn instead to the Hegelian concept of recognition.  Although 
Allen convincingly weaves together Foucauldian and Habermasian insights, I will argue 
that the concept of recognition will both address Allen’s concerns about non-strategic 
interpersonal relationships and have the added benefit of filling in explanatory gaps in 
Foucault’s account of power as constitutive of the subject. 
 In recent years, Axel Honneth and Fred Neuhouser have sought to clarify and 
expand Hegel’s concept of mutual recognition as a condition of possibility for a “social 
concept of freedom.”16  As Honneth describes it, this neo-Hegelian concept of 
recognition incorporates into the concept of freedom itself the conditions necessary for its 
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realization.17  These conditions include other subjects who can promote or thwart the 
realization of a subject’s will as well as the social institutions that form the background 
against which subjects are intelligible to each other.  As Neuhouser formulates the 
concept of social freedom, it is a quality that can be predicated of both human subjects 
and the institutions to which they belong.  Freedom can be predicated of social 
institutions insofar as those institutions serve as the ground in which the process of 
socialization endows the subject with certain capacities and as the space in which 
freedom is to be realized.18  In Hegel’s terminology, institutions that adequately instill 
such capacities and thrive on the expression of the freedom of their members are deemed 
“rational.” 
The concept of recognition, then, incorporates both of the social dimensions of 
freedom found to be necessary for a Foucauldian concept of freedom, namely in the 
conditions for both forming an autonomous will and realizing that will in the world.  
Furthermore, because recognition has both an interpersonal and an institutional 
component, it is well suited to addressing the forms of domination that arise on these two 
levels.  Finally, and most importantly, because social freedom can be predicated of both 
subjects and institutions, it can serve as the form of freedom that is both practiced in 
ethics as a way of life and that serves as an ontological condition of ethics.  This is 
because, as we will see, in the social concept of freedom, subjects exercise their freedom 
by contributing to their community through the expression of their particular ways of 
being and free institutions are the condition for this type of freedom insofar as they foster 
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the formation and expression of these individual ways of being.  However, much more 
needs to be said about what the concept of recognition is and how it augments our 
concept of autonomy into a concept of social freedom before we can see that it is a 
suitable supplement to Foucault’s account of power. 
The Ontological Concept of Recognition  
 
 It is important to distinguish at the fore two related concepts of recognition.  On 
the one hand, the ontological concept of recognition takes relationships of mutual 
recognition to be constitutive of individual identity.  On the other hand, the ethical 
concept of recognition serves as a normative guide by claiming that the subject’s freedom 
is dependent on relationships of mutual recognition.  It is the latter ethical concept to 
which we must turn in order to construct an account of freedom that coheres with 
Foucault’s accounts of power and the subject.  However, first exploring the ways in 
which Foucault, perhaps unwittingly, presupposes the ontological concept of recognition 
will better establish the foundation for incorporating elements of the ethical concept of 
recognition in a concept of Foucauldian freedom. 
 To recognize a person, in the sense inspired by Hegel, is to assert that the person 
has a particular quality and to positively evaluate the person for having said quality.  On 
the ontological interpretation of recognition, these acts of recognition are constitutive of 
our being persons in the first place.19  There are a few ways we can interpret the idea that 
recognition is constituting, and they mirror the senses in which Chapter 1 described 
power as constituting the subject.  In the first place, recognition serves as a criterion for 
picking out the kind of entity we have in mind when we speak of persons.  Because acts 
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of recognition invoke a set of evaluative criteria, they distinguish persons “from other 
beings that they otherwise resemble in that, unlike those beings, these beings organize, or 
experience their world as organized, by values and social norms.”20  As in the discussion 
of power in Chapter 1, we are here interested in discussing human subjects insofar as they 
are responsive to social norms.  Since power and recognition are concepts that refer to the 
social interactions of human subjects, both can form the basis of a conceptual definition 
of the subject.  Just as Chapter 1 provided a conceptual definition of the subject as the 
kind of thing that can be responsive to relations of power, so too can we define the very 
same subject as the kind of thing that can perform and be subject to acts of recognition.   
 The ontological concept of recognition also serves, for Hegel, as a transcendental 
condition for self-consciousness.  Without encountering an Other, the subject would 
experience what Honneth calls “a delusion of omnipotence” – in which it believes that all 
of reality is a product of its own conscious activity – as well as failing to conceive of 
itself as a member of a genus.21  When the subject encounters another consciousness, 
both perform two acts of negation, on the Other and on themselves.  I take this statement 
to mean roughly that each subject takes the Other to be an object, and in light of the 
realization that the Other has taken it to be an object, the subject objectifies itself as well.  
In this reciprocal relationship of negation and self-negation, both subjects gain a new 
facet of self-consciousness, which might be likened to what Sartre called “being-for-
others.”  The subject comes to understand itself not as the omnipotent, world-creating 
consciousness it had previously been, but also as an object for the Other who is 
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recognized as another self-consciousness.  In order to overcome the feeling of alienation 
from self that accompanies recognition of oneself as an object for the Other, the subject 
must reidentify with the consciousness of the Other.  It is through their self-negating acts 
that the subject and the Other can encounter each other without viewing each other as 
mere objects.22  Though Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is complex and metaphysically 
laden, there is an aspect of this thought that self-consciousness is dependent on 
recognition by the Other that we can appropriate on Foucault’s behalf in addressing the 
following objection.   
As noted in the previous chapter, Béatrice Han takes issue with Foucault’s (albeit 
infrequent) use of the term ‘recognition’, in particular with the fact that he only uses the 
term to speak of a subject recognizing itself as thus and so.  For example, in The History 
of Sexuality Vol. 2, Foucault describes the ways in which individuals came to recognize 
themselves as subjects of a sexuality linked to a system of rules and constraints,23 and he 
describes his own methodological shift toward an analysis of the subject in terms of a 
search for “the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual 
constitutes and recognizes itself qua subject.”24  Han generalizes this way of speaking in 
claiming that “recognition does not take place between two consciousnesses for Foucault, 
but from self to self.”25  If Han is correct that recognition, on Foucault’s account, is 
limited to self-recognition, then she has identified a genuine problem with that account.  
                                                
 22 Ibid., 15. 
 
 23 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley, (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1990), 4. 
 
 24 Ibid., 6. 
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This way of formulating recognition as a relation to self, rather than a relation to others, 
entails that the formation of a subject’s identity is undertaken freely by the subject 
itself.26  Such an idea would signify a radical break with Foucault’s middle period 
genealogical works – in which the subject is constituted socially within relations of 
power – by instead claiming that the subject is constituted by its own reflective choices.27  
Although I earlier argued that this is a false dichotomy, Han’s claim that self-recognition 
makes no reference to an Other or to a social context would be incompatible even with 
the idea that we can reflectively constitute ourselves within the conceptual boundaries 
established by power, for ‘power’ itself already refers to a shared social context. 
However, there are passages within the same work, The History of Sexuality Vol. 
2, that complicate the idea of self-recognition.  Rather than characterizing self-
recognition as a freely chosen act on the part of the subject, Foucault speaks of subjects 
who “are obliged” to recognize themselves within various forms of sexuality28 and of 
practices by which “individuals were led…to recognize… themselves…as subjects of 
desire.”29  He describes the project of the second volume of The History of Sexuality in 
terms of determining “how, for centuries, Western man had been brought to recognize 
himself as a subject of desire.”30  Such formulations implicate an Other, even in the 
relationship of self-recognition.  To whom or to what are subjects obliged to recognize 
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themselves in various ways?  By whom or by what were subjects led or brought to their 
self-recognition? 
No doubt “power” is the Foucauldian answer to such questions, but we must 
further explicate the concept of power in the context of this discussion of recognition.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, power plays the psychological role of attaching an individual to 
h/er identity and the epistemological role of allowing individuals to be intelligible to each 
other.  It was through the concept of problematization that we first encountered this idea 
that the subject is encouraged to examine, decipher, and recognize its own identity with 
respect to particular features (e.g. desire, sexuality, deviance, etc.).  The 
problematizations by which we come to understand ourselves are the product of relations 
between power and knowledge in society.  An act of self-recognition, as an act that 
affirms an aspect of one’s identity, should therefore be understood as the result of power 
relations and problematizations that have led to the formation of that identity.   
But to speak of relations of power already reminds us that we are never detached, 
isolated individuals; instead, we are always already embedded in a continual process of 
socialization.  While Foucault’s methodological appeal to anonymous power is helpful 
insofar as it puts the subject in the position of explanandum rather than explanans, it is 
also misleading insofar as a regime of power can only be sustained by the actions of 
individuals.  We must recall that power emerges in interactions – among individuals or 
between individuals and social institutions – in which actions are motivated by appeal to 
prevalent norms and values of a particular society.  Acts of recognition, then, are a 
species of power relation that encourage the expression of certain qualities in individuals.  
An act of self-recognition, which references prevailing norms and values, must be 
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parasitic on these prior acts of social recognition and the evaluative concepts of the 
historical a priori that enable those prior acts.  Foucault notes as much when he says that 
even acts of self-constitution must occur within a social context.31  Hegel’s insight that 
recognition by the Other is a transcendental condition for the possibility of self-
consciousness can be modified here to claim that recognition by the other is a condition 
for the possibility of the relationship of self to self that defines the subject.32  Insofar as 
we are able sustain ourselves as subjects at all, we must be engaged in acts of 
recognition; in the context of discussing Hegel’s theory, Axel Honneth refers to this fact 
as an “ontological need” for recognition.33 
 Although self-recognition is not the problem that Han makes it out to be, to claim 
that Foucault unwittingly presupposes an “ontological need” for recognition may raise 
problems of its own.  Han asserts that Foucault’s work “remains haunted by a pseudo-
transcendental understanding of the subject, in which the structure of recognition, 
although experiencing different historical contents, nonetheless appears to function in 
itself as an unthematized a priori.”34  It’s important to unpack Han’s claim carefully.  The 
implication here seems to be that because the structure of recognition is “an 
unthematized a priori,” Foucault cannot escape the standpoint of the transcendental 
subject – the very standpoint he sought to move away from by analyzing the constitution 
of the subject by power.  But the crucial point that she concedes is that the “contents” of 
recognition are historically variable.  As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the relationship of 
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self to self that forms the subject is constituted differently in different power/knowledge 
regimes according to different problematizations.  In more than a trivial sense, subjects 
constituted within the ancient Greek care of the self are not the same subjects constituted 
according to the modern liberal tradition with its concept of autonomy inherited from the 
Enlightenment.  It is not merely the self-conception of the subject that changes, but the 
relationship to self that makes the subject what it is that varies across these historical 
epochs.  Foucault need not remove all traces of the transcendental in order to remain self-
consistent; instead, his starting point must never be that of the transcendental subject.  
Even with the basic structure of recognition serving as a transcendental condition for 
being a subject of any kind, the subject remains in the position of that which is to be 
explained.  As was the case in the previous chapter’s discussion of power/knowledge, 
here we should understand that, for Foucault, the concept of recognition can provide a 
lens through which one can examine the historically particular conditions of subject 
formation.   
While Hegel’s original concept of recognition as the transcendental condition for 
self-consciousness is helpful in clarifying the nature of self-recognition, it is also 
transcendental in much stronger a sense than we need attribute to Foucault.  In fact, Axel 
Honneth argues for the contemporary relevance of Hegel’s theory of recognition by 
linking it to empirical research on the psychological development of the subject through 
object relations theory.35  Although Foucault may be suspicious of even this maneuver, – 
embroiled as it is in many of the dubious anthropological commitments of the human 
sciences – nevertheless Honneth drives home the point that Hegel’s theory can be 
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detranscendentalized, and he demonstrates the relevance of this theory in a contemporary 
Western historical context.   
Amy Allen argues that Foucault historicizes Kant by replacing the categories with 
the historical a priori and that, in doing so, Foucault becomes much more Hegelian than 
Kantian.36  I would here extend Allen’s argument to say that much of the remaining 
Hegelian metaphysics can be historicized in order to better complement Foucault’s 
analyses of power and the subject.  For example, it is consistent with both Hegel’s 
account of recognition and Foucault’s descriptions of subject formation to say that, 
“recognition makes what it affects the kinds of beings they essentially are.  In other 
words, somehow, through recognition new kinds of entities come into being.”37  But For 
Foucault, the entities (the subjects) produced through acts of recognition are historically 
variable. Once we understand the background values and norms by which we are 
recognized to be historically variable, we leave behind a problematically transcendental 
concept of the world-constituting subject and can instead focus on how the subject is 
constituted through acts of recognition.   
 As noted above and in Chapter 1, there is an important psychological component 
to the constitution of the subject by power.  Although for Hegel the concept of 
recognition plays a fundamental metaphysical role in his philosophy of mind, so too does 
this concept play a psychological role as recognition provides the social feedback that 
helps to form our practical identities.  The psychological constitution of the subject 
through acts of recognition becomes all the more apparent when examined in the context 
of Foucault’s historicized account of subject formation as the creation of a relationship of 
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self to self.  As Axel Honneth describes Hegel’s use of the concept, recognition 
encourages the adoption of a self-conception by allowing the subject to identify with its 
own qualities.38  This recognition can be bestowed upon the subject by other individuals 
or by institutions (e.g. in the recognition of the legal status of a person with various rights 
granted on the basis of that institutional status).  According to Hegel, there are three 
major social institutions in which relationships of mutual recognition constitute some 
aspect of the subject’s identity, both as a self-conception and as perceived by others.  
These institutions are the family, civil society, and the state.  As Neuhouser succinctly 
describes,  
Through their participation in civil society and the family, 
individuals develop and express identities as distinct human 
beings and acquire and pursue specific interests that 
distinguish them from other members of society.  As 
citizens of the state, on the other hand, individuals attain a 
universal existence in the sense that they gain an identity 
that is shared with all other citizens and learn to discern and 
be moved by the best interest of the whole, even though 
this may conflict with some interest they have by virtue of 
their particular positions within civil society or the 
situations of their own particular families.39 
 
For our purposes, the details of Hegel’s specific accounts of each of these institutions is 
not as important as the more general idea that the subject’s identity is formed through 
interactions with other subjects within these institutions. 
 As we have seen, rather than praise these social institutions as that which creates 
and sustains our subjectivity, Foucault provokes us to be mistrustful of the ways in which 
we are constituted.  These Foucauldian insights provide a valuable source of criticism for 
traditional recognition theory as well as potential problems in reconciling that theory with 
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Foucault’s more radical statements about detachment from dominating subjection.  We 
must see, first, how recognition theory has associated the formation of our identities 
within social institutions with varieties of freedom enjoyed by subjects so formed.  We 
will then be in a position to see how Foucault’s accounts of power and subject formation 
complicate this picture of recognition as a wholly beneficial phenomenon.  The terms of 
this debate can be well established by looking at the works of Axel Honneth and Judith 
Butler as representative of its two sides. 
The Ethics of Recognition 
Freedom and Identity 
 Hegel’s concept of ethical life, to which Neuhouser and Honneth refer as “social 
freedom,” is defined by Hegel as being with oneself in an other.40  Although this 
formulation of the concept may seem puzzling, it is the key to understanding the 
relationship between individual identity and the community as a whole that enables the 
concept of social freedom to take its own conditions of possibility into account.  Roughly, 
this idea of being with oneself in another amounts to a relationship of identification.  In 
interpersonal relationships, one must be able to identify with other subjects in order to 
cultivate noninstrumental relationships that render the Other an extension of oneself 
rather than a threat to one’s own freedom.41  Recognition of one’s particular identity in 
relationships of cooperation and the endorsement of mutual ends are necessary for the 
realization of the freedom of self-determination.  On the level of the broader social order, 
recognition of one’s universal status as an equal member of the community is necessary 
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for political freedom.  One must be able to identify with the social institutions of which 
one is a member in order to endorse them as the products of one’s own will.42  In 
Elements of Philosophy of Right, Hegel details how such identifications take place within 
institutions of modern Western societies.  However, for the purpose of providing a 
plausible normative supplement to Foucault’s account of power, such details are not 
necessary or even desirable, as they risk slipping into context-transcendent claims about 
the structure of recognition and social freedom.  Rather than determining how existing 
institutions may or may not realize the ideal of social freedom,43 we should focus instead 
on clarifying the concept of social freedom itself and the ways in which it complements 
Foucault’s investigations into the operation of power.  Three features of social freedom 
are especially attractive from a Foucauldian standpoint.   
The first point is practical – that social freedom is attractive not merely from the 
point of view of Foucault’s analyses of power, but from the standpoint of a member of a 
modern Western society as well.  It is important to see that social freedom is a realistic 
alternative concept within the live options that we might be able to endorse.  Foucault is 
sensitive to the fact that through the process of socialization we become habituated to the 
operative concepts of our specific historical context and that our historical a priori sets 
limits on what is conceivable for us.44  The very fact that power operates differently in 
different historical contexts implies that different strategies of resistance will be 
necessary in these contexts; as we saw with Foucault’s interest in the arts of existence, 
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resistance requires finding a conceptual schema that can appropriately oppose the 
concepts that serve domination in a particular society.  The concept of social freedom is 
appropriate to a disciplinary context because it affords the subject recognition of h/er 
particularity.  It is within our grasp because it relies on already familiar concepts of 
freedom.  As Foucault notes, “it is part of the function of memory and culture to be able 
to reactualize any objects whatever that have already featured.  Repetition is always 
possible; repetition with application, transformation.”45 
We have seen that Foucault believes we have inherited a Kantian concept of 
autonomy that focuses too much on a single concept of freedom as the freedom of the 
universal will, and this to the exclusion of concepts of freedom that allow for individual 
self-expression.  What makes Hegel’s concept of social freedom a plausible candidate for 
our endorsement is that it does not force a substitution of some wholly other form of 
freedom in the place of Kantian autonomy.  Rather, Hegel’s concept contains within itself 
three distinct notions of freedom so that individuals will still be afforded to some degree 
the freedom of non-interference, the freedom of self-determination and autonomy, and 
finally, the freedom of identification with an overarching social structure that gives birth 
to and allows them to express their particular identities.  Because Hegel’s concept of 
social freedom is an expansion of, rather than a replacement for, the Kantian concept of 
autonomy, it is the more likely that we modern Western readers will be able to perform a 
repetition with transformation of the latter concept in order to take social freedom on 
board. 
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The second attractive feature of social freedom – with its focus on recognition as 
constitutive of our identities – is that it can play an explanatory role in Foucault’s own 
accounts of subject formation.  Hegel claims, and Honneth empirically supports the idea, 
that the attainment of political freedom is dependent upon the freedom and successful 
identity formation of subjects within other primary institutional structures.  From a 
psychological standpoint, Honneth demonstrates that “only the feeling of having the 
particular nature of one’s urges fundamentally recognized and affirmed can allow one to 
develop the degree of basic self-confidence that renders one capable of participating, with 
equal rights, in political will-formation.”46  That is to say, on a practical level, the 
recognition gained in interpersonal relationships is a prerequisite to participation in the 
political arena; therefore, the whole of the social institutions present in a community must 
provide opportunities for this recognition and affirmation of particularity.  Furthermore, 
Heikki Ikäheimo establishes the interdependence of these forms of recognition and their 
corresponding modes of freedom on the conceptual level.  On his account, in order to be 
institutionally recognized, one must first be recognized interpersonally because, as he 
puts it, “there is no collective norm administration without the administrators forming a 
‘we’ or collective coauthority by taking each other as coauthors and thereby attributing 
each other this status.”47  In other words, to be a person in the institutional sense of 
having rights is dependent on a prior interpersonal recognition of the subject as a 
legitimate “coauthority” for social and political determination because the recognition of 
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such coauthorities is itself a necessary condition for the very practice of the collective 
administration of norms.48   
What is particularly interesting about these observations from Honneth and 
Ikäheimo is that they find expression in Foucault’s description of his own methodology 
as he says, “one must analyze institutions from the standpoint of power relations, rather 
than vice versa, and that the fundamental point of anchorage of the relationships, even if 
they are embodied and crystallized in an institution, is to be found outside the 
institution.”49  Foucault’s claims, addressed in Chapter 1, about the nature of power on 
the interpersonal and institutional levels are supported by the empirical and conceptual 
orders of priority established by Honneth and Ikäheimo.  Recall that Chapter 1 described 
a kind of feedback loop between the localized and isolated relations of power between 
individuals and those discernible patterns of power that become systematized in 
institutions.50  What Ikäheimo provides through his interpretation of Hegel’s theory of 
recognition is an explanation of the mechanism by which this feedback loop becomes 
established and self-perpetuating.   
Finally, and relatedly, the acknowledgment of the interdependence of forms of 
recognition and forms of freedom helps to ensure that the ideal of freedom considers all 
facets of social life – even those within which individuals act as particulars – because this 
concept of freedom does not confine itself to the universal freedom of Kantian autonomy 
earlier criticized for giving insufficient expression to the particular self. It has already 
                                                
 48 Ibid., 350. 
 
 49 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 222. 
 
 50 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 
1990), 99. 
136 
been implied that Hegel describes a variety of ways in which an individual can be 
recognized, each of which produces a different facet of the individual’s identity.  In 
particular, Hegel describes the formation of particular practical identities on the one hand, 
and universal identities – as say, a citizen or a person with equality under the law – on the 
other.  In the formation of identity through recognition, Hegel can provide a more solid 
theoretical foundation for Foucault’s remark about the varieties of self-relation that 
constitute one and the same individual as a political subject that is different from the 
subject who seeks to fulfill its sexual desires.51  At the same time, Foucault’s descriptions 
of the classification and individuation of subjects expand Hegel’s own insights beyond 
the consideration of identity formation in ideal modern institutions.  For example, 
Foucault’s analysis of the ancient Greek care of the self includes not only the idea of 
creating an identity by which one can be recognized (in the Hegelian sense of ‘affirmed’), 
but also the idea that the identity so cultivated will tie one to certain obligations within 
the community.  The care of the self requires cultivating an ethos that “is also a way of 
caring for others…Ethos also implies a relationship with others, insofar as the care of the 
self enables one to occupy his rightful position in the city, the community, or 
interpersonal relationships.”52  By observing the different ways in which recognition 
operates in different historical contexts, Foucault demonstrates the variety of ways in 
which the particular and universal identities of individuals interact and inform one 
another.   
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 Many scholars have noted the potential tension between the subject qua particular 
individual and the subject qua universal moral and legal individual.53  But this potential 
tension was not lost on Hegel.  On the contrary, the different kinds of identities formed in 
the different institutions of recognition are the keys to solving the “problem of freedom” 
that arises from this tension.54  According to Neuhouser “individuals can be brought to 
will and work freely for the collective good of the social groups to which they belong, 
insofar as doing so is at the same time a way of giving expression to a particular identity 
that they take to be central to who they are.”55  Honneth, too, describes the relationship 
between particular and universal identities as one in which “subjects with equal rights 
could mutually recognize their individual particularity by contributing, in their own ways, 
to the reproduction of the community’s identity.”56   
 But, as was known to Hegel, this characterization of the relationship between the 
individual and the institutions of the state is one-sided and insufficient to guarantee social 
freedom.  Consider the relationship between the individual and social institutions in 
disciplinary power.  In such a regime, individuals maintain disciplinary social institutions 
whether they conform to them or deviate from them.  Indeed, the insidiousness of 
disciplinary power is that it thrives on what is phenomenologically experienced as 
deviance.  The rebellious student only serves to reinforce the standards and hierarchies 
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established by disciplinary power insofar as she still finds a place within that hierarchy, 
rather than questioning the very system of grades, attendance, pedagogical goals, etc.  
Social freedom, then, cannot be gained solely by the maintenance of social institutions.  
Rather, the institutions themselves must foster socialization in such a way as to provide 
recognition of the particularity of their individual members.  As discussed at the end of 
Chapter 3, disciplinary institutions do not provide this recognition; they are designed to 
encourage conformity, to homogenize by measuring and reducing the gaps between 
individuals, to individuate rather than individualize.  Hence, the interdependence of forms 
of recognition and forms of freedom becomes crucial insofar as it places a constraint on 
the kinds of institutions that will count as free and rational.  Disciplinary institutions are 
criticizable from within a Hegelian framework on the grounds that they provide 
insufficient means of expression for subjects in their particularity. 
  Given that recognition theory is able to address at least some of the concerns 
raised by Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power, it seems that we are left with a rosy 
picture of recognition in which individuals are assured of their freedom through 
participation in free, rational institutions.  Indeed, Hegel has been criticized as merely 
attempting to justify the status quo through a demonstration that the institutions of his 
own society in 19th-century Europe were in fact rational.  However, by the very attempt 
to overcome the potential tension between particular and universal identities, Hegel 
admits the possible failure of social institutions to guarantee the successful recognition 
that would produce subjects who are fully socially free.  Modern scholars such as 
Neuhouser and Honneth therefore take up the normative implications of Hegel’s social 
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theory as a useful toolset for social criticism.57  For example, Honneth discusses the ways 
in which the disastrous emotional consequences of failures of recognition can motivate 
social movements.58  Interestingly, Foucault seems to acknowledge the same motivational 
force of failures of recognition as he notes the “series of oppositions which have 
developed over the last few years: opposition to the power of men over women, of 
parents over children, of psychiatry over the mentally ill, of medicine over the 
population, of administration over the ways people live.”59  What is noteworthy about 
Foucault’s descriptions of such oppositions is that, without using the term, he clearly 
views them as struggles for recognition:  
They are struggles which question the status of the 
individual: on the one hand, they assert the right to be 
different and they underline everything which makes 
individuals truly individual.  On the other hand, they attack 
everything which separates the individual, breaks his links 
with others, splits up community life, forces the individual 
back on himself and ties him to his own identity in a 
constraining way.60  
 
In this passage, Foucault is describing the tension between the recognition of the 
particularity of the subject and the recognition of that subject as a valid and equal 
participant in the community – the very tension the concept of social freedom seeks to 
ease. 
 While Honneth focuses on the ways in which the feeling of failures of recognition 
can be motivating, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, to the contrary, intended to demonstrate 
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that the subjective sense that one is unfree may in fact be due to a limited understanding 
of what freedom ought to entail.  Fred Neuhouser clearly articulates the distinction 
between subjective and objective freedom found in Hegel’s work and, like Honneth, 
believes that a subjective lack of freedom can provide clues about defects in our social 
institutions. For social freedom to be actualized, it must contain both the objective 
component, “rational laws and institutions must furnish the basic social conditions 
necessary for realizing the freedom (in a variety of senses) of all individuals” and the 
subjective component, “it must be possible for all social members to affirm those 
freedom-realizing laws and institutions as good and thus to regard the principles that 
govern their social participation as coming from their own wills.”61 
 With this distinction in mind, it seems that Foucault’s aim is quite the opposite of 
Hegel’s.  If we characterize Foucault’s project in these Hegelian terms, we can see that 
rather than hoping to demonstrate the rationality of modern social institutions and thereby 
reconcile us to them, Foucault seeks to prompt our dissatisfaction with our social 
institutions in the hope that we will no longer feel ourselves to be free once we fully 
grasp the meaning of social freedom.  Just as Hegel had to redefine freedom in order to 
attempt the demonstration of our objective freedom, Foucault has to redefine freedom to 
demonstrate our objective domination.  As earlier noted, disciplinary power allows us all 
the freedom of reflection, deliberation, and self-transformation that a reflexive concept of 
freedom would prescribe.  It is only by redefining freedom as social freedom that we can 
see that recognition of the particularity of the individual is lacking in disciplinary 
power/knowledge regimes.   
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 Thus far we have seen several reasons to think that the concept of social freedom 
with its emphasis on recognition is preferable to a concept of freedom as Kantian 
autonomy.  The concept of social freedom considers the conditions necessary for its own 
actualization, and it takes seriously the ontological need for recognition as requisite for 
being a subject.  But there is a further aspect of this concept that speaks in its favor.  
Recall that at the end of Chapter 3, I argued that Foucault leaves it to us his readers to 
decide whether it is problematic that disciplinary power denies recognition of the 
subject’s particularity.  Although he is not prescriptive, it is undeniable that Foucault’s 
descriptions of the operation of disciplinary power are designed to make us feel, at the 
very least, uncomfortable.  With the concept of social freedom, we are able to articulate 
the source of our discomfort at the thought that we are being made regular, calculable, 
like among like.  That is because social freedom takes seriously another kind of need for 
recognition beyond the ontological.  Neuhouser calls this “a spiritual need” that human 
individuals have “to experience themselves as belonging integrally to a greater social 
reality, a reality whose significance and being transcend their own particular projects and 
finite life span.”62  Although Foucault would be unlikely to endorse the idea that this is a 
spiritual need (for such a term is too metaphysically loaded), we can easily move away 
from that descriptor to claim instead that it is a psychological need, perhaps even a need 
that arose historically but of which we cannot now rid ourselves.63 
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human needs that are nevertheless historically constituted.  In particular, Nietzsche mentions a need for 
meaning for our suffering as a “new need” in Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter 
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Recognition as Domination 
 
 Though social freedom and the need for recognition can play important 
explanatory and normative roles as supplements to Foucault’s account of power, it is this 
spiritual or psychological need for recognition that is at the same time the basis for a line 
of criticism of recognition theory.  Judith Butler poses a deep challenge to the project of 
integrating recognition theory into a Foucauldian concept of freedom because she argues 
that this need for recognition is the source of our domination.  In fact, Butler situates 
herself perfectly to criticize all that I have said thus far about both contemporary 
recognition theory and its applicability in a Foucauldian social theory:  she establishes the 
need for recognition in psychoanalytic terms – very similarly to Honneth’s own approach 
on the topic – and then argues on Foucauldian grounds that this need is systematically 
exploited to perpetuate our subjection.  Butler’s main concern is summarized as follows: 
“where social categories guarantee a recognizable and enduring social existence, the 
embrace of such categories, even as they work in the service of subjection, is often 
preferred to no social existence at all.”64  This observation that we accept and perpetuate 
subjugating identities because they guarantee our social existence is the basis of two 
criticisms, one leveled against Foucault and the other against recognition theory.  Both 
criticisms threaten the project of integrating the concept of social freedom into a 
Foucauldian social theory. 
 In the first place, Butler uses recognition theory to criticize Foucault for taking 
insufficient account of the need for a socially recognized identity.  She takes particular 
issue with Foucault’s statement that, “maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what 
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we are, but to refuse what we are.  We have to imagine and to build up what we could be 
to get rid of this kind of political ‘double bind,’ which is the simultaneous 
individualization and totalization of modern power structures.”65  If Neuhouser and 
Butler are correct that there is a need – spiritual or psychological – to have our identities 
socially recognized, then refusing such identities is psychologically damaging.  If Hegel 
and Honneth are correct that recognition is necessary for being a subject at all, then 
refusing the identities by which we’re recognized is psychological suicide.  On Butler’s 
interpretation of Foucault, he is careless in failing to realize the impossibility of refusing 
our identities.  But if I am also correct that Foucault’s account of subject formation 
presupposes a kind of recognition theory, then Butler’s criticism would render his 
thought not merely careless but internally inconsistent. 
 With respect to the passage Butler chooses as exemplary of the problem she finds 
in Foucault, he thankfully tempers his language in such a way as to avoid the position 
that Butler is right to criticize.  In the passage quoted above from “The Subject and 
Power,” Foucault does not simply call for a refusal of all identity, but of a specific “kind 
of individuality” – that totalizing individuality of disciplinary power.66  However, it 
would be disingenuous to claim that the fact that Butler has overstated the case with 
respect to this passage means that her criticism fails.  In fact, we can bolster her argument 
by taking note of an interview in which Foucault expresses admiration for thinkers such 
as Bataille, Nietzsche, Blanchot, et al. for whom “experience has the function of 
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wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself, or that 
it is brought to its annihilation or its dissolution.  This is a project of desubjectivation.”67 
 We can make a similar attempt to temper Foucault’s statement here by putting 
this quotation in its context.  In this interview, Foucault mentions these thinkers and their 
view of experience by way of contrast with the tradition of phenomenology, which 
focuses on quotidian experiences and “the sense in which the subject that I am is indeed 
responsible, in its transcendental functions, for founding that experience together with its 
meanings.”68  Foucault therefore admires thinkers who have contributed to dissolving this 
phenomenological concept of the subject by focusing on limit-experiences that strain our 
ability to remain a coherent meaning-giving subject.  The refusal of identity in this case, 
then, might be viewed as a (rhetorically loaded) reiteration of Foucault’s destabilization 
of the transcendental subject.   
However, we mustn’t be too hasty in attempting to interpret away the problem 
raised by Butler.  The fact that Foucault uses the term ‘desubjectivation’ is undeniably 
problematic.69  In the technical sense employed by Foucault, ‘subjectivation’ refers to the 
process of subject formation; not this or that form of subject formation as it occurs in a 
specific historical context, but the general process which has yet to have its historical 
contents filled in.  If, in this interview, Foucault is using the term in his own technical 
sense then he does seem to call for just the kind of radical refusal of identity that we, with 
Butler, should oppose on conceptual and psychological grounds.  By using a 
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psychoanalytic version of some of recognition theory’s fundamental assumptions, Butler 
establishes a constraint that prevents us from following Foucault in his most radical 
visions of what resistance might entail.  We must realize that there are limitations to the 
kinds of self-transformation that are possible within a Foucauldian social theory, namely, 
that we cannot dispense with our social identities altogether and must, instead, search for 
modes of subjectivation that are less dominating. 
 However, Butler’s second criticism, of recognition theory itself, would cast grave 
doubt on the possibility of establishing such non-dominating forms of subject formation.  
Butler doesn’t just claim that we must prefer subjugating forms of identification to the 
absence of all such identification; she further implies that any constitution of the subject 
through recognition must be dominating because recognition invokes pre-established 
norms and values beyond the subject’s control.  As Butler puts it,  
bound to seek recognition of its own existence in 
categories, terms, and names that are not of its own 
making, the subject seeks the sign of its own existence 
outside itself, in a discourse that is at once dominant and 
indifferent.  Social categories signify subordination and 
existence at once.  In other words, within subjection, the 
price of existence is subordination.70 
 
If Butler were here using the term ‘subjection’ in the technical Foucauldian sense, then 
she would be articulating a version of his criticism of disciplinary power – that it 
produces subjects who must subordinate their particularity in order to achieve social 
recognition.  However, the subjection of disciplinary power is not a result of the fact that 
social categories are part of the historical a priori that exists prior to the subject’s 
constitution and beyond its control, as Butler suggests.   
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To make matters worse, it is not at all clear that Butler does have a technical 
Foucauldian sense of subjection in mind, as she seems to use the terms ‘subjection,’ 
‘subjectivation,’ and ‘subjugation’71 interchangeably.72  To see that Butler is speaking 
much more generally than the term ‘subjection’ might indicate, we need only see that she 
asserts, absent historical contextualization, that “to desire the conditions of one’s own 
subordination is required to persist as oneself” because “one is dependent on power for 
one’s very formation [and] that formation is impossible without dependency.”73  In 
passages such as these, Butler seems to take it for granted that power is domination, that 
subject formation is the same as subjection, and that dependency is the same thing as 
subordination.74  Enough has been said in Chapter 2 to dispense with the idea that these 
concepts are conflated in Foucault’s works, and I see nothing in the works of Hegel, 
Honneth, or Neuhouser to suggest that such equations exist in their versions of 
recognition theory either.  The fact that we can distinguish between power and 
domination, subjectivation and subjection, dependency and subordination means that, in 
principle, recognition need not always result in subjection.  Although the general 
criticism that recognition is pernicious gains no purchase on either Foucault’s social 
theory or recognition theory, the more modest claim that an illusion of recognition can 
pacify resistance – as we’ve already touched upon in the case of disciplinary power – is a 
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reasonable concern.  We must therefore take care to ensure that acts of recognition are 
genuine insofar as they not only involve a discourse of affirmation of particularity, but 
also provide the material conditions that serve to confirm that affirmation.75 
 But if we modify Butler’s concern about the subordinating effect of recognition, it 
may cut deeper than she herself even realizes.  What I take to be the greatest problem yet 
to be sufficiently addressed by recognition theory is the fact that genuine acts of 
recognition can perpetuate dominating power structures.  Amy Allen raises this problem 
in explicitly Foucauldian terms as she asks, “does Honneth’s account of power in terms 
of morally motivated struggles for recognition in the lifeworld actually do justice, as 
Honneth aims to do, to the insights of Foucault’s analysis?”76  Allen provides an example 
of the troubling role recognition can play in perpetuating gender stereotypes.  We are to 
imagine Elizabeth, a five-year-old girl, who finds her parents’ love expressed in 
statements that reinforce the values of beauty, obedience, and personal relationships 
rather than achievements.77  Allen describes the effects of such acts of recognition in 
terms that resonate with Butler’s (less nuanced) criticism:  
[Elizabeth] is receiving recognition (through the vehicle of 
parental love) and subordinating gender ideology in a 
single stroke.  And because Elizabeth has been receiving 
love and gender subordination in a single stroke for as long 
as she has been alive, and for all that time has been unable 
to assess that gender ideology critically because she hasn’t 
yet fully developed the requisite capacity for autonomy, she 
is likely to form a psychic attachment to those 
subordinating modes of femininity that may prove, in 
adulthood, quite difficult to shake.78 
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The trouble for recognition theory is that the acts of recognition on the part of Elizabeth’s 
parents are entirely genuine.  They affirm real aspects of the child’s identity, they afford 
her the approval of her community, and, as we know too well, conformity to gender 
stereotypes can have real material benefit while non-conformity can result in loss of 
opportunities.79  We cannot, therefore, claim that Elizabeth is struggling against a failure 
of recognition; insofar as she has her individual identity recognized and is able to 
participate within her community, she is unlikely to feel the damaging emotional 
motivation to struggle at all.  Nevertheless, the perpetuation of gender stereotypes is a 
form of domination as it teaches (primarily female) children that what makes them 
valuable is their confinement to specific roles and a lack of ambition to be recognized for 
qualities that are available candidates for recognition in other members of the 
community.  Here Foucault can helpfully inform and modify recognition theory by 
acknowledging the dominating effects of such acts of recognition.  To put it in 
Foucauldian terms, what enables us to determine that systematic acts of recognition such 
as those that reinforce subordinating gender identity are indeed forms of domination is 
that they establish fixed, asymmetrical ascriptions of value to individuals.  
The Openness Principle 
 With this Foucauldian insight woven into recognition theory, we are in a better 
position to inquire into the conditions that make struggle possible even in such cases 
where a “psychic attachment” is formed to one’s subordinating identity.  There is an 
interesting point of intersection among Foucault, Honneth, and Butler in the idea that acts 
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of recognition in the service of the prevailing power structure cannot completely account 
for what the subject is to become.  As Foucault describes it, “the relationship between 
power and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot therefore be separated…At the very heart 
of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will 
and the intransigence of freedom.”80  As a result of this recalcitrance on the part of the 
individual, the extension of power into ever more realms of life only serves to better 
define its limitations.81  Honneth and Butler both seem to endorse the same kind of idea, 
as Butler describes the “inassimilable remainder” of the subject that “marks the limits of 
subjectivation” and Honneth claims that subjects may sense “inner impulses to act in a 
way that is hampered by the rigid norms of society.”82  
 I would argue that this inassimilable remainder is inseparable from the freedom of 
imagination discussed in Chapter 3 as a necessary component of Foucauldian freedom.  
To see that the ability to conceive of alternatives outside of the paradigm of what is 
socially endorsed is a necessary addition to recognition theory, we have only to consider 
real historical struggles for recognition such as the civil rights and women’s liberation 
movements.  In order for marginalized groups to resist the rigid norms of society, they 
must have at least the freedom to imagine that they may one day win the struggle for 
recognition.  Honneth makes a similar point83 in The Struggle for Recognition, but goes 
further in claiming that the struggle itself can result in the reclamation of the self-respect 
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that was lost by the denial of recognition.84  Furthermore, the struggle for broad social 
recognition can itself provide recognition of a more limited scope.  In identifying oneself 
as a part of a particular struggle, one gains the identity of a member of a group in which 
fellow members (if not society at large) can receive mutual affirmation of their needs, 
judgments, skills, etc.85  Without being overly sanguine, we must not forget that real 
material changes in circumstance have been the result of such broad social movements 
and that some gain is made through the struggle itself prior to any resolution. 
 Where the case of Elizabeth warns us of the dangers of placing unequal 
constraints on the qualities that we may recognize in others, consideration of the benefits 
of the struggle for recognition reminds us that recognition is still a worthy goal.  
However, even such broad social movements may not be radical enough to capture the 
sense of the “inassimilable remainder” that Butler has in mind.  After all, such social 
movements tend not to resist all social classification; rather, they expand existing 
classifications in important ways.  Butler seems to suggest the more extreme idea that we 
ought to recognize even identities that entail the wholesale rejection of social categories 
and embrace the desubjectivation – for which she criticized Foucault – that amounts to “a 
willingness not to be.”86  Perhaps such a rejection can be found in modern movements 
that object to the binary classification of ‘straight’ and ‘gay’ or to the idea that there are 
two discrete genders.  But even in such movements, the demand for these identities to be 
recognized requires that they be articulable, perhaps not within existing social categories, 
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but by broadening these categories and creating new ones.87  Even in such movements, 
group members can identify with one another, if only by recognizing each other under the 
category of “those who reject existing categories.”  I would therefore soften Butler’s 
point in asserting that the remainder that is inassimilable in a given set of social 
categories may provide the impetus to expand social categories and allow for new forms 
of recognition. 
Foucault himself seems to call for an expansion of forms of recognition in 
passages such as that mentioned above in connection with Butler, that we must refuse the 
identities formed within disciplinary power/knowledge regimes if we understand those 
identities to be those which deny us the recognition of our particularity.  He similarly 
appeals to us to shake off ready-made formulas of interpersonal relationships of love88 
and says that we “should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative 
activity,” which, as I understand it, would call for imagining more and different 
opportunities for recognition.89 
Once we understand that recognition is a Foucauldian goal and that expanding the 
varieties of recognition available in a given society requires struggle, we are able to make 
sense of Foucault’s call for resistance.  In Foucault’s works, it is considerably more 
common to find him use the word ‘resistance’ (rather than ‘freedom’) in contrast to 
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‘domination.’90  Yet, I have not sought to define ‘resistance,’ instead choosing to focus 
on a concept of social freedom that would be the proper contrast to a Foucauldian 
concept of domination.  But I have not overlooked the crucial role played by resistance in 
Foucault’s social theory.  Prior to establishing the concepts of domination and freedom, it 
was not possible to determine what was in need of resistance or why we should resist.  It 
is only now that we are able to give a definition of ‘resistance’ as a struggle for 
recognition that promotes social freedom.  To return to the question with which I began 
this chapter, we can make sense of the idea that ethics is a practice of freedom insofar as 
ways of life that demand to be recognized become acts of resistance that promote the 
social freedom that then, in turn, becomes the condition of possibility for ethics via the 
constitution of particular identities that continue to demand recognition.   
 Recognition does, therefore seem to be a primary goal within Foucault’s social 
theory, and we have seen that the tacit acceptance of both the ontological and ethical 
concepts of recognition plays a variety of explanatory roles in his works.  It is crucial that 
we realize, however, that Foucault’s commitment to a concept of social freedom via 
recognition does not necessitate the appropriation of the normative detail of Hegel’s, or 
even Honneth’s, social theory.  That is to say, as discussed above and in Chapter 3, 
Foucault’s concept of subjectivation through recognition radically underdetermines both 
the features of the subject that should or will be recognized and what the specific 
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demands for recognition in acts of resistance will entail.  For Foucault, such matters 
cannot be settled a priori, or even in abstraction from historical context.  
 Foucault neither prescribes the specific qualities that ought to be recognized nor 
specifies the criteria for excluding certain forms of recognition.  Because the normative 
principles of recognition must be worked out from within a given historical context, we 
should characterize Foucault’s normative stance as that of a coupling of a general concept 
of social freedom with a metaethico-political openness principle committing us to acts of 
resistance that would attempt to push the boundaries of recognition so that we may affirm 
previously unimagined ways of life.91  Realizing the extent to which forms of recognition 
are subject to historical change should enable us to be more flexible about adhering to 
specific categories within our own context.  A principle of openness with respect to 
recognized ways of life forces us to challenge our own normative limits.  Such a 
challenge can encourage experimentation with unconventional modes of identification.  
Furthermore, even those disinclined to such experimentation in their own lives will be 
better equipped to imagine a possible space of existence for those who appear to defy 
conceivable labels.  The openness principle therefore serves as a foil for the kind of 
recognition found in disciplinary and normalizing relations of power in which there is an 
insistence on conformity to categories, even where those categories mark out and specify 
modes of deviation.   
An openness principle may seem absurd if we take it to mean that all ways of life 
ought to be socially affirmed.  Even more traditional contemporary recognition theory 
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does not claim that all qualities of the subject must be recognized in order to ensure social 
freedom, that “the freedom of finding one’s own destiny must be liable to general 
restrictions.  But there can be social rules and institutions which leave more room for 
such a search than others.”92  Guided by a principle of openness with respect to granting 
recognition, our social rules and institutions will be more inclined to leave room for self-
creation. 
Furthermore, the thought that we ought to persistently resist the limitations of our 
social categories through a principle of openness is precisely the kind of “constant 
checking”93 that Foucault would have us perform on our own historical contexts.  A 
principle of openness with respect to relations of recognition and power relations more 
generally helps us to maintain vigilance with respect to the tendency of power relations to 
become cemented situations of domination.  Openness to new forms of recognition 
facilitates an expansion of social freedom because, as Honneth states, “with every value 
that we can affirm by an act of recognition, our opportunities for identifying with our 
abilities and attaining greater autonomy grow.”94  A metaethico-political principle 
demanding new forms of recognition must be the primary ethical principle of Foucault’s 
social theory because only societies guided by such a principle will be capable of 
realizing the social freedom in which institutions both constitute the particular identities 
of individuals and become strengthened by the expression of those identities.  
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 The project of social criticism should both diagnose the central dangers of the 
present and help us to navigate a course toward progressive social change.  In order to 
accomplish these aims, we need an account of power in all its complexity as well as a 
concept of freedom that can serve as our normative guide.  While there can be little doubt 
that Foucault’s accounts of power and subjection contribute to the former goal of social 
criticism, whether he contributes to the latter has been a source of much debate in the 
Foucault literature.  The principal aim of this dissertation has been to demonstrate the 
strengths of Foucault’s accounts of power and subject formation in terms of both of these 
goals of social criticism by examining what he means by ‘power’ and defining a concept 
of freedom that is compatible with his warnings about subjection.   
 However, it is sometimes believed that Foucault’s account of power is 
incompatible with concepts of freedom that would help us to overcome the dangers 
revealed by the diagnosis of the present in terms of power.  The belief in this tension 
between power and freedom creates a perceived division between thinkers such as 
Foucault and Butler on one side and Habermas and Honneth on the other.  In my opinion, 
there are no winners in the debate between Foucault and critical theory as typically 
characterized.  On the one hand, so the story goes, Foucault and Butler assert that 
freedom is impossible because our subjectivity is an inescapable source of domination.  
On the other hand, Habermas and Honneth are thought to rely on naïve and utopian ideas 
of the purity of autonomy and the impossibility of subordinating forms of recognition.  
My project contributes to the dissolution of this debate by demonstrating that no such 
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simplistic description of Foucault’s work does him justice.1  To this end, I argue that 
Foucault maintains an implicit commitment to much of the work of recognition theory in 
terms of the ontological explanation of our constitution as subjects through relations of 
power.  We can therefore redescribe the concept of social freedom as found in 
recognition theory in terms compatible with Foucault’s analyses of subjectivation. 
 The first step of my project, then, has been to clarify Foucault’s account of power 
so that domination becomes only a subset of power relations more generally.  Much of 
the criticism of Foucault’s account of power stems from the conflation of the concepts of 
power and domination, resulting in the idea that if “power is everywhere” then there is no 
escaping domination.2  However, as Chapter 1 made clear, ‘power’ is the more general 
term for the guiding of behaviors in social interactions, and it is only states of 
domination, a subset of power relations, that are negatively characterized as asymmetrical 
relations that have become difficult to reverse or render reciprocal.   
 With this distinction in hand, I examined Foucault’s account of subject formation 
in the hope of carefully navigating a path between the reality of our subjection and the 
possibility of our freedom.  While Foucault’s analysis of subjection serves as an 
important caution against the dominating tendencies of our modes of identification, it 
should not be read as a wholesale rejection of the concept of subjectivity as inherently 
dominating.   I argue that Foucault’s genealogical period with its diagnosis of subjection 
is wholly compatible with, and indeed inseparable from, his ethical period with its 
                                                
1 Amy Allen similarly contributes to the dissolution of the so-called “Foucault Habermas debate” in a 
number of texts, perhaps most notably The Politics of Our Selves. 
 




emphasis on self-transformation.  Read as two sides of a coin, these periods of Foucault’s 
work establish the terms in which we must understand the ethico-political struggle in 
which we constantly find ourselves as subjects of self-transformation embedded in 
identity-constituting relations of power. 
 I then turned, in Chapter 3, to Foucault’s criticism of the Kantian concept of 
autonomy as taking insufficient account of the ways in which our subjective capacities 
are formed within processes of socialization.  This chapter investigated more deeply 
Foucault’s analysis of subjection in order to uncover the means by which we are 
dominated by our current relations to ourselves as subjects.  Part of this investigation 
involved a comparison between the Enlightenment concept of autonomy and the ancient 
Greek concept of freedom as self-management.  This comparison was offered in order to 
demonstrate the historical contingency of the Enlightenment concept of autonomy and to 
provoke the freedom of our imagination with respect to how we understand ourselves as 
subjects.  Through this comparison, Foucault reveals that new forms of domination were 
allowed to flourish thanks to their adoption of a (roughly) Kantian concept of the subject 
and its autonomy.  In doing so, he gestures toward attractive features of the ancient Greek 
ethics of the care of the self that we may wish to reclaim through a transformation 
appropriate to our own historical context. 
 One such feature is the recognition – in the sense of affirmation – of the 
particularity of the individual.  In Chapter 4, I argue that the recognition that plays an 
explanatory role in Foucault’s account of subjectivation also plays an ethical role in his 
criticism of the present age.  Foucault describes contemporary power struggles in terms 
that resonate with Axel Honneth’s descriptions of struggles for recognition and calls for 
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imagining new or different ways of life that would demand such recognition.  It is 
Foucault’s statements about ethics as a way of life that led me to consider the concept of 
social freedom found in recognition theory as a viable concept to supplement Foucault’s 
account of power.   
I argued that a roughly Hegelian concept of social freedom can make sense of 
Foucault’s statements that freedom is a condition of the possibility for ethics and that 
ethics is a practice of freedom.  This is because the concept of social freedom takes 
seriously the idea that the autonomy of the individual is both created and expressed 
within social institutions.  Furthermore, the concept of social freedom adapted from 
Hegel in recognition theory takes recognition of the particularity of the individual to be 
an indispensible component of the exercise of freedom.  Therefore, I argued, Foucault 
must adopt something like a historically contextualized version of the Hegelian concept 
of social freedom in combination with a metaethico-political openness principle that 
would call for the constant testing of the limits of recognition through acts of resistance. 
 Though I believe this union of Foucault and recognition theory provides fruitful 
insight for the project of social criticism, there are still theoretical questions left to answer 
another day.  These considerations correspond to the two sides of social criticism: the 
diagnosis of present injustice and setting us on the path of progress.  Both of these 
considerations stem from the position of the genealogist or social critic within h/er 
historical context.  In the first place, we are left to wonder how the social critic is able to 
gain the necessary critical distance from h/er historical context in order to diagnose the 
problems that arise from the historical a priori in which h/er own subjectivity was 
formed.  This concern can be read as a version of Nancy Fraser’s worry that we could be 
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so thoroughly normalized as to be unable to grasp the dangers inherent in our own 
power/knowledge regime.  The second concern pertains to how we are able to judge 
whether acts of recognition are subordinating, given that our normative standards are 
necessarily informed by our historical context.  With this second concern we encounter 
the threat of relativism and risk being unable to make judgments across historical or 
cultural lines. 
 In addressing the second concern, evaluating acts of recognition may require us to 
turn, as Honneth suggests, to a concept of progress equipped with “a moderate value 
realism.”3  Whether Foucault can make room for any such value realism is debatable.  
Amy Allen states that there is at least room in Foucault’s thought for us to take our own 
values, such as egalitarian reciprocity, to be universal as long we recognize the context 
dependence of the concepts of universality and context transcendence.4  However, it’s not 
clear to me that we can acknowledge this context dependence without thereby inviting 
back the specter of relativism.  I would argue that Foucault’s definitions of domination 
and power more generally do seem to suggest that he presupposes the universality of the 
value of mutual recognition.  Given that recognition is understood as a condition of 
subject formation, it is an appropriate and perhaps unique value to uphold as universal.  
Furthermore, given his emphasis on the context dependence of the forms that even 
recognition must take, Foucault can only suggest a very general principle for assessing 
the dangers of the present age on the basis of recognition.   
                                                
 3 Axel Honneth, The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition, trans. Joseph Ganahl (Malden, 
MA: Polity Press, 2012), 83. 
 
 4 Amy Allen, The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical 
Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 180. 
160 
I submit that it is the general openness principle that allows us to address both of 
the concerns regarding the historical situatedness of the social critic.  In terms of the first 
worry, that the social critic cannot escape h/er own historical context, the openness 
principle with its call for the persistent testing of limits based on imaginative 
reconceptions of ourselves is befitting of Foucault's ethico-political stance that 
"everything is dangerous."  This principle is the logical extension of Foucault's own 
position: "if everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.  So my 
position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism.” 5  Social criticism 
guided by the openness principle can help to generate social change whatever the 
historical context.   
But in evaluating the benefit of such social transformation, I take it as a positive 
feature of the openness principle, rather than a deficiency, that it prescribes no specific 
content to the form that struggles for recognition should or will take or to the forms of 
reciprocity and recognition that our social institutions ought to embody.  The openness of 
the principle is befitting of Foucault’s stance that “criticism is no longer going to be 
practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value.”6  It will only be 
through real acts of social resistance in the struggle for recognition that we will be able to 
determine the values that lead to genuine social progress with the openness principle 
providing “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”7 
 
                                                
 5 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 232. 
 
 6 Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment” in The Essential Foucault, ed. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas 
Rose (New York: The New Press, 2003), 53. 
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